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The water crisis is essentially a crisis of governance. 
 
-The United Nations World Water Development Report 
 
 
 
The time is fast approaching when water can no longer be viewed in isolation by one 
institution or any one group of professionals without explicit and simultaneous 
consideration of other related sectors and issues and vice versa. 
 
 -Asit K. Biswas, Stockholm Water Prize recipient 
 
 
The 21
st
 century will be the century of the city, but this fact has not yet been fully 
appreciated. 
 
-Michael Harcourt, Chair, Prime Minister‘s External Advisory Committee on 
Cities and Communities, Canada. 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Geography is destiny.  In his masterpiece, Europe Between the Oceans, the 
distinguished archeologist Barry Cunliffe writes that in human history ―geography 
provides the stage with all its constraints and opportunities‖ (Cunliffe 2008, viii), and 
that it is the complex interaction of humans with their environment that provides the 
content of that history.  In North America, geography brings Canada and the United 
States face-to-face across a shared 9,000 kilometer border, provides much of the 
content of the domestic and bilateral relations that bind them across the 49
th
 parallel, 
and suffuses these relations with their central motif which is the indelible tension 
between economic and environmental aims.  In terms of the economy, Cunliffe 
observes that ―geography determines that natural resources are not evenly distributed‖ 
(26), and it is this innate imbalance which drives the social, political and economic 
interactions between the two countries, finding its most forceful expression in the free 
trade era, and the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), which has increased cross-border trade between Canada and the United 
States fifteen-fold within the last three decades (Brunet-Jailly 2008, 109).  Much of 
that exchange is driven by what is the largest energy trade relationship in the world 
based on Canada‘s seemingly endless natural resources and the United States‘ 
seemingly endless demand.  At the same time, the fact that half the border cuts across 
three-hundred shared water basins composed of lakes and rivers has also thrust the 
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two countries together into environmental cooperation to protect these watersheds 
from the air and water pollution emanating from increasing industry, transportation 
and other fossil-fuel based activities.  That the first permanent joint institution 
established by Canada and the United States was the International Joint Commission 
(IJC), created a century ago by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to settle and 
prevent disputes emanating from the use of transboundary water bodies, illustrates the 
importance of the environmental dimension to these bilateral relations.  Hence, no 
dynamic has solidified and simultaneously strained these relations more so than the 
increase in economic trade and the increased concern over management of shared 
ecosystems coming under growing pressure from transboundary pollution and other 
derivatives of a globalized North American economy.  As a result, in short, no other 
dynamic has catalyzed closer cross-border linkages and integration than the 
environmental-economic nexus. 
This observation is supported by the fact that cross-border linkages in North 
America are concentrated around flows of trade (see Figure 1) and shared ecosystems 
(see Figure 2) leading to the formation of four distinct clusters or cross-border regions 
where those linkages are thickest and most intense (Policy Research Institute, 2005). 
In addition to serving as a catalyst for these bilateral relations, more than ever, 
geography is prompting the United States and Canada to re-consider, adapt, and re-
scale the structures which govern their flow.  This is particularly evident in the sphere 
of bilateral environmental policy due to a growing understanding of the fundamental 
mismatch that exists between geography and the political institutions erected thus far 
to manage the numerous shared ecosystems at the border.  The two societies, 
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proceeding from a territorialized understanding of nature, have historically sought to 
impose governance systems that are territorially fixed upon natural resources like 
lakes and rivers that are fluid and governed by hydrological laws which transcend 
socially-constructed political boundaries (Norman 2009) and exceed the scope of 
state sovereignty and the capacity of any one level of government (Lopez-Gunn 
2009). 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Trade and Traffic Flows in U.S.-Canada border 
Source: Austin et al. 2008, 13 
 
Our conceptualization of transboundary water governance has long been 
mired in what Agnew (1994) termed the territorial trap, which is a Westphalian 
conceptualization of the state and sovereignty as territorially bounded and 
hierarchical, based on the conceptual separation of domestic and international affairs, 
and on the conceptualization of the state as a container of social and political-  
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United States-Canada Shared Ecosystems and Cross-Border Regions 
 
Figure 2: Four Cross-Border Regions 
Source: Policy Research Institute, Canada, 2008, 3 
 
 
-processes (Agnew 1994, 1995, 1999).  Consequently the dominant paradigm for 
transboundary water governance has been a state-centric, hierarchical, federal-to-
federal model, reflected for example in regime theory, which espouses top-down 
management of transboundary water-issues through international agreements, 
protocols, compacts and global conferences that minimize or ignore non-central-state 
actors.  It is often termed the ‗cascade model‘ because sub-national actors are 
portrayed as the passive recipients of policy direction from on high (Bulkeley and 
Betsill 2003). 
5  
Essentially we are now slowly realizing that the principle of ‗spatial 
exclusion‘ (Agnew 1995) underpinning our long-held conceptualization of the state is 
incongruent with transboundary water issues that are inherently too complex and 
interconnected—affecting agriculture, industry, energy, and health policy—and too 
fluid—affecting the local, regional, national and global scales—to be addressed by 
any single jurisdictionally bounded organization, institution, or regime (Biswas 
2004).  To illustrate, a single governmental agency such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) is ill-equipped to protect the interests of American port 
communities on the St. Lawrence River whose drinking water is affected by effluent 
from Canadian paper mills, whose reliance on fisheries for subsistence is threatened 
by invasive species introduced by international ocean freighters from Asia and Latin 
America, and whose dependence on the shipping industry makes them sensitive to 
global processes such as global warming which alter the levels of the waterways. 
 Only within the last decade have we become alive to the fact that watersheds 
simultaneously interact with processes at all levels between the local and global and 
thus begun to comprehend the need to develop a comprehensive, holistic, multi-scalar 
approach to watershed management (Conca 2006).  Hence, we are witnessing a 
paradigm shift from top-down, state-centric models of transboundary watershed 
management to an Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) approach with 
a clear emphasis on collaboration, de-centralization, and a new localism, based on the 
assumption that local community involvement improves the decision-making process 
(Corry and Stoker 2002; Biswas 2004). 
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As a result of these changes in our perception of natural resources and their 
management, we have witnessed over the last two decades the democratization of 
water governance and a proliferation in the quantity and variety of governance 
instruments being applied to transboundary water governance.  Lopez-Gunn (2009) 
argues,  
This realization or shift in the perception of groundwater as a common 
resource and as a flow rather than a stock also has subtle - yet crucial 
institutional implications. It shifts the focus towards a process-oriented 
outlook on managing a common flow through appropriate institutional 
frameworks, such as networks operating at multi-scalar levels, 
including international, regional, national and local partnering 
opportunities between international institutions, state, private and civil 
society, NGOs, communities, individuals and epistemic communities 
(42). 
 
These changes have sparked a new period of institutional innovation and rescaling as 
the United States and Canada increasingly adapt their political structures in order to 
accommodate their geography, and not vice-versa. 
One of the hallmarks of this period of democratization and innovation is the 
re-scaling of environmental governance downwards.  A growing variety and number 
of sub-central governments and non-state actors are interacting across the border in 
order to manage the environment and balance the tension at the heart of the 
relationship between Canada and the United States.  Analyzing the number of 
transboundary water governance instruments (i.e. treaties, memoranda of agreement, 
organizations) created per decade across the Canada-U.S. border between 1900 and 
2007, Norman and Bakker (2009) concluded that ―the majority of instruments created 
since the 1980s were conceived and implemented at the sub-national level‖ (106) as 
part of a clear trend toward greater sub-national (provincial/state) and local (sub-
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state/sub-provincial) participation in cross-border environmental policymaking (See 
Figure 3).   
  
 
Figure 3: Number of federal and sub-national governance instruments created per 
decade (1900-2007) 
Source: Norman and Bakker 2009, 105 
 
Consequently, in his study, ―The Canada-U.S. Relationship at the Turn of the 
Century‖, Alan Schwartz (2000) observed that ―there is a complex web of 
interactions on many levels‖ (223).  Although we have attained a more sophisticated 
appreciation of this complexity, our understanding of who participates in the bilateral 
environmental relations between Canada and the United States, remains incomplete.  
Until the 1990s, bilateral relations between the United States and Canada were 
predominantly understood to be the exclusive domain of federal governments, due in 
large part to a strictly formal, constitutionally defined understanding of jurisdictional 
authority in international affairs (Carroll 1983).  Gradually, scholars peeled back, and 
peered below, the layer of the nation-state to find a thick, intense web of sub-national 
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cross-border interactions between provinces and states (Munton and Kirton, 1996; 
Alper 1997; Rabe 1997; Smith 2002).  Subsequent investigations uncovered intricate 
networks of cross-border exchanges, a kind of micro-diplomacy not confined to the 
public sector but including non-governmental organizations and industry.  Munton 
and Kirton (1996) and VanNijnatten (2003), for instance, found that epistemic 
communities composed of scientific and technical experts from government, non-
governmental organizations, and industry were prerequisites for the day-to-day 
operation of the bilateral relationship as well as critical components for successfully 
completing intermittent high-profile environmental negotiations.   
Yet, despite the more nuanced appreciation of the multilevel character of 
bilateral environmental relations between the United States and Canada inclusive of a 
greater array of actors, our relative understanding of the role local government plays 
within this mesh of relations remains a blank space.  To paraphrase an observation 
made by Daniel Latouche (1988), of all government actors, local governments have 
been the slowest to receive recognition as a bona fide international actor, in part 
because their potential contribution to theory building and policymaking has been 
considered negligible (29).  The lack of formal-constitutional recognition of local 
government in the United States and Canada has meant that local governments have 
traditionally been depicted as inconsequential actors in bilateral environmental 
policymaking and predominantly ignored.  In most minds, they remain ‗bit players‘ 
(Graham et al. 1998, 1).  In 2005, for example, the Policy Research Institute 
sponsored by the Government of Canada conducted a survey of 110 Canadian and 
American leaders in the public and private sector to record perceptions of cross-
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border linkages between the two countries and found that cities were perceived to be 
the least useful actors in promoting cross-border linkages, far behind provinces and 
states, think-tanks, the research community, non-governmental organizations and 
even chambers of commerce. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to correct these unbalanced perceptions by 
presenting evidence of the ever-increasing policy repertoire of American and 
Canadian local governments, one that goes far beyond responsibility for local streets 
and sewers and which takes them beyond the boundary of their city limits, and even 
beyond the limits of the nation-state, focusing on their expanded participation—
empowerment—in cross-border environmental management within one particular 
region—the Great Lakes basin.  This dissertation seeks to add to the thin body of 
literature that directly acknowledges the increasing capacity of local government in 
transboundary environmental management (Allee 1993; De Loe et al. 2002; Frame et 
al. 2004; Priscoli and Wolf 2009), defined as the degree to which actors can 
participate in and influence governance, or decision-making, processes (Norman 
2009). 
At the turn of the millennium, local governments around the Great Lakes 
lacked a seat at the decision-making table and were virtually invisible in the major 
bilateral environmental agreements and institutions that formed the structure of Great 
Lakes environmental governance.  Today, local governments work alongside their 
federal, provincial and state counterparts within a wide range of forums such as the 
bi-national International Joint Commission and the sub-national Council of Great 
Lakes Governors, reviewing major international agreements such as the Great Lakes 
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Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA), and setting priorities and outlining strategies to 
meet their goals for the basin.  In addition, for the first time local governments are 
being invited to take part in formal governance structures, such as the Canada-Ontario 
Agreement (COA) which implements major bilateral water agreements on the 
Canadian side of the border.  Furthermore, the first meetings between federal, sub-
national, and local governments via a newly established, and previously non-existent, 
trilateral forum for cooperation were held in the fall of 2009. 
What is striking about this transformation is the degree of internationalization 
of these non-central-state actors.  Local governments are bypassing their own national 
governments in conducting their own foreign policy.  For example, Canadian local 
governments are using the American court system to pressure American industries to 
adhere to American environmental standards while referring specific complaints not 
to their own federal government, i.e. Environment Canada, but to the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other American institutions.  In one 
recent case the City of Toronto filed an amicus curiae brief in 2005 with a United 
States court, joining the U.S. federal government, eight states, and twelve non-
governmental organizations in an environmental lawsuit against American Electric 
Power Corporation, one of the largest operators of coal-fired plants in the United 
States.  Toronto‘s participation in the lawsuit was notable not only for the fact that it 
contributed to the largest pollution reduction settlement by a utilities operator by 
testifying on the health and environmental costs of transboundary air pollution from 
American coal fired plants, but it was the first time a Canadian local government 
utilized an American court system in this manner to conduct its own foreign policy. 
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In addition, American and Canadian local governments operate beyond the 
Great Lakes basin and are in constant communication with other local governments 
across the globe through, for example, their membership in the International Council 
for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), a network of close to 500 cities from 
over 40 countries headquartered in Toronto, Canada, or through collaboration with 
the Union of Baltic Cities (UBC) headquartered in Gdansk, Poland, a network of over 
100 Northern European cities from ten countries, to plan and coordinate the voluntary 
implementation of tougher carbon emission standards and water conservation 
measures than their own national governments are adopting.  This internationalization 
of local government stems from a broader trend referred to as glocalization 
(Swyngedouw 1997), which is a neologism describing the intensifying combination 
of local and global interactions brought about by advances in transportation and 
communication so that communities no longer define themselves spatially but 
socially (Wellman 2002) and thus operate on multiple scales. 
While dedicating part of the dissertation to describing their expanded 
capacities as individual local governments, this dissertation will focus specifically on 
the development, behavior and role of one particular mechanism for cross-border 
interaction, the transnational municipal network, which is an institutionalized form of 
cross-border cooperation between local governments.  This dissertation will focus on 
the only example of a regionally defined transnational municipal network in North 
America, and the only network whose membership is confined to North American 
cities.  This network, the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, 
institutionalizes cooperation between American and Canadian mayors from over sixty 
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cities within the Great Lakes basin and operates from a secretariat located on the 
shore of Lake Michigan in the city of Chicago.  This organization finds itself at the 
heart of the environmental economic nexus, with an explicit mission to secure the 
economic vitality of the basin by preserving the environmental integrity of the Great 
Lakes.  Combined with a commitment to social equality, these three principles 
comprise the organization‘s ‗triple bottom line‘.   
Thus, one can say, that the regular traffic of bilateral relations between 
Canada and the United States composed in large measure of issues of trade and water 
are now passing over a newly established bridge that is the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Cities Initiative, which connects the full range of stakeholders, the different 
levels of government, non-governmental organizations, industry and citizens, and 
integrates the trade and environmental communities that have traditionally operated 
on separate shores. 
Evidence presented in this dissertation of the viability of the Cities Initiative 
challenges previous findings that local actors in North America are unable to 
institutionalize their cross-border relations.  Brunet-Jailly (2004) concludes that a 
‗competitive-city paradigm‘ permeates cross-border relations in North America 
predicated on intense market pressures that precludes local governments from 
establishing and sustaining institutionalized forms of cross-border cooperation.  
Norman (2009), in her analysis of transboundary water governance along the United 
States-Canada border, concludes that ―although local actors are genuinely attempting 
to engage in transboundary governance, they encounter limited success due to 
inadequate resources and restricted capacity‖ (141) and that ―local actors are less able 
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to transcend the border than their nation-state counterparts‖ (141).  The emergence of 
a viable transnational municipal network in the Great Lakes challenges these 
conclusions.  The Cities Initiative is the clearest manifestation of the increased policy 
capacity of American and Canadian local governments. 
The Cities Initiative also exposes the limitations of Norman‘s methodology.  
Norman limits her investigation into ‗local actors‘ to non-governmental organizations 
and First Nations while ignoring local government.  This practice is reflective of a 
wider trend in the study of transboundary water governance (Alper 1996; Schwartz 
2000; Fall 2000) of lumping local governments and community organizations 
together while emphasizing the latter.  This dissertation makes the case that local 
governments, and especially transnational municipal networks, must be studied on 
their own terms otherwise their distinct nature and behavior is obscured. 
Transnational municipal networks have been studied almost exclusively in the 
context of the European Union (Heinelt and Niederhafner 2005; Kern 2007; Kern and 
Bulkeley 2009) or in the context of global networks such as the International Council 
for Local Environmental Initiatives (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003).   The Cities Initiative 
is the first, purely North American example of this phenomenon, and this is the first 
study of the role of a regionally defined transnational municipal network both within 
the Great Lakes and within the context of broader bilateral relations between Canada 
and the United States.  Hence, this dissertation is also the first to take the opportunity 
to study North American and European transnational municipal networks in 
comparative perspective.   
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Two important findings emerge from this comparative analysis.  It is 
demonstrated that the mode of transition which transformed cities from inward-
looking domestic actors into transnational ones, though showing similarities in 
Europe and North America, also has its differences which must be taken into account.  
In addition to different modes of transition, North American local governments find 
themselves in a political environment defined by different political opportunities and 
constraints than cities belonging to the European Union.  Foremost in this category, 
the lack of a robust, overarching supranational superstructure, like the one found 
within the European Union, conditions the behavior and structure of North American 
local government cross-border cooperation in important ways that distinguishes these 
networks from their European cousins. 
In addition to outlining the differences between North American and 
European transnational municipal networks, this dissertation sets out to address 
common questions related to both.  These include, what precipitated local 
governments to institutionalize their cross-border relations?  How do transnational 
networks govern themselves internally?  Do they behave like public or private actors 
or both and to what effect?  What role do these networks play externally, for example, 
in policymaking?  Are local governments simply participating in policymaking, or 
can they actually influence the process and the outcome? 
There are several compelling reasons, besides updating the record, for 
bringing local government bilateral environmental cooperation into the spotlight.  
First and foremost, contrary to previous expectations, a realization is slowly growing 
that environmental challenges will not be solved at the international level or through 
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the cooperation of federal governments alone.  As Betsill and Bulkeley (2006) argue 
with regards to climate change, ―it is increasingly clear that nation-states will be 
unable to meet their international commitments for addressing climate change without 
more explicit engagement with sub-national action‖ adding that especially in the area 
of airborne pollutants, for example, ―the local is the most appropriate political 
jurisdiction for bringing about any necessary reductions in these emissions‖ (141). 
Cities potentially have the greatest impact in addressing most environmental 
challenges, not just climate change, for the simple fact that three-quarters of the 
developed world now lives in urban regions, which makes them major consumers of 
energy and emitters of pollution but also sites with the greatest potential for positive 
change.  In their study, ―The Carbon-Neutral Individual‖, Michael Vandenbergh and 
Anne Steinemann (2007) calculate that individual Americans, through everyday 
transportation and household energy use, contribute roughly one-third of all carbon 
emissions in the United States, a proportion that exceeds even total industrial 
emissions.  They conclude that tremendous reductions in pollution can be achieved 
through small behavioral changes of individual citizens that have a monetary benefit 
and requires little effort, what they term ―low-hanging fruit‖.  Since six-out-of-ten 
Americans live in the 100 largest metropolitan centers, local governments, as the 
government closest to individual citizens, are arguably the best placed governments to 
influence their behavior and make a dramatic positive environmental impact by 
enacting by-laws, implementing urban planning, organizing information and outreach 
programs with regards to ‗low-hanging fruit‘ such as recycling, engine idling, home 
insulation and heating etc.   
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Cities not only have influence over their inputs and outputs through their 
control over land-use planning, transportation supply, energy management, and 
wastewater treatment, but they have extensive expertise to offer federal governments 
and international regimes in environmental conservation, prevention, mitigation and 
remediation.  With regards to other contributable resources, in terms of dollars-and-
cents, American and Canadian local governments around the Great Lakes 
cumulatively spend $15 billion annually on basic water quality management in the 
basin (GLSLCI 2008).  Simply put, it is time for a reappraisal of local government 
policy capacity in cross-border environmental cooperation around the Great Lakes so 
that our perceptions are commensurate with their contributions.   
Another compelling reason for analyzing local government is that their 
increased participation in environmental governance around the Great Lakes has the 
potential to improve accountability within water governance structures, adding an 
extra layer of oversight to an otherwise deteriorating regulatory system in the United 
States and Canada.  A recent article published in the New York Times on September 
13, 2009, entitled ―Toxic Waters‖, found that violations of the Clean Water Act have 
risen at a steady pace across the country, and that between 2004-2009, factories and 
plants have violated the Clean Water Act 506,000 times by over 23,000 companies 
(Duhigg, 1).  The report states that, ―tap water in parts of the Farm Belt, including 
cities in Illinois, Kansas, Missouri and Indiana, has contained pesticides at 
concentrations that some scientists have linked to birth defects and fertility problems‖ 
(Duhigg, 2).  One in ten Americans, meaning thirty-one million people, have been 
exposed to drinking water ―that contains dangerous chemicals or fails to meet a 
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federal health benchmark‖ (Duhigg, 2).  Sixty-percent of polluters were deemed to be 
in ‗significant noncompliance‘ which means that the discharges of cancer causing 
agents such as copper, lead, zinc, chlorine and selenium into water systems were not 
being measured or reported.   
More troubling, and reflective of the moth-eaten regulatory system in the 
Great Lakes and the country, less than three percent of Clean Water Act violations 
resulted in fines.  In an internal memo sent by the current EPA administrator Lisa 
Jackson to her enforcement deputy, she noted that ―in many parts of the country, the 
level of significant noncompliance with permitting requirements is unacceptably high 
and the level of enforcement activity is unacceptably low‖ (Duhigg, 4).  The 
significance of local government mobilization effectively as oversight agents is a 
critical development in the light of recent comments by Minnesota Congressman 
James Oberstar that ―the EPA and states have completely dropped the ball.  Without 
oversight and enforcement, companies will use our lakes and rivers as dumping 
grounds—and that‘s exactly what is apparently going on‖ (Duhigg, 4).  The 
weakened regulatory structure illustrates the negative consequences of the 
decentralization of North American water policy and the retrenchment of both federal 
and state governments from water management.  As former EPA administer William 
Reilly states, ―unless the EPA is pushing state regulators, a culture of transgression 
and apathy sets in‖ (Duhigg, 8), while Matthew Crum, an employee of West 
Virginia‘s Department of Environmental Protection, observes, ―if you don‘t have 
vigorous oversight by the feds, then everything just goes limp‖.  In such a context, the 
mobilization of local government as additional oversight agents, as catalysts for the 
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improvement of accountability structures within the water governance system, takes 
on a new imperative. 
The Great Lakes region is a natural laboratory for analyzing how local 
governments participate in the management of the economic-environmental nexus at 
the heart of bilateral relations between Canada and the United States, and presents 
somewhat of a difficult case, because nowhere in North America is the relationship 
between energy, economy and the environment so intertwined, the public and private 
interests of each sector so concentrated and the stakes so high.  The region, which 
includes Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin and parts of Minnesota and 
New York, as well as the province of Ontario and part of Quebec, has been for over a 
century the center of North American economic development.  It is the birthplace of 
the oil, steel, auto and aviation industries and, according to the Brookings Institute, is 
the ―primogeniture of the world‘s carbon economy‖ (Austin et al. 2008, 2).  As a 
country, it would be considered the second largest economy in the world, containing 
almost half of the total manufacturing jobs and one-third of the population of both 
countries (Austin et al. 2008, 7).  The $500 billion worth of annual trade between the 
region‘s provinces and states represents 62.3 per cent of all trade between Canada and 
the United States, a third of that passing across the Windsor-Detroit border alone 
(Austin et al. 2008, 10).  As the continent‘s economic engine, it is also one of the 
largest consumers and producers of energy, with large concentrations of coal-fired 
electric plants and the largest concentration of nuclear power plants in North 
America.  At the same time, the heavy industrial production and energy consumption 
poses serious environmental challenges which threaten the integrity of the Great 
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Lakes, the largest fresh water resource in the world containing 95 per cent of the 
United States‘ fresh surface water.  The environmental footprint also manifests itself 
in simmering cross-border conflicts in the form of transboundary air and water 
pollution which has led to the highest rates of respiratory, neurological and other 
pollution related diseases in both countries.  In such a high-stakes game one would 
expect federal as well as provincial and state governments to keep the management of 
the economic-environmental nexus free of interference from local government and 
other external actors by minimizing their role.   
 
Organizational Framework 
The organizational framework employed to analyze expanding local 
government policy capacity has been developed by Hoberg (1997), Harrison (2000) 
VanNijnatten (2003), and Norman and Bakker (2009) which holds that environmental 
bilateral relations between Canada and the United States must account for cross-
border relations occurring at all levels of government, and that this account must 
include an examination of both formal and informal relations.  Consequently, this 
dissertation will employ a multilevel governance framework which sees authority 
being dispersed away from the central-state both vertically, to supranational and sub-
national actors, as well as horizontally to non-governmental organizations and other 
societal actors as well as across borders through both formal and informal channels.  
Accounting for informal governance structures is critical since the expansion of sub-
national and local government policy capacity in North America stems almost 
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exclusively from an informal basis (Norman and Bakker 2009) and this has 
significant consequences for the behavior of transnational municipal networks. 
Chapter Two provides a literature review which traces the evolution of our 
understanding of bilateral relations and the role of sub-central-state actors within 
them.  The chapter will demonstrate how a multilevel governance framework allows 
us to understand the processes shaping bilateral environmental relations in North 
America, namely, the reorganization of the state, the re-scaling of policymaking and 
the internationalization of non-central state actors.  Chapter Three will outline the 
methods that were used to collect and organize data. 
Chapter Four will outline how formal authority relating to cross-border 
environmental cooperation is dispersed within the American and Canadian federal 
systems.  The evolution of formal intergovernmental relations between the federal 
and sub-national governments is traced in order to demonstrate that the expansion of 
local government policy was precipitated by the gradual re-balancing and re-scaling 
of formal relations between federal, state and provincial governments and,  in 
particular, the adoption of a more participatory, collaborative model of 
intergovernmental relations on both sides of the border that together have led to the 
opening of political opportunities, the appearance of functional imperatives for local 
government mobilization, and the stirring of local political entrepreneurialism. 
Chapter Five will analyze how the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities 
Initiative governs its internal and external relations and present what is novel about 
this particular actor.  Fundamentally, what distinguishes transnational municipal 
actors from all others is the fact that they govern their internal and external relations 
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as non-state actors, yet as a constellation of individual local governments they remain 
anchored to the hierarchical federal structure and remain governed by the inherent 
hierarchical intergovernmental power relations in which they are supremely 
subordinate.  The fact that the network‘s authority is derived almost entirely from 
informal structures, yet it must operate from a position of weakness within the 
shadow of hierarchy (Scharpf 1997) of a federal structure, endows the member cities 
of transnational municipal networks with a sense of their own tenuousness and 
vulnerability and this understanding dictates how the Cities Initiative conducts its 
relations with other actors in the basin and how it balances the economic-
environmental nexus.  This vulnerability pushes the network to act as a catalyst for 
closer integration, eschewing conflict in favor of cooperation, building new platforms 
of communication between all levels of government while strengthening existing 
accountability structures within the governance system.  Furthermore, the lack of a 
supranational superstructure like the European Union with institutions outside the 
federal structure that could provide transnational municipal networks with political 
and financial support to test its authority further means that the Cities Initiative is 
especially concerned with maintaining positive relations with higher levels of 
government.   
Nonetheless, despite the tenuousness of its formal standing, local 
governments, largely through the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, have 
successfully embedded themselves within the informal governance structures around 
the Great Lakes and within networks which include all levels of government, industry 
and non-governmental organizations.  Through these informal networks, they have 
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acquired policy capacity and broken the bounds of their formal constitutional 
jurisdiction, while at the same time, that policy capacity is increasingly becoming 
institutionalized in an increasingly formal basis. 
The Sixth Chapter will address a fundamental question raised by Peters and 
Pierre (2004) about the informal basis of multilevel governance in general, and the 
informal basis for the expansion of local government policy capacity, which is ―to 
what extent informality entails inequality?‖ (23). In other words, although it is well 
demonstrated throughout the dissertation that local governments, largely through the 
Cities Initiative, have acquired a seat at the decision-making table in environmental 
governance around the Great Lakes, the question remains whether local governments 
and transnational municipal networks can actually influence the outcome of the 
policymaking process?  Can they affect environmental management around the Great 
Lakes?  The general assumption is that local governments are bit players, passive, 
captives of industry, and that their attempts at cooperation are thwarted by centrifugal 
forces of intra-city competition.  In short, although increasingly present, local 
governments are expected to remain ineffectual actors. 
The case study presented in this chapter addressing this central concern 
centers on local government opposition to the expansion of refinery capacity at the 
British Petroleum refinery in Whiting, Indiana.  The British Petroleum expansion 
represents a difficult case in the sense that local governments were not expected to 
oppose a project of this scale and import, one that was painted as a matter of national 
security, and one that was backed by immense political and financial investments by 
federal, state, and provincial governments, industry, and supported by pubic opinion 
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which supported the increase in refinery expansion in order to find relief from record 
gasoline prices by bringing more supply online.  Furthermore, the refinery expansion 
represented significant local and regional investments in an otherwise economically 
depressed area, precious investments which local governments would not otherwise 
be expected to delay or endanger.  Nonetheless, contrary to these expectations, local 
government and the Cities Initiative mobilized and successfully opposed the 
expansion, resulting in decreased discharges of pollutants into Lake Michigan and, 
most importantly, led to the instigation of a significant regulatory review by the State 
of Indiana of its permit process, thereby improving the accountability structure 
around the Great Lakes. 
Chapter Seven will draw conclusions from the original research contained in 
the preceding three chapters, and outline the direction for future studies, as well as 
provide suggestions for improving environmental management around the Great 
Lakes. 
Finally, a word about what this dissertation will not include.  Norman (2009) 
cautions against the pitfall of what Brown and Purcell dub (2005) the local trap in 
which it is assumed that ―organization, policies and action at the local scale are 
inherently more likely to have desired social and ecological effects than activities 
organized at other scales‖ (Brown and Purcell, 607).  Rather, this dissertation joins a 
major thread emerging within the political ecology literature which posits that ―there 
is nothing intrinsically desirable about the local scale‖ (Brown and Purcell, 608) and 
that ―the characteristics of a given scale or scalar arrangement cannot be assumed a 
priori; rather the social and ecological outcomes of any particular scalar arrangement 
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are the result of the political strategies of particular actors, not the inherent qualities 
of particular scales‖ (609).  Hence, this dissertation will refrain from making any 
claim that there are inherent benefits in the inclusion of the local scale in 
transboundary water governance, but instead will operate from the premise that 
―scales and scalar relationships are the object and outcome of political struggle‖ 
(Brown and Purcell, 620).  A corollary of the rejection of these a priori assumptions is 
that, as will be demonstrated, it is not the rescaling of the governance architecture 
itself which empowers local governments, although it does provide favorable 
conditions in which enterprising local governments may empower themselves. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CROSS-BORDER RELATIONS IN 
A MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Introduction 
On March 16, 2006, Richard M. Daley appeared before the United States 
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee in his capacity as Mayor of 
Chicago and the Chairman of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative to 
discuss the Great Lakes Regional Collaboration Strategy to Restore and Protect the 
Great Lakes, a significant document released in 2005 that sets priorities, objectives 
and strategies for environmental management in the basin, and lays the groundwork 
for the forthcoming bi-national review of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.  
The Strategy resulted from months of effort on the part of the Great Lakes Regional 
Collaboration, a network which brought together 1,500 members from the federal, 
state, provincial and local governments of Canada and the United States as well as 
representatives of First Nations, non-governmental organizations, and industry, in 
meetings held in cities across the basin in Rochester, Toledo, Traverse City, and 
Duluth.  In discussing the contributions of local government to the Strategy, Mayor 
Daley submitted two documents to the Senate Committee.  The first was a list of the 
48 cities from the United States and 37 cities from Canada who, as members of the 
Cities Initiative, had deliberated on and formed common positions that were 
represented in the Strategy.  The second document was a letter from David Miller, the 
Mayor of Toronto and the Canadian Chair of the Cities Initiative, supporting the 
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testimony of the mayor of Chicago and presenting to the Committee a very brief 
update on the work taking place on the Canadian side of the border (For GLSLCI 
Member-City Map see Figure 4 and Member-City List see Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: GLSLCI Member-City List 2009 
 
 
Mayor Daley‘s testimony in front of the Senate as a delegate of a transnational 
municipal network institutionalizing cross-border cooperation between American and 
Canadian local governments that took part in an expansive multilevel, multi-
stakeholder, and bi-national collaborative policymaking network illustrates the 
complexity of environmental policymaking around the Great Lakes.  However, two 
interdependent and complimentary processes can be teased out of this tangled policy 
mess. 
• Sarnia
Grand Haven
•Muskegon
Spring Lake
•Ashland •Marquette
Rimouski
Montreal-Est
Repentigny
Chatham-Kent
Bruce County
Huron-Kinloss
Welland
Tiny
Halton
Figure 4: GLSLCI Member-City Map 2009 
Source: www.glslcities.org 
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Table 1: Member-City List 2009 
 
Source: www.glslcities.org 
 
First, the swarm of actors, both state and non-state, interacting across multiple 
levels and across national boundaries, in varying combinations, reflects the 
democratization of transboundary water management.  It has been argued that this 
phenomenon is a hallmark of global processes that are partially ‗hollowing out‘ the 
state as traditional power bases are eroded (Pierre 2000) and political power is 
dispersed away from the central-government upward to the supranational level and 
downward to the sub-national and local level. 
ONTARIO 
1. Ajax (town) 
2. Archipelago (twnp) 
3. Blue Mountains 
(town) 
4. Bruce County 
5. Carling Township 
6. Chatham-Kent 
7. Cobourg 
8. Collingwood 
9. Cornwall 
10. Durham Region 
11. Georgian Bay 
(twnp) 
12. Goderich (town) 
13. Halton Region 
14. Hamilton 
15. Huron-Kinloss 
(twnp) 
16. Kingston 
17. Midland (town 
ONTARIO 
18. Niagara Falls 
19. Niagara Region 
20. Nipigon (twnp) 
21. Parry Sound 
22. Penetanguishene 
(town) 
23. Port Colborne 
24. St. Catherines 
25. Sarnia 
26. Sault St. Marie 
27. Tay (twnp) 
28. Terrace Bay (twnp) 
29. Thunder Bay 
30. Tiny (twnp) 
31. Toronto 
32. Wasaga Beach 
(town) 
33. Welland 
34. Windsor 
ILLINOIS 
1. Chicago 
2. East Chicago 
3. Evanston 
4. Highland Park 
5. Waukegan 
 
QUEBEC 
1. Beaconsfield 
2. Becancour 
3. Chateauguay 
4. Montreal 
5. Montreal-Est 
6. Quebec 
Metropolitan 
Community 
7. Repentigny 
8. Rimouski 
9. Salaberry-de-
Valleyfield 
10. Sorel-Tracy 
11. Trois-Rivieres 
INDIANA 
1.    Gary 
2.    Whiting 
MICHIGAN 
1. Ferndale 
2. Ferrysburg 
3. Grand Haven 
4. Grand Rapids 
5. Marquette 
6. Muskegon 
7. Spring Lake 
(village) 
 
MINNESOTA 
1. Duluth 
2. Grand Marais 
OHIO 
1. Sheffield Lake 
2. Toledo 
WISCONSIN 
1. Ashland 
2. Bayfield 
3. Milwaukee 
4. Racine 
5. Superior 
NEW YORK 
1. Rochester 
PENNSYLVANIA 
1.    Erie 
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Second, within this democratization of the policymaking process, we see 
evidence of the internationalization of non-central governments (NCG), in this case, 
involving the internationalization of local government in the form of a transnational 
municipal network, the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative.  External 
relations have traditionally resided outside the constitutionally defined jurisdiction of 
local government hence the institutionalization of cross-border municipal relations 
can be interpreted as the loosening of those constitutional fetters and an assertion of 
local power vis-à-vis the state.  Local governments have seized the opportunity 
presented by the reorganization of the state in order to widen and exercise their 
political freedom, and the transnational municipal network has been an integral 
vehicle in that process.   
Thus, the reorganization of the state and the internationalization of local 
government are two intertwined processes transforming the mode of bi-national 
environmental policymaking around the Great Lakes.  This chapter will begin by 
describing how our understanding of the internationalization of local government has 
evolved, followed by how our understanding of bilateral relations has grown to 
include a role for sub-central actors such as local governments within the study of 
transboundary water governance.  Finally, a multilevel governance framework will be 
applied to advance our understanding of the changing role of non-central state actors 
in policymaking within an evolving and re-organizing nation-state moving away from 
a centralized, closed model of decision-making. 
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The Internationalization of Local Government and Transnational Municipal 
Networks 
 
The internationalization of local government has unfolded in three ways, 
either through engagement in issues with a foreign policy dimension as individual 
local governments, as part of temporary alliances, or as members of long-term, 
institutionalized cooperation.  For example, starting with the first form, the City of 
Oakland waded into international nuclear non-proliferation debates by passing a 
resolution banning city investments in companies involved in the manufacture of 
nuclear warheads which was eventually struck down by United States v. City of 
Oakland (1990).   Illustrative of temporary alliances, during the 1980s, hundreds of 
local governments joined a large-scale divestment movement protesting South 
African apartheid thereby pressuring the Reagan administration to adopt the 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (Shuman 1986; Love 1986).  Over 700 
local governments have adopted targets set by the Kyoto Protocol when the United 
States federal government refused to ratify the international agreement on climate 
change.  Sister-city and Twin-city projects institutionalized cultural and economic 
cooperation.  Emblematic of deeper institutionalization of local government 
internationalization, in the second half of the twentieth century, local governments 
began joining a burgeoning list of regional and global municipal associations that 
have transformed them into global actors, such as the United Cities and Local 
Governments (UCLG), the largest international association of local governments 
comprising over 1000 members across 120 countries, the World Federation of United 
Cities, the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) and the 
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative.  The institutionalization of the 
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external role of local government has gained considerable international recognition 
most recently in the ‗Cardoso Report‘1, presented to the United Nations Secretary-
General in 2004, containing two proposals which recommended that ―the General 
Assembly should debate a resolution affirming and respecting local autonomy as a 
universal principle‖ and that ‗‖the United Nations should regard United Cities and 
Local Governments as an advisory body on governance matters‖ (United Nations 
2004, 18).  This is a significant development considering local governments have 
traditionally lacked legal standing or presence in the eyes of international law and 
international institutions. 
For the most part, political science was quite slow in recognizing the 
internationalization of local government.  One can reach as far back as Port Cities in 
our International Relations (1935), an address by then Secretary of State, Cordell 
Hull, to mark the beginning of the conversation.  Historians (Braudel 1977) have of 
course examined the foreign adventures of local government, but Duchacek‘s (1986) 
work symbolized the start of the systematic study of municipal external relations 
within political science at a time when Alger (1990) observed that ―mainstream 
political science research on international relations has almost totally ignored cities‖ 
(494).  Duchacek established three categories of ‗trans-sovereign activities‘ including 
(1) Cross-border Regionalism: interactions between local and sub-national 
governments that are regionally confined (2) Transregional Paradiplomacy: 
interactions between non-central governments which are not geographical neighbors, 
but whose national governments are (3) Global Paradiplomacy: interactions between 
non-central governments in non-contiguous nations.  Although it may appear that 
                                                 
1
 Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, 
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transnational municipal networks fit neatly into the cross-border regionalism 
category, that observation is not entirely true.   For example, the Cities Initiative 
collaborates with global organizations such as the Union of Baltic Cities and the 
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives.   Hence, the categories are 
not mutually exclusive.  The more significant problem with Duchacek (1986) and 
subsequent analyses is that they focused almost exclusively on the paradiplomacy of 
region-states or sub-national governments (Balthazar 1993; Ohmae 1993; Keating 
1999 and 2004; Hocking 1999) to the neglect of local government. 
The research that did surface on local government external relations could be 
grouped into three broad categories.  The first dealt with general descriptions of the 
changing role of cities in the context of global changes, for example, in response to 
transformations within the nation-state (Bilder 1989; Alger 1990; Hocking 1993; 
Hobbs 1994; Keating 1999; Amin and Thrift 2005), in response to the wave of 
democratization at the end of the Cold War (Jacob et al. 1995), the transformations 
within international law (Blank 2006), and in response to globalization (Friedman 
1986; Hambleton et al. 2002; Savitch 2002).  Cities were shown adopting new tactics 
such as city branding (Hudson and Hawkins 2006; Anholt 2007), or setting up 
information bureaus in foreign capitals (Duchacek 1990), in order to attract mobile 
investment and labor that had become unmoored from the limitations of territorial 
fealty and national borders.  At the same time, they were seen as sites for the 
mobilization of grass-roots social movements which challenged the Washington 
consensus (Castells 1983).  A lot of attention was paid to exceptional cities, or so-
called ‗world cities‘ (Friedman 1986) ‗global cities‘ (Hall 1984; Sassen 1991) and 
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‗information cities‘ (Castells 1994), which acted as nodal points in the flow of global 
capitalism due to their enormous concentration of resources.   
The second group of studies concentrated research around the concept of city 
diplomacy, which focused on the participation of local government in policy areas 
once considered beyond the realm of local government, such as fostering north-south 
relations and economic development (Hewitt 1996; Proctor 2000; Bontenbal 2009), 
international conflict prevention (Bush 2008) and peace-building (Galtung 2003).  
Most of this research spotlights the work of individual local governments, or 
temporary alliances, in isolated issues such as the divestment movement that was 
directed against the authoritarian regime in Burma (Guay 2000).   
The third group of literature focused on institutionalized forms of international 
local government cooperation and was predominantly concerned with city-to-city 
connections such as ‗twinning‘ or ‗sister city‘ exchanges (Zelinsky 1991; van den 
Berg et al. 1996; Jones and Blunt 1999; Vagale 2003).  Very little attention was being 
paid to other, distinct, manifestations of institutionalized external relations such as 
transnational municipal networks. 
The handful of studies into transnational municipal networks that have been 
undertaken analyze international networks, such as the Cities for Climate Protection 
program (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003), comprised of member cities from around the 
world, or regional networks confined to a particular geographic region.  The latter 
include ‗catch-all‘ transnational municipal networks, such as the Council of European 
Municipalities (Heinelt and Niederhafner 2005), or single-issue networks such as the 
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Climate Alliance and the Energie-Cites (Kern and Bulkeley 2009). What they all have 
in common is they have focused exclusively on European networks.   
The exclusive focus on transnational networks in the European context and as 
a European innovation has a basis in the long pedigree of transnational municipal 
mobilization stretching back to the 13
th
 century in the form of the Hanseatic League. 
The Hanseatic League was an alliance of trading cities along the coast of Northern 
Europe, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the North Sea, governed by its own set of 
laws and institutions that provided order and protection from outside threats.  
Continuing that legacy in the post-second-world-war era, the first ‗twin cities‘ were 
established in Europe and have since mushroomed to somewhere in the neighborhood 
of 30,000 twinning arrangements (Ewen and Hebbert 2007).   
There is a body of literature that points to the distinctive character of the 
development of European social organization (Crouch 1999), involving a dramatic 
move away from formal, enclosed styles of government (John 2001) towards a 
system of multilevel governance, especially under the European Union (John 2000), 
and the adoption of greater pluralism in power relationships (Benington 1994) which 
favors the autonomy of cities (Barnasco and Le Gales 2000).  Multilevel governance 
is defined as ―a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at 
several territorial tiers—supranational, national, regional, and local‖ (Marks 1992, 
211) and the concept will be explored more in-depth as the chapter progresses.  These 
observations undergird subsequent research demonstrating that networks of municipal 
government have flourished under the European Union (Le Gales, 2002).   
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However, even in this European context of advanced multilevel governance, 
Kern and Bulkeley (2009) state that,  
while the role of local authorities in European integration has been 
discussed more frequently in acknowledgement of the growing multi-
level character of European governance (John 2000; Le Gales 2002), 
the emergence of TMNs [transnational municipal networks] has been 
widely neglected.  Most studies which mention such networks do not 
focus on them (John 2000, 888; Marshall 2005, 680-1), but tend to 
consider them solely in terms of their role as lobbying agencies 
(Bennington and Harvey 1998; Ward and Williams 1997, 440) and pay 
little attention to their internal dynamics (310). 
 
Research into the internal and external dynamics of these networks has been limited 
to three studies (Heinelt and Niederhafner 2005; Kern 2007; Kern and Bulkeley 
2009). Hence, analyzing the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative is 
significant not only because it contributes to a very limited body of research on 
transnational municipal networks, but because it provides a completely new 
perspective.  Research into North American transnational municipal networks has 
thus far been non-existent.  This dissertation represents the first cut.   
The lack of research on North American transnational municipal networks can 
be partly attributed to the fact that the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, 
the first and only example of such a network, was established rather late, in 2003, 
compared with the establishment of the first European transnational municipal 
network, the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) in 1951.  The 
delay in the emergence of transnational municipal networks can be further attributed 
to the delay in the expansion of local government policy capacity, which is attributed 
to the late adoption of a multilevel system of governance in North America.  Chapter 
Four of this dissertation, Breaking the Formal Bounds of Federalism, demonstrates 
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that only within the last decade or so have North American intergovernmental 
relations moved away from a closed system of intergovernmental relations in which 
higher levels of government jealously guard their constitutionally defined 
jurisdictions to an emphasis on the quality and openness of the policymaking process 
which has opened up new, mostly informal, avenues for local government 
participation in decision-making.  In addition, as argued earlier, the slow recognition 
of transnational municipal networks also results from the persistent bias against local 
government in the study of intergovernmental, international, bilateral relations as well 
as in the application of multilevel governance. 
 The growing acknowledgement of local governments as credible external 
actors extends the natural progression of International Relations away from state-
centric, realist perspectives defined by Morgenthau‘s Politics Among Nations (1948) 
and Arnold Wolfers‘ Discord and Collaboration (1962), which viewed the nation-
state as a self-contained billiard-ball, ―a closed, impermeable, and sovereign unit, 
completely separated from other states (Wolfers 1962, 19), towards a more complex 
perspective which sees sub-national actors, non-governmental and intergovernmental 
organizations participating in a complex web of interdependent cross-border 
interactions above and below the level of the nation-state (Keohane and Nye, 1972).  
The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War brought to the 
foreground scholarship which argued that national borders were becoming obsolete 
and that new scales of geopolitical organization were emerging which were breaking 
the bounds of traditional formal federal structures (Ohmae 1990).  Thus, not only 
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were more actors more free to interact domestically across multiple scales, but they 
were now more free to interact across multiple scales and across national boundaries. 
A debate emerged between those who argued that ―the absolutes of the 
Westphalian system‖, such as a territorially fixed state and territorially defined 
authority, were ―dissolving‖ (Mathews 1997, 50), and those contending that ―the state 
is not disappearing, it is disaggregating‖ (Slaughter 1997, 185).  The former pointed 
to the rise of transnational relations involving nongovernmental actors and the 
emergence of hybrid authorities composed of state and non-state actors where non-
governmental organizations take on formerly public roles as definitive of the new 
world order which challenges the role of the modern state and questions its very 
existence (Mathews 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998).  The latter pointed to 
transgovernmental relations between agencies and government sub-units across 
borders as ―rapidly becoming the most widespread and effective mode of 
international governance‖ (Slaughter 1997, 185), thus conceding that states were 
undergoing a transformation while maintaining their relevance as ultimate 
gatekeepers.  The transnational v. transgovernmental debate signaled that new units 
of analysis above and below the level of the nation-state had become entrenched 
mainstream components of serious International Relations.   The state was no longer 
conceived of as a billiard ball, but rather as a ‗snowflake‘ with all its complexities 
worthy of attention (Fordham and Asal, 2007).   
In addition, the transnational v. transgovernmental debate further crystallized 
the conceptual division between state and non-state actors, which was unfortunate 
because it obscured the emergence of a third-type of actor—a hybrid of state and non-
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state qualities—brought about by the internationalization of non-central state 
governments.  As Hocking (1996) points out, with regards to non-central 
governments, these two mutually exclusive terms ―do not do justice to the distinctive 
qualities of a category of actor which combines, in the case of federal systems, some 
of the features of the state—territory and a degree of residual sovereignty—with those 
of distinct ‗polities‘ within their political settings‖ (40).  Hocking emphasizes the 
‗unique status‘ of non-central governments as ‗hybrid actors‘ ―transcending 
Rosenau‘s ‗two worlds of world politics‘, the ‗state centric world‘ of the nation-state 
and the ‗multicentric world‘ of non-state actors‖ (40).   
While Hocking focuses on the general term of ‗non-central governments‘, 
Blank (2006) analyzes the legal status specifically of local governments, but in the 
same manner adroitly stresses ―the unique duality of localities—being state agents on 
the one hand, and voluntary human associations…on the other‖ (874) while also 
arguing that ―localities have been extremely resilient because they have managed to 
recompose themselves as non-state actors‖ (935).  Blank points to the recognition of 
local governments contained in the Cardoso Report as proof that ―this reconfiguration 
of local governments into non-governmental organizations has been so successful‖ 
(935).   
Although recognizing the duality of non-central and local governments, both 
Hocking (1996) and Blank (2006) do not provide an explanation as to what structural 
or behavioral characteristics qualify either of these actors as non-governmental.  This 
dissertation clarifies the discussion in Chapter Five by positing that this duality 
manifests itself exclusively in transnational municipal networks.  The general 
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assumption about the novelty of any form of network governance is that ―the 
boundary between organizations and public and private sectors has become 
permeable‖ (Stoker 1998, 38), but the more striking curiosity about transnational 
municipal networks is that they behave simultaneously as both a state and non-state 
actor.  They are registered as not-for-profit, non-governmental organizations, hence 
they govern their internal and external relations as non-state actors, as members of 
civil society, yet as a constellation of individual local governments they remain 
anchored to the hierarchical federal state structure and are thus themselves governed 
by the inherent hierarchical intergovernmental power relations of the federal state.  
Consequently, transnational municipal networks are institutions in which the 
boundaries between the public and private sectors are not only penetrated, but are 
dissolved.  Hence, at least at the level of local government, civil society is no longer 
organized versus the state, as Hegel and Marx had conceived.  Instead, the separation 
between the political state and civil society is transcended (Swyngedouw 2005, 
1996).  This duality of transnational municipal networks will be explored in more 
detail in subsequent chapters. 
 
Canada-United States Bilateral Environmental Relations 
By virtue of being a shared ecosystem, the environmental management of the 
Great Lakes falls under the rubric of Canada-United States bilateral relations and has 
been considered so since the Boundary Waters Treaty was signed a century ago.  
However, until the 1970s, general bilateral relations between Canada and the United 
States were treated as a ‗non-subject‘ (Clarkson, 1973) by scholars of International 
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Relations.  Stoett and Le Prestre (2006) explain that ―the lack of heightened conflict 
between the two states made for boring study‖ (6), and that ―Canada was condemned 
by many to be little more than a glorified American satellite and therefore it was 
unnecessary, even superfluous, to study the foreign policies of a state with such 
limited foreign policy latitude‖ (6).  It took another decade before bilateral 
environmental relations entered the mainstream of scholarship with Carroll‘s (1983) 
Environmental Diplomacy, and a decade after that until they were firmly entrenched 
through a dedicated volume of The American Review of Canadian Studies (1997). 
Until the 1990s, environmental bilateral relations between Canada and the 
United States were studied mostly from the perspective of federal governments as 
scholars fixated on formal cross-border exchanges and major agreements such as the 
Boundary Waters Treaty, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, the Air Quality 
Agreement, NAFTA and on high-stakes confrontations over acid rain, Pacific salmon 
and softwood lumber.  The dominant paradigm at the time was Robert Putnam‘s 
(1988) two-level game analysis, and regime theory, which separated the domestic and 
international arenas and placed an emphasis on treaty-making and points of 
ratification which focused attention on the federal government.  Carroll (1983), 
exemplifying this state-centric paradigm, observed ―[s]ince only governmental 
officials at the federal levels in both countries are constitutionally authorized to 
negotiate or make decisions in this area, these federal actors are naturally the central 
focus of attention‖ (3).  These studies, employing a purely formal, narrow legal-
constitutional reading of jurisdiction, disqualified non-central actors like local 
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governments a priori because the constitution did not afford them authority either in 
environmental policy or in external relations. 
The bias minimizing local government was not limited to International 
Relations but was reinforced in the field of Intergovernmental Relations.  Local 
governments were traditionally treated as the ―constitutional orphans‖ (Valiante 2007, 
1065) of federalism and consequently portrayed as passive policy-takers and 
overlooked as policy-shapers (Valiante 2007).  At best, they were treated as ‗bit 
players‘ in Canada (Graham et al. 1998, 1) while the ―political invisibility of 
American cities‖ (Waste 1998, 21) went unchallenged.  Even more recent literature 
reviews such as Cameron and Simeon‘s (2002) ―Intergovernmental Relations in 
Canada‖ still acknowledge this persistent bias by stating that, ―this article has 
followed a standard Canadian pattern; municipalities have not figured greatly in our 
analysis‖ (69).   
This bias was reinforced outside academia as well by judicial decisions and 
the dominant national discourse.  In Hines v. Davidowitz (1941), a case that went 
before the United States Supreme Court, the ruling stated that ―our system of 
government is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the 
interest of the whole nation, imperatively requires the federal power in the field 
affecting foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference‖ (quoted in 
Shuman 1990, 169).  This decision was reinforced two decades later by Zschernig v. 
Miller (1968).  Constitutional scholars, such as Peter Spiro, criticized local 
governments on the pages of the Wall Street Journal for organizing a divestment 
movement targeting South African apartheid in an article titled ―Get States and Cities 
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off Foreign-Policy Stage‖ (Spiro 1986).  On the same subject, the chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana), argued that 
―we cannot have individual states and cities establishing their own foreign policies‖ 
(Shuman 1986, 169).   Some local governments censured themselves. For instance, 
the city of San Buenaventura, California, passed a resolution which states, 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, by the City Council of the 
City of Buenaventura that they will continue to devote their time and 
efforts to considering and resolving only those matters of local concern 
of which they have elected responsibility; and further the City Council 
will use whatever means available to dissuade those groups or 
individuals who request their assistance on matters of national or 
international concern (quoted in Alger 1990, 511). 
 
The city joined the chorus of those drawing a thick line separating the local from the 
international, but globalization would soon reveal that the artificial dichotomy 
between ‗international‘ and ‗domestic‘ politics was untenable (Mansbach and 
Vazquez, 1981). 
As the 1980s moved on, only a handful of comprehensive studies existed 
which examined the interactions occurring at the sub-national level between Canadian 
and American provinces and states (Swanson 1974; Swanson 1978; Munton and 
Kirton 1988; Duchacek at al. 1988; Duchacek 1990), in large part because 
institutional cross-border linkages were considered a relatively new phenomenon in 
North America (Brunet-Jailly, 2008).  For example, Gerard Rutan (1988) examined 
the Pacific Northwest for these sub-national diplomatic relations only to discover that 
―there is little detectable…direct communication between the state and provincial 
governments‖ (166) and furthermore ―there is no consistent desire for a relationship‖ 
(187). These observations reinforced the mainstream perception reflected again in 
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Carroll‘s (1983) observation that ―U.S. states are not accustomed to dealing across 
international borders.  Thus they have little history and little expertise in this area‖ 
(17). 
It was not until Munton and Kirton (1996) documented over one-hundred 
agreements existing between provinces and states that more and more scholars 
became interested in looking for, and succeeded in identifying, the myriad of bilateral 
interactions taking place beneath the level of the nation-state.  Subsequent analyses 
(Alper 1997; Rabe 1997) revealed that not only were these linkages expanding, but 
that they were being increasingly institutionalized, becoming more formal, and 
gaining respect.  Kincaid (1990b) early on theorized that these relationships are not 
inherently inferior to federal bilateral relations while Leyton-Brown and Sands (1997) 
argued, ―it would be a mistake to suggest the U.S.-Canada relationship was the 
exclusive preserve of policymakers in Washington and Ottawa.  As the Pacific 
salmon dispute indicates state and provincial governments and a variety of other 
stakeholders play an important part in defining the timbre of relations‖ (163) between 
Canada and the United States. 
As scholars peeled back, and peered under, the layer of the nation-state, they 
not only found a lively web of provincial and state relations, but they began 
discovering intense collaboration between these sub-national actors, the federal 
government, and thick networks of non-governmental organizations and industry 
which undergirded a significant proportion of cross-border exchanges (Munton and 
Kirton 1996).  Special attention was paid to epistemic communities, which are 
networks composed of scientific and technical experts from both the private and 
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public sector deliberating on specific problems typically outside the formal machinery 
of government (VanNijNatten 2006, 55).  Kirton (1997) went so far as to state that 
these epistemic communities were prerequisites for bilateral environmental relations 
at all levels, whereas VanNijnatten (2003) credited the epistemic community of air 
quality officials, scientists, and environmentalists with the successful negotiations of 
the Ozone Annex to the Canada-United States Air Quality Agreement, concluding 
that, ―this epistemic community acted as the supports for the bridge being built via 
the binational negotiations‖ (117).   
Upon second look, the Pacific Northwest, for example, appeared nothing like 
Rutan‘s (1988) landscape, barren of cross-border linkages, but in fact revealed a 
multiplicity of linkages which are ―rational, high-level and intense‖ (Smith 2002, 
130) while most recent observers scanning the entire span of the 49
th
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surprisingly found ―the thickness and intensity of links are greatest in the Pacific 
North West‖ (Brunet-Jaillly 2008, 114).  These linkages include the British 
Columbia-Washington Environmental Cooperation Council created by their 
respective premier and governor, the Pacific Corridor Enterprise Council which 
promotes free-trade through non-profit organizations, the cooperation of Canadian 
and American non-governmental organizations working on transportation issues 
through the Cascadia Project, and perhaps best illustrated by the Pacific Northwest 
Economic Region (PNWER) which brings together numerous public and private 
sector actors across five American states and three Canadian provinces into a Council 
of Delegates and an Executive Committee to deliberate on policy issues ranging from 
transportation, tourism, and telecommunication to energy, economy, and the 
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environment (Brunet-Jailly 2008, 114).  Lost in this complex mesh of cross-border 
relationships between Canada and the United States (see Figure Four), however, is the 
role of local government which remains relatively unstudied. 
 
Figure 5: Select Cross-Border Networks and Organizations 
Source: Policy Research Institute, Canada, 2008, 8 
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of the recent use, and misuse, of the multilevel governance framework in the study of 
bilateral relations in North America (Blatter 2001; Brunet-Jailly 2004 and 2008; 
Smith 2002; VanNijnatten 2003 and 2006). 
The multilevel governance framework emerged as an amalgam of existing 
theories and approaches trying to explain the reorganization of the state that was 
taking place during the period of accelerated European integration after the signing of 
the Single European Act (1986).  Only very recently has the framework been applied 
to North America.  The term multilevel governance was first used by Gary Marks 
(1992) to describe the aftermath of the reforms made to the European Union‘s 
Structural Policy in 1988 which he interpreted as signaling the ceding of central 
government control over the design and implementation of Structural Funds to the 
European Commission and to local and regional governments.  A heretofore 
centralized system was opened to include new actors who were granted decision-
making powers through the adoption of the European Union‘s partnership principle 
which mandated that the funds be administered through partnerships consisting of 
supranational, national, sub-national, regional and local actors.  From these 
observations, Marks (1992) defined multilevel governance as  
a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at 
several territorial tiers—supranational, national, regional, and local—
as a result of the broad process of institutional creation and decisional 
allocation that has pulled some previously centralized functions of the 
state up to the supranational level and some down to the local/regional 
level (211).   
 
By highlighting the dispersion of authority away from the central state, multilevel 
governance in essence replaced neofunctionalism (Haas 1958 and 1961; Lindberg 
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1963), as the alternative to state-centric theories especially Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1993 and 1998).   
The concept of multilevel governance has been applied in many different 
ways, but Bache and Flinders (2004) identify four common elements that we can 
place under the headings—democratization, de-nesting and decoupling, de-
formalization, and disorganization and democratic deficit—which describe the 
transformations taking place around the Great Lakes basin with regards to the 
reorganization of the state and the expansion and internationalization of local 
government policy capacity.  The first two elements describe what is meant by the 
term multilevel, and the other two elements describe what is meant by the term 
governance and assist in helping to understand its effects. 
 
Democratization 
The first common element of multilevel governance is “that decision making 
at various territorial levels is characterized by the increased participation of 
non-state actors” (Bache and Flinders 2004, 197).  Hooghe and Marks (2001) would 
emphasize that multilevel governance also involves increased participation by sub-
units of state government, not just non-state actors.  Thus, multilevel governance 
distinguishes itself from traditional concepts of federalism which focus on only two 
territorial jurisdictions—federal and sub-national—and allocate ―ultimate legal 
responsibility in one political decision-making unit‖ (Stein and Turkewitsch 2008, 
13).   
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The North American application of a multilevel governance framework was 
undertaken by Brunet-Jailly (2008) to account for the sub-national activity taking 
place in the Pacific Northwest, such as the PNWER, and by VanNijnatten (2003) to 
account for the role of epistemic communities in the Ozone Annex.  It is also a 
suitable framework for analyzing the role of local government within various 
decision-making forums around the basin such as the aforementioned Great Lakes 
Regional Collaboration and the changing relationships between local government and 
the various stakeholders across multiple levels.   
The increased participation of local government in the environmental 
governance structure around the Great Lakes is in part an extension of the decades-
long process of devolution that has delegated authority for environmental governance 
away from the federal level to sub-national governments (Gibbins 2001; Maddock 
2004).  The shift away from traditional federal-to-federal models of transboundary 
governance across the U.S.-Canada border to models which incorporate multiple 
actors below the level of the nation-state (Norman 2009) is best illustrated by the 
adoption of the International Watershed Initiative (IWI) by the International Joint 
Commission.  In a recent report titled ―The International Watershed Initiative: 
Implementing a New Paradigm for Transboundary Water Basins‖, the IJC (2009) 
states that ―the underlying premise is that local people and institutions are often the 
best placed to anticipate, prevent or resolve many problems related to water 
resources‖ (3).  The Initiative was first presented by the International Joint 
Commission in 1997 in a report titled ―The IJC and the 21st Century‖ in response to a 
request by the governments of Canada and the United States to develop ―a better 
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integrated, more participatory‖ (3) approach to transboundary water issues with 
greater involvement by non-central state actors.  The increasing inclusion of the 
Cities Initiative within Great Lakes governance structures is indicative of this new 
approach. 
 
De-nesting and Decoupling 
This shared responsibility over decision-making brings up the second 
common element in multilevel governance studies, which is “that the identification 
of discrete or nested territorial levels of decision making is becoming more 
difficult in the context of complex overlapping networks” (Bache and Flinders 
2004, 197).  According to Hooghe and Marks (2001), relations between levels of 
government are interconnected instead of being nested like a Russian matryoshka 
doll, and this means that local governments are able to jump scales, establishing links 
with other actors, at all levels of government, as well as across national boundaries, 
without first having to pass through intermediaries.  In our Introduction, we illustrate 
this jumping of scales by describing a case of transnational environmental litigation 
involving transboundary air pollution in which the City of Toronto collaborates with 
American states and government agencies while engaging the American judicial 
system without the involvement either of the Province of Ontario or the Government 
of Canada.  The case is raised again in Chapter Four.   
Further illustrating these complex networks is the aforementioned testimony 
by Mayor Daley in front of the Senate committee in which the views of Canadian 
local governments around the Great Lakes are channeled through American local 
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governments which are then represented at the federal level of the United States 
without intermediation from either the Canadian federal or sub-national governments.  
This jumping of scales is remarkable considering that three decades earlier Ontario 
quashed the federal Ministry of State for Urban Affairs because it objected even to 
direct federal-local domestic relations. 
The multilevel nature of this framework continues the evolution of our 
conceptualization of intergovernmental relations away from zero-sum games.  For 
example, Peterson, Wong and Rabe (1986) argued that issues which affected more 
than one level should be handled by the federal government, while Rabe (1991) and 
John (1994) subsequently found that policymaking power should be located at the 
sub-national level.  However, reality dictates that environmental issues in particular 
tend to affect the global, national, regional and local level simultaneously, 
necessitating policy cooperation between governments and non-state actors 
simultaneously across multiple scales that crosses jurisdictions and bypasses levels.  
Anton (1989) and Stever (1993) did describe interactions between all levels of 
government, including local government, but these relations were still hierarchically 
organized and the sub-national level was still seen as a necessary intermediary or 
chaperone, for example, in federal-local relations.  The possibility that the local 
government could actually ‗by-pass‘ higher tiers of government was introduced by 
Agranoff and McGuire (1998), who argued that ―fundamental changes in 
intergovernmental relations and governance support the idea that intergovernmental 
management is more complex and involved than indicated by either of the zero-sum 
approaches‖ (Agranoff and McGuire 1998, 2).  Multilevel governance extended this 
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trend further by drawing attention to a fourth, supranational, level that is above the 
nation-state. 
The most relevant insight from this second element of multilevel governance 
to this dissertation is that local governments form alliances with these fourth level, 
supranational, actors to expand their policy capacity and strengthen their transnational 
networks.  The clearest evidence of this comes from the European Union where local 
governments frequently bypass their federal and sub-national governments and 
cooperate directly with the European Commission, the European Parliament, and to a 
lesser degree, the European Court of Justice in order to attain new resources, to affect 
policymaking in Brussels where close to ninety-per-cent of European law now 
originates, or even to influence domestic policy by forming coalitions with 
supranational actors against their own national governments.   
This local-supranational nexus has also been studied in the context of North 
American cross-border cooperation, and it is here where the application of multilevel 
governance tends to obscure the cross-border activities of local government, because 
it overemphasizes the importance of the supranational level in the mobilization and 
institutionalization of cross-border local government cooperation.  This is the origin 
of the paradox, wherein our more sophisticated appreciation of bilateral relations still 
neglects to account for local government. 
For instance, Brunet-Jailly (2004) used a multilevel governance framework to 
compare local-cross border relations under NAFTA and the European Union, 
focusing on the effects that dynamics at the supranational level have on cross-border 
cooperation between cities.  The author‘s approach was quite innovative, in that it 
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was the first to apply a multilevel governance framework to North American cross-
border cooperation which took into account the supranational-local nexus.  This 
approach borrows from the political opportunity literature which states that, 
―exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts 
of claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be 
exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy‖ 
(Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1458).  In the Brunet-Jailly article, NAFTA and the 
European Union are the exogenous factors.   
His basic argument is that economic integration and free-trade regimes impose 
adjustments on intergovernmental actors and intergovernmental relations in the form 
of intense market pressure, which directly impact local governments, creating intense 
inter-city economic competition which disrupts cross-border relations.  Brunet-Jailly 
then argues that the development of advanced supranational institutions such as the 
European Commission regulates these pressures and mitigates their effect, creating 
conditions in the European Union where cross-border relations ―eventually 
blossomed‖ (26), including local government cross-border cooperation, which the 
Commission actively promotes, expands and strengthens.   
The absence of such mediating supranational institutions under NAFTA, he 
argues, has meant that a ―competitive-city paradigm‖ permeates the Great Lakes 
region and local government cross-border relations in general between Canada and 
the United States dissolve in the caustic conditions of aggressive competition for jobs, 
investment, and labor, creating a situation where there is no ―co-production of 
policies spanning the border, and there are no cross-border institutions‖ (25).  Brunet-
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Jailly‘s conclusion concurs with previous studies of cross-border relations in the 
Cascadia region in the Pacific Northwest (Blatter 2001), which found that although 
some ad-hoc cross-border cooperation did exist, no institutional structure was 
detected.  Norman (2009) and Norman and Bakker (2009) concur that local actors in 
general have difficulty transcending significant barriers to transboundary cooperation. 
The evidence presented in this dissertation describing increasing local 
government cross-border environmental cooperation, increasing institutionalization of 
this cooperation in the form of transnational municipal networks, and the increasing 
formalization of local government participation in governance structures around the 
Great Lakes, challenges the conclusions by Brunet-Jailly who states that ―local actors 
primarily compete‖ (25) and that in North America ―intra-metropolitan regional 
competition exists in principle‖ (3).  The viability of the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Cities Initiative, despite the competitive pressures and the lack of 
mediating supranational infrastructure, challenges the ‗competitive-city paradigm‘ 
forthright. 
Again, Brunet-Jailly‘s (2004) mistake rests in the overestimation of the 
influence of supranational level institutions and the underestimation of local 
governments when analyzing the effects of the local-supranational nexus on local 
government cross-border relations.  This mistake is characteristic of the use of 
multilevel governance in its classic form which was marked by the stubborn tendency 
to view local governments as passive receptors of authority from national and 
supranational levels of government, rather than as actors who ―behave strategically 
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and purposefully‖ (Fairbass and Jordan 2004, 164) on their own to attain greater 
policy capacity for themselves.   
Charlie Jeffery (2000) spearheaded this critique that precipitated the current 
drive to develop ―a more comprehensive conception of multi-level governance‖ (9) 
one which takes into account a ‗bottom-up‘ dimension to sub-national and local 
government mobilization treating local governments as active subjects rather than 
passive players.  Jeffery argues that what is fundamentally problematic about the 
classic multilevel governance approach is that it focused primarily on the central state 
and the European supranational level as determinants of the parameters of multilevel 
governance.  According to Jeffery, sub-national actors (SNAs), which according to 
his definition, includes local governments, 
…are typically portrayed as essentially inconsequential and passive 
players until either an incidental by-product of central state-EU 
interplay provides an opportunity for mobilization, or a central 
government decision is taken which passes decision-making powers 
down to SNAs.  The perspective remains primarily a ‗top-down‘ one.  
This perspective plays down the possibility that SNAs may 
themselves, and from the ‗bottom-up‘, actively seek to change and 
succeed in changing those dynamics in ways which facilitate European 
policy mobilization (Jeffery 2000, 8). 
 
In contrast to Brunet-Jailly (2004), who emphasized ‗top-down‘ over ‗bottom-up‘ 
dynamics, this dissertation attempts to incorporate both perspectives.  Granted, 
Chapter Four of this dissertation, Breaking the Formal Bounds of Federalism, spends 
considerable effort on describing ‗top-down‘ dynamics, namely, the rebalancing of 
intergovernmental relations between federal-state and federal-provincial 
governments, which precipitated the opening up political space for the expansion of 
multilevel governance and local government policy capacity, but subsequent chapters 
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are dedicated to highlighting the ‗bottom up‘ dynamics by demonstrating that, around 
the Great Lakes, local governments actively push the boundaries of the multilevel 
governance system without assistance from the supranational level, that they have 
succeeded in attaining a seat at the decision-making table in various forums, and that 
they are successfully pushing for greater institutionalization of that expanded policy 
capacity, again, largely on their own in the context of a largely non-existent, 
overarching supranational structure.  In this manner, we avoid the aforementioned 
local trap (Brown and Purcell 2005), by starting from the assumption that ―scales and 
scalar relationships are the object and outcome of political struggle‖ (620), and that it 
is not the ‗top-down‘ rescaling of the governance architecture itself which empowers 
local government, although it does provide favorable conditions in which enterprising 
local governments may empower themselves. 
The fact that local governments were able to institutionalize cross-border 
cooperation in the form of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative in a 
North American context supposedly ruled by caustic market forces disruptive of 
cross-border linkages, and minus the counterbalancing supranational structures, 
indicates that the effects of these market forces are themselves exaggerated.  The 
dominant perception is that cities are slaves to the market.  Bulkeley and Betsill 
(2003) conclude from their case studies involving cities from Australia, the United 
States and the United Kingdom that ―where protecting the climate [or environment] 
conflicts with other social and economic goals, such as economic restoration or the 
interests of particular local industries, any political will towards the former 
disappears‖ (185).  It is widely argued that the increased mobility of capital in a 
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globalized world has meant that local governments will align their policies with 
industry for fear of losing investment opportunities (Graham 1995; Leo 2002; 
Pendras 2002).  Consequently, as McAllister (2004) observes, ―from this perspective, 
local governments might be seen as little more than captive agents of private-sector 
forces efficiently organizing social processes for the benefit of propertied interests‖ 
(20).  Peterson (1981) observed very early on that cities have few policy options 
because they are limited by intense market forces.  To these arguments, Brunet-Jailly 
(2004) simply adds that economic integration under NAFTA has only intensified 
intra-city competition over investments and jobs to such a degree that, absent 
mediating supranational structures, it precludes the ability of local government to 
establish institutionalized forms of cross-border cooperation in North America, which 
is why, he concludes, ―there are no cross-border institutions‖ (25) involving local 
government. 
However, this dissertation joins emerging studies that are beginning to 
question whether cities really are slaves to free-market competition and beholden to 
private interests.  For example, Sutcliffe (2006) demonstrates the ability of the City of 
Windsor to develop a position regarding the construction of an international bridge 
that runs counter to the stated interests of major local industries, concluding that 
individual local governments are ―capable of developing policy positions 
autonomously of business interests‖ (14).  Of course, as already stated, the simple 
existence of the Cities Initiative suggests that local governments are able to overcome 
market forces by establishing and institutionalizing cross-border cooperation.  
Furthermore, Chapter Six in this dissertation, Transnational Municipal Networks and 
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the Effective Deployment of Informal Powers: Opposition to the Expansion of British 
Petroleum’s (BP) Whiting Refinery, presents a case study which demonstrates that 
local governments are capable of developing common positions autonomously of 
business interests, even positions which challenge those interests directly, and that 
they can succeed in altering the trajectory of policy decisions backed by major 
industries and higher tiers of government.  This dissertation adds that transnational 
municipal networks are able to transcend the ‗competitive city paradigm‘ on issues 
with ―material cross-border interdependencies‖ (Blatter 193). 
Therefore, exogenous factors such as supranational institutions and market 
forces should be acknowledged but not exaggerated when it comes to local 
government cross-border cooperation in North America.  This balanced approach is 
reflected in this dissertation. Hence, Chapters Five and Six do spend considerable 
effort considering how supranational institutions under the European Union and 
NAFTA influence the structure and behavior of transnational municipal networks 
and, in turn, both their policy capacity and their effectiveness.  However, it should 
quickly become apparent that much of their destiny rests with local governments 
themselves.   
Jeffery‘s (2000) critique alludes to the effect of self-governance by pointing 
out three intervening variables requiring our attention that influence the degree to 
which local governments are able to attain greater political authority.  These variables 
include the level of entrepreneurship, the degree of legitimacy and social capital, and 
the quality of intergovernmental relations. 
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(i) Entrepreneurship 
An important factor determining the influence of local government in the 
governing structure is what Jeffery terms ―the level of entrepreneurship in sub-
national mobilization‖ (14).  He argues that ―the effective administrative adaptation, 
leadership, and coalition-building strategies…are likely to improve the prospects or 
influencing…decision-making‖ (14).  It has been observed that the effectiveness of 
transnational municipal networks rests in large part on the efforts of so-called 
‗pioneers‘, those cities that already adopt environmentally progressive policies (Kern 
and Loffelsend 2008), and especially on deeply committed mayors and individuals 
that act as policy entrepreneurs (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003; Kern and Bulkeley 2009).  
The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative also has a polycentric governance 
structure centered around two global cities—Toronto and Chicago—which generate 
much of the ideas, set the policy direction and provide the political muscle for the 
network.  It will be interesting to follow how the Cities Initiative responds to the fact 
that Toronto Mayor David Miller—a dynamic member, co-founder, and longtime 
Canadian chair of the network—recently announced he will not seek reelection in 
2010.  It raises the question whether the network is entrenched enough to survive the 
exit of such a key player. 
 
(ii) Legitimacy and Social Capital 
The effectiveness of the strategies adopted by the leadership of transnational 
municipal networks is dependent on a second factor, what Jeffery terms legitimacy 
and social capital.  He argues that ―the credibility of SNA claims for influence 
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in…decision-making is likely to be enhanced by the perceived legitimacy which 
SNAs bring with them into the …policy process‖ (17).  What legitimacy means for 
Jeffery (2000) is the extent to which the strategies and policies pursued by local 
governments reflect ―the values or social representations of the population 
concerned‖ (Smith quoted in Jeffery 17).  In other words, the strength of the position 
of sub-national actors vis-à-vis other actors depends on perceptions of the level of 
support sub-national actors enjoy from the population they represent. This legitimacy 
is strengthened ―where there is a well-developed civil society, a sense of identity, 
civic traditions, an associative life, and relationships of confidence and exchange 
within the territory‖ (Keating 1996 quoted in Jeffery, 17).  Thus, for example, the 
reason why sub-national regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Country are more 
influential within the European Union is that ―they constitute not just competence-
strong political units…but also firmly established civil societies‖ (17) and thus their 
―claims for a share in European decision-making processes will be high and less easy 
for central state institutions to ignore or deflect‖ (17).  Therefore, in short, Jeffery 
acknowledges identity as a source of local government authority.   
However, such territorial identities are lacking in the Great Lakes region.  In 
its relationships with other actors, the Cities Initiative cannot point to a Great Lakes 
constituency with a shared identity supporting its actions.  A Policy Research Institute 
(2005) report sponsored by the Government of Canada, entitled The Emergence of 
Cross-Border Regions, has determined that although there is greater affinity in values 
and philosophies between Americans and Canadians living within a region (i.e. Great 
Lakes) than there is, for example, between Canadians living in different regions (i.e. 
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Great Lakes vs. Cascadia), these affinities do not translate into territorially based or 
geographically defined identities.  With regards to the Great Lakes itself the report 
finds that there is ―little sense of identity‖ (12).  Consequently, local governments and 
the Cities Initiative cannot draw on a Great Lakes identity as a source of credibility or 
to further legitimize its actions.  This condition has ramifications for the kind of 
strategy local governments can pursue.  In the case of the Cities Initiative, local 
governments must improve their legitimacy and credibility by other means.   
If, as has been argued, pursuing policies that accord with the population 
increases legitimacy, the Cities Initiative must define ‗the population‘ broadly.  In the 
Great Lakes context, the population not only includes the popular will, and the 
environmental epistemic communities, but also territorial interest groups such as 
industry and, above all, higher tiers of government.  One phrase that was repeated 
during interviews with Great Lakes mayors is that they must simultaneously ‗wear 
more than one hat‘.  They cannot afford to alienate any constituents, but they 
especially cannot afford to alienate higher tiers of government and industry.  Their 
political latitude is thus limited.  Therefore, as a result, they tend to seek out, identify 
and pursue policies that are positive-sum for all the parties involved.  Rarely will 
transnational municipal networks venture too far ahead of what the political and 
business communities consider permissible.  A corollary to this first strategy is that 
the Cities Initiative garners legitimacy and is invited into the governance structure by 
its ability to provide governments and industry with expertise and information that 
will allow them to develop and implement policy more efficiently and helps them 
avoid negative attention.  Hence, transnational municipal networks in North America 
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are forced to assume the posture of a regional diplomat around the basin.  Their 
authority emanates considerably less from who they are (i.e. who they represent), 
than what they do (i.e. what resources they contribute, how they behave vis-à-vis 
other actors etc.). 
 
(iii) Intergovernmental Relations 
Finally, Jeffery (2000) argues that the quality of intergovernmental relations 
between local governments and higher tiers of government (sub-national, national, 
supranational) is the third important intervening variable determining the level of 
influence local governments are able to generate.  He argues that ―formal structures 
… of intergovernmental relations are likely to provide more effective channels for 
policy influence than more informal interactions‖ (14).   
This dissertation demonstrates that the difference in the quality of 
intergovernmental relations is a crucial distinction between European and North 
American transnational municipal networks.  As Chapter Five illustrates, the greater 
formal institutionalization of relations between local governments and national, as 
well as supranational, actors within the European Union provides European 
transnational municipal networks with more political opportunities for exercising 
policy influence and provides more resources for the expansion of the network.  
Meanwhile, local government policy capacity around the Great Lakes is rooted 
predominantly in informal structures, and the institutionalization of relations between 
local and national and supranational actors remains weak, leading to transnational 
municipal networks in North America that are relatively stunted in their structure and 
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behavior.  However, as will be demonstrated, the process of institutionalizing these 
relations has already begun, with new formal platforms of exchange between different 
levels of government either erected or being proposed. 
 
 De-formalization  
The third component of the multilevel framework which speaks directly to the 
meaning of governance, is that “in this changing context the role of the state is 
being transformed as state actors develop new strategies of coordination, 
steering, and networking to protect and, in some cases, enhance state autonomy” 
(Bache and Flinders 2004, 197).  This transformation in the role of the state is 
predominantly characterized as a transition from government to governance or ―from 
statist command-and-control systems to horizontal networked forms of participatory 
governance‖ (Swyngedouw 2005, 2002), inclusive of a greater array of actors.  The 
best way to understand this change is by contrasting the terms government with 
governance.  According to Rosenau (1992), 
Both refer to purposive behavior, to goal-oriented activities, to systems 
of rule; but government suggests activities rather are backed by formal 
authority, by police powers to ensure the implementation of duly 
constituted policies, whereas governance refers to activities backed by 
shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally 
prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police 
powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance.  Governance, in 
other words, is a more encompassing phenomenon than government.  
It embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, 
non-governmental mechanisms whereby persons and organizations 
within its purview move ahead, satisfy their needs, and fulfill their 
wants (4, italics introduced by author for emphasis). 
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That the state is undergoing some sort of reorganization is rather settled, but scholars 
disagree over how this transformation has changed the relationship between the 
central-government and other stakeholders (Joas et al. 2008).   
According to Lundqvist (2004),  for one group of scholars, the move toward 
governance symbolizes an erosion of central state authority and ―central government 
is seen as dwindling to a position of one among equals within a structure of 
governance consisting of inter-linked networks…mutually interdependent on each 
other for resources such as money, expertise and legitimacy‖ (19).  The other side 
argues that although central governments are in fact playing a greater coordinating 
role within network governance, hierarchical relations characteristic of traditional 
government remain intact, central governments still determine the rules of the game 
and maintain control over critical resources and powers.  Furthermore, although 
central governments distribute some peripheral tasks and responsibilities to different 
agents, they do so not as the result of an unintended erosion of authority, but in order 
to co-opt social interests and thus ‗supplement‘ or strengthen their power (Keohane 
and Nye 2000; Pierre and Peters 2000). 
In her study of transboundary water governance along the United States-
Canada border, Norman (2009) argues that the process of glocalization must be 
decoupled from the ‗hollowing out of the state‘ as the higher tiers of government 
ultimately retain their powers and authority.  This dissertation similarly posits that it 
is possible to stake a middle ground where new governance structures and strategies 
are not perceived to replace or weaken the old government ones, but instead they 
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emerge outside, interdependent of, parallel and complementary to, those old 
structures, in what Swyngedouw (2005) terms ‗governance-beyond-the-state‘. 
What matters for our study of the new role of local government around the 
Great Lakes, is that governance-beyond-the-state entails the opening up of new 
spheres of policymaking where our definition of the role of government moves away 
―from a role based in constitutional powers‖ (Pierre and Peters 2000, 25).  
Consequently, this new sphere is recognized as the site for the heretofore expansion 
of local government policy capacity in North America, one which provides novel 
avenues through which local governments might escape their otherwise tight 
constitutional constraints in their relations with other actors (Sancton and Robert 
2004; Sutcliffe 2004; Tindal and Tindal 2004; Sutcliffe 2006; Valiante 2007). 
 
(i) Type I and Type II Multilevel Governance 
An important conceptual innovation within multilevel governance which 
further clarifies this transformation of the state and, especially, the interdependent 
relationship between the new and old structures and strategies, was introduced by 
Hooghe and Marks (2003) who subdivided multilevel governance into two types—
Type I and Type II—essentially a formal and informal sphere of governance that 
―embody contrasting visions of collective decision-making‖ (Marks and Hooghe 
2004, 29) but which are nevertheless complementary.  These two types of governance 
describe two different and co-existing organizational structures governed by two 
different norms of interaction between actors.   
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Type I multilevel governance closely resembles traditional federal systems 
and has four defining characteristics.  It is composed of general purpose jurisdictions 
where decision-making authority over a number of policies is bundled together and 
located at discrete territorial levels.  It is characterized by non-intersecting 
memberships, meaning, memberships at the national, sub-national, regional and local 
level of government do not intersect, and membership is defined territorially.  
Government is composed of a limited number of jurisdictions, traditionally, between 
a national, intermediary, and local level.  Finally, the loci of decision-making are 
characterized by a system-wide, durable architecture, which typically includes a 
legislature, executive and judiciary which are difficult to amend.   
Type II multilevel governance also has four defining characteristics, but it is 
composed of task-specific jurisdictions where authority that is dispersed is organized 
around solving specific problems or carrying out specific tasks.  It is characterized by 
intersecting memberships where borders and jurisdictions can be crossed, and where 
the activities of lower jurisdictions are not necessarily contained within the 
boundaries of higher jurisdictions. Further, governance operates across many 
jurisdictional levels, meaning that it is organized across a large number of levels 
which are not organized hierarchically but are composed of public and private actors 
collaborating in shifting coalitions.  Finally, the decision-making architecture is 
characterized by a flexible design in which actors are free to join or exit the structure, 
which itself can be taken down as quickly as it is erected, once a task is accomplished 
or problem solved.  Relationships between members are not fixed but constantly 
negotiated. 
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Recognizing these two types of multilevel governance with distinct 
organizational logics and norms of interaction helps to locate the source of expanded 
local government policy capacity in North America, namely, in informal, Type II 
governance structures.  In contrast, in Europe, for instance, the empowerment of sub-
national and local authorities is in large measure the result of ―a deep and broad 
reallocation of authority from central states to regions in the European Union‖ (Marks 
and Hooghe 2004, 23) from political decentralization that has transpired in the more 
formal, and more effective Type-I multilevel governance in addition to Type II 
structures.  The vital importance of Type II structures is that they allow us to explain 
how the expansion of local government policy capacity is occurring without a 
concomitant transfer of formal constitutional authority and resources downward, in 
other words, in contexts such as North American where the formal Type I structures 
and relations have been relatively stable and no such dramatic re-allocations of 
authority have taken place thus far. 
The informal, Type-II governance mechanisms, according to Rhodes (1996), 
for the most part take the shape of ―self-organizing, interorganizational networks‖ 
(660) composed of private and public actors, and it is argued that these networks 
increasingly constitute the structure of European governance and decision-making 
(Leach and Percy-Smith 2001; Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 2004).  Theorizing 
European Union governance ―as nonhierarchical, mobilizing networks of private and 
public actors who engage in deliberation and problem-solving efforts guided as much 
by informal norms as formal institutions‖ (Pollack 2005, 380) distinguishes the 
governance approach from a traditional rationalist framework which ―theorizes the 
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EU as a political system in which formal rules shape the behavior of governmental 
and non-governmental actors‖ (Pollack 2005, 380).  The transition towards an 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) model in the form of the 
International Watershed Initiative (IWI) demonstrates that environmental 
policymaking around the Great Lakes basin is also showing evidence that decision-
making is increasingly taking the form of these kinds of ‗self-organizing, 
interorganizational networks‘ illustrated also by the Great Lakes Regional 
Collaboration. 
Once formed, these new Type-II decision-making structures, these networks, 
beget new logics, new strategies, and new behaviors.  Peters and Pierre argue on 
separate occasions that ―the novelty of governance is the emphasis of process over 
institution‖ (2004, 77) and that ―political power and institutional capability is less and 
less derived from formal powers accorded the state but more from a capacity to wield 
and coordinate resources from public and private actors and interests‖ (2001, 131).  In 
distinguishing itself further from traditional, rationalist assumptions of 
intergovernmental relations, the multilevel governance approach borrows heavily 
from constructivist theories in particular by emphasizing, for example, ―the capacity 
of the EU to foster deliberation and persuasion, a model of policy making in which 
actors are open to changing their beliefs and their preferences and in which good 
arguments can matter as much or more than bargaining power‖ (Pollack 2005, 380).  
From these assumptions, it is possible to explain the ability of weak actors 
such a local governments to break the bounds of their limited formal authority 
without significant transfers of formal powers or resources downward from higher 
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tiers of government, by positing that such changes have taken place as a result of 
cognitive reforms within higher levels of government.  Furthermore, through 
‗deliberation and persuasion‘, backed by information and expertise, local 
governments are able to play a larger role, and wield more influence, then their 
constitutional powers would otherwise suggest due to their own political 
entrepreneurialism. 
This transformation of the state and the burgeoning of innovative structures is 
perhaps best illustrated by the European Union‘s Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC), which was institutionalized by the Lisbon European Council in 2001, and 
which alters not only the structure but the logic of decision-making.  The OMC is a 
platform for multi-level deliberations between state and non-state actors based on a 
vision of deliberative democracy in which ―informal norms, deliberation, good 
arguments, and consensus matter more than formal voting rules…[which]…recede 
into the background in favor of a collective search for the technically best solution to 
a given policy problem‖ (Pollack 2005, 388).  The OMC is characterized ―by 
common guidelines and objectives, by…indicators, by the elaboration of national 
action plans…by a joint evaluation of the results, by peer reviews and the exchange 
of best practices and by the continuous repetition of this cycle‖ (Heidenreich and 
Bischoff 2008, 501).  The OMC is intended to complement, not replace, the more 
formal EU decision-making processes which are characterized by traditional 
rationalist logic of strategic bargaining, utility maximization, and traditional 
constructivist logic of appropriateness and rule-guided behavior.  These informal, 
deliberative structures are based on Risse‘s (2004) third logic of social action—the 
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logic of arguing—which ―implies that the participants in a discourse are open to 
being persuaded by the better argument and that relationships of power and social 
hierarchies recede in the background‖ (7) thus holding that ―actors‘ interests, 
preferences, and the perceptions of the situation are no longer fixed but subject to 
discursive challenges‖ (7).   
Such a method of coordination infused with the logic of arguing, is just now 
beginning to emerge in the North American context.  For instance, Chapter Five of 
this dissertation analyzes the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), a 
supranational agency tasked with administrating the environmental sub-agreement to 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which provides a novel venue 
for public and private actors across multiple levels to deliberate outside the formal 
machinery of government, much like the OMC.  The Great Lakes Regional 
Collaboration is another example of this kind of governance which provides local 
governments with the opportunity to influence the trajectory of policymaking via the 
strength of their discursive challenges and the credibility they are able to develop 
with various stakeholders.  The International Watersheds Initiative (IWI) developed 
by the International Joint Commission is a third example. 
 
Disorganization and Democratic Deficit 
The fourth element speaks to the ramifications of multilevel governance and 
holds that ―in this changing context, the nature of democratic accountability has 
been challenged and needs to be rethought or at least reviewed” (Bache and 
Flinders 2004, 197).  This last understanding of governance points to the second 
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branch of the multilevel governance approach which is rooted in a normative critique 
of multilevel governance and the development of the European Union in general 
(Pollack 2005).  Two lines of criticism have emerged.  First, the complexity of 
multilevel governance due to the proliferation of actors in the decision-making 
process and the absence of clear lines of authority has reduced transparency and 
accountability (Bache and Flinders 2004).  This state of affairs reflects the old adage 
that if everyone is in charge, no one is in charge.  Second, Peters and Pierre (2004) 
argue that a Faustian bargain has been struck, where ―the capacity to govern has been 
sold, or at least has been downgraded, in an attempt to achieve more open and 
inclusive bargaining, and in order to circumvent formal structures that have been 
central to governing and to intergovernmental allocations in many systems‖ (88).  
The emphasis on informal exchanges and structures presents the dual-problem that 
state actors could use this complexity as a means for evading responsibility and 
accountability and for political interests to escape regulation in the absence of a 
central authority (Peters and Pierre 2004, 84).  As Chapter Four of this dissertation 
will demonstrate, both of these are valid concerns with regards to accountability 
around the Great Lakes basin, and in terms of the general state of water quality 
regulation in North America as the aforementioned New York Times article, ―Toxic 
Waters‖ attests. 
Rather than ending this train of thought as a critique of multilevel governance, 
George (2004) alludes to the fact that this accountability gap can serve as an 
important catalyst for the further mobilization of sub-national actors including local 
government.  Whereas George (2004) interprets this mobilization on the part of sub-
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national actors as their way to augment or protect their authority, Chapter Five of this 
dissertation demonstrates that this mobilization also serves to redress the 
accountability gap by galvanizing local governments into a regulatory role or 
watchdog role, pointing out the accountability gaps in the regulatory process and 
putting pressure on higher governments to repair that gap.   
With regards to environmental policy around the Great Lakes, subsequent 
chapters will demonstrate that local governments mobilize in response to the growing 
accountability gap on functional terms, because they object to the financial burdens 
that central government retrenchment places on local government in environmental 
management and, from a normative standpoint, they object to the sharp disconnect 
between their significant and increasing fiscal contributions to environmental 
management in the basin and their relative political insignificance in the decision-
making process.   
Furthermore, from a normative standpoint, they object to what they perceive 
to be a gross imbalance in the economic and environmental aims pursued by higher 
tiers of government.  As Chapter Six demonstrates, one of the ways in which local 
government mobilization manifests itself is that they act as a ballast between 
environmental and economic concerns in the policies of higher tiers of government 
and the activities of industry, acting as a watchdog or whistleblower when that 
balance is tipped too far in favor of private economic interests.  Thus, local 
government mobilization addresses both the accountability gap and the democratic 
deficit within environmental management in the basin.  Consequently, this 
dissertation demonstrates that there is a ‗bright side‘ to the ‗dark side‘ of multilevel 
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governance in the form of highly mobilized local governments that introduce a new 
self-monitoring and self-correcting mechanism into the system. 
 
 
Multilevel Governance and Polycentricity: Local Governments as Vital Components 
of Systems Addressing Common-Pool Resource Problems 
 
The findings presented in this dissertation that local governments, through the 
transnational municipal network, are adding another layer of oversight to the 
management of Great Lakes water quality fits nicely with recent findings in the study 
of common-pool resources.  A common-pool resource is a large resource (i.e. forest, 
air-shed, or a lake) whose use is difficult to control because it is difficult to 
differentiate legitimate from illegitimate users and thus exclude the latter.  
Furthermore, these resources are ‗subtractable‘, meaning that one person‘s use 
diminishes benefits for other users.  The central concern of this scholarship has been 
to develop a system of management that prevents the ‗Tragedy of the Commons‘ 
from occurring, which is the exhaustion of the common-pool resource due to overuse 
(Hardin 1968).  Until recently, this debate was also framed in zero-sum terms.  The 
push toward centralization of resource management in the 1970s and 1980s gave way 
to ―the decentralization euphoria of the 1990s‖ (Andersson and Ostrom 2008, 72) 
which promoted placing control of natural resources in the hands of local actors.  In 
the last decade, however, research from local government resource management has 
shown mixed results leading scholars to ask, why does local control over resource 
management work in some cases and not in others (Andersson and Ostrom 2008)?  
Recall the emerging consensus within political ecology literature which posits 
that ―the characteristics of a given scale or scalar arrangement cannot be assumed a 
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priori; rather the social and ecological outcomes of any particular scalar arrangement 
are the result of the political strategies of particular actors, not the inherent qualities 
of particular scales‖ (Brown and Purcell 2005, 609).  According to Andersson and 
Ostrom (2008), success is not determined by whether resource management is 
centralized or de-centralized, but by the quality of relationships among actors with 
overlapping jurisdictions operating across different levels.  Such systems, involving 
higher-level participation on the part of multiple stakeholders has been called 
polycentricity (Ostrom et al. 1961) or more recently collaborative planning (Frame et 
al. 2004).  Andersson and Ostrom (2008) argue that imperfections exist at any one 
level of governance, and these imperfections can be offset by ‗complementary back-
up institutions‘ existing at higher or lower levels of governance (73).  In other words, 
―a governance system that manages to distribute capabilities and duties in such a way 
that perverse incentive and information problems at one level are offset to some 
extent by positive incentives and information capabilities or actors at other levels, 
will achieve better outcomes than either a highly centralized or fully decentralized 
system‖ (Andersson and Ostrom 2008, 73).  However, the effectiveness of such 
systems is not pre-determined, but relies on the relationships forged by the actors 
involved. 
Hence, the ability of local governments to embed themselves in the 
environmental governance structure around the Great Lakes, largely through the 
institutionalization of cross-border cooperation and the establishment of a 
transnational municipal network, not only serves the political purpose of local 
government, increasing its presence and policy capacity, but potentially provides a 
73 
‗complementary back-up institution‘ to federal and state authorities thereby 
supporting a moth-eaten regulatory system.  Furthermore, local governments acting as 
diplomats seeking positive-sum solutions may also improve or strengthen the quality 
of relations between all actors involved in the basin thus enhancing the governance 
system (Andersson and Ostrom 2008).  Again, the key vehicle in both these 
transformations has been the internationalization of local government manifested 
through transnational municipal networks. 
 
 
Multilevel Governance and Regional Cross-Border Cooperation in North America 
and Comparisons Abroad 
 
Multilevel governance is a natural framework for analyzing regional, cross-
border cooperation at the level of local government taking place within the Great 
Lakes basin.  Liesbet and Hooghe (2004) argue that ―type II jurisdictions are common 
in cross-border regions, especially in North America and Europe.  Ad hoc, problem 
driven jurisdictions in the form of inter regional commissions, task forces, and inter-
city agencies have mushroomed over the past three decades‖ (25), adding that Type II 
governance structures are ―widespread at the local level‖ (26), and ―appear where 
local communities are faced with local common pool resource problems‖ (27).   
Yet, the recent consensus from studies examining multilevel governance in 
the European context (Carmichael 2005; Marshall 2005) and comparative analyses 
involving multiple countries including those in Europe, North America and Africa 
(Lazar and Leuprecht 2007), is that multilevel governance has developed more fully 
outside the North American context where there are greater opportunities for local 
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government mobilization.  The question thus becomes, how great is the gap between 
multilevel governance in Europe and North America and, consequently, how great the 
continental gap between local government policy capacity? 
In their study of eight countries, Lazar and Leuprecht (2007) conclude that 
municipalities in France, Germany, Spain, Mexico, South Africa and Switzerland ―are 
maturing constitutionally as a distinctive sphere of government‖ (7) and 
interdependence between levels of government is increasingly recognized.  The South 
African Constitution (1996) is touted as exceptional in that it formally recognizes 
municipalities as one of three spheres of government that are, ―distinctive, 
interdependent, and interrelated‖ (quoted in Leuprecht and Lazar 2007, 7), and 
because it mandates that local government be given an opportunity to comment on 
national and provincial legislation ―that affects the status, institutions, powers or 
functions of local government‖ (quoted in Leuprecht and Lazar, 7).   
In contrast, Vogel (2007) concludes in his analysis of multilevel governance 
in the United States that ―the federal partnership with cities has completely 
evaporated‖ (288) and that ―national policymaking is made without reference to the 
problems of cities and with little direct input from city officials‖ (271).  
Municipalities within the Canadian multilevel governance system do not fair better.  
Gattinger (2008) argues that ―Canada‘s overall multi-level governance system is 
underdeveloped, particularly at the institutional level. No formal mechanisms exist 
for federal, provincial, and municipal levels of government to coordinate and 
collaborate on joint issues on an ongoing basis‖ (1).  Relations between the federal 
and local governments remain ad hoc (Berdhal 2006), and ―there is little evidence of 
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a coherent agenda [or] systematic co-ordination‖ (Bradford 2004, 7) between the 
three levels of government, while overall ―municipalities still struggle with a 
centuries-old subordination to provincial governments‖ (Bradford 2004, 7).  The gap 
between the two continents appears to be yawning.   
However, again, the establishment of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities 
Initiative and its growing participation in various policymaking arenas, at the very 
least suggests that the generalizations about retarded North American multilevel 
governance should be tempered or at minimum include a caveat which points to the 
expansion of multilevel environmental governance around the basin as a counter-
example. 
In one of the very few comparative analyses of multilevel governance in 
Europe and North America to date, Blatter (2001) emphasizes not only the 
differences but the continuing divergence of the two continental multilevel 
governance systems by arguing that cross-border cooperation in Europe is evolving 
into a multi-level system’ which is ―formalized, comprehensive and territorially 
defined‖ while in North America a multi-level polity  is emerging where ―only 
informal, specific and non-territorial institutions are evolving‖ (175).   
Interestingly enough, Blatter keeps the door open to the possibility that a 
significant degree of convergence could eventually take place, by stating,  
The hypothesis that we are witnessing divergent paths of polity change 
in Europe and North America might be challenged by the observation 
that the current state of affairs in the border regions in North America 
resembles the situation in Western Europe at the end of the 1960s and 
the beginning of the 1970s when the first limited cross-border linkages 
emerged.  A functionalist would assume that North America will catch 
up and that soon we will see the development of a full-blown, 
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territorially based polity in North America on the continental and the 
borderlands level (202). 
   
Blatter‘s concluding paragraph could very well be, in fact, the starting paragraph for 
this dissertation which demonstrates that multilevel governance, and the policy 
capacity of local governments within that system, is expanding, at least around the 
Great Lakes basin and, therefore, the gap between multilevel governance around 
North American and European water basins, for example between the Great Lakes 
and the Baltic Sea, may well be shrinking. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 This chapter explains the methods used in this study to gather data on the 
expansion of local government policy capacity in bilateral environmental politics 
around the Great Lakes, the manifestation of this expansion through a transnational 
municipal network called the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, and the 
effectiveness of increased local government participation in environmental 
policymaking around the basin.  The growing emphasis in the study of Political 
Science on policy-relevant research and the observation by Hugh Heclo (1972) that 
―there remains great untapped potential in the use of case studies for policy analysis‖ 
(93) motivates both the exploration of this particular subject matter and the use of 
case studies as the dominant technique within this research. 
 
Case Studies 
Orum et al. (1991) define a case-study as ―an in-depth, multifaceted 
investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon‖ (2).  
The major advantage of case studies, over quantitative, statistical analyses, is that 
they permit the study of complex phenomena within a ―real life context‖ (Scholz and 
Tietje 2002) thereby providing a greater level of conceptual validity.  Furthermore, a 
case study is appropriate where ―the universe of cases is too small for a statistical 
analysis‖ (Walt 1996, 15), as is the case with transnational municipal networks.  A 
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case study is also superior to historical analyses particularly in recent or ongoing 
phenomena because of ―its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence—documents, 
artifacts, interviews and observations—beyond what might be available in a 
conventional historical study‖ (Yin 2003, 8). 
The use of different types of case studies should be tailored to the particular 
research objective pursued and to the stage of the research project (George and 
Bennett 2005).  Yin (1993) identifies three types of case studies: exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory.  Exploratory case studies typically reflect the early 
stages of research within a nascent body of research on a particular phenomenon 
requiring basic data collection to establish the basis for identifying patterns and 
formulating basic hypotheses.  Descriptive case studies are more advanced in that 
they describe the characteristics of a particular phenomenon through data collection 
that is guided by already established theories or models.  The more advanced 
explanatory case studies seek to identify causal mechanisms and investigate ‗how‘ or 
‗why‘ certain events occur.  This dissertation employs a multiple-case-study approach 
which utilizes all three types of case studies.  This  strategy reflects the ―growing 
consensus that the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use 
of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single 
study or research program‖ (George and Bennett 2005, 18) and it also reflects the 
multiple theory-building research objectives of the dissertation (George and Bennett 
2005). 
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Case One: The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative 
The first type of case study employed is a combined exploratory and 
descriptive case study of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative.  It is 
exploratory because there has been no previous research on the Cities Initiative or any 
other North American transnational municipal network.  It is descriptive because the 
data collected on the Cities Initiative will be guided by models established by 
previous research on European transnational municipal networks (Heinelt and 
Niederhafner 2005; Kern and Bulkeley 2009).   
This case study of the Cities Initiative contains three research objectives 
(George and Bennett 2005).  In the first instance, it is a building block study, which 
will provide thick descriptions of a particular subtype or subclass of actor or event 
thus distinguishing it from the general phenomenon.  Thus, the building block 
contributes to typological theorizing by identifying variance, in this case, within the 
class of transnational actors and variance within the subclass of transnational 
municipal networks.  Next, the case study serves a heuristic objective by seeking to 
identify new variables which affect the structure and behavior of transnational 
municipal networks, which is achieved through a unique ‗cross-case comparison‘ 
between European and North American transnational municipal networks.  An 
impetus for including such a comparative component was the symposium on Trans-
border Water Governance sponsored by The Academies of Arts, Humanities and 
Sciences of Canada (RSC), which concluded that ―there is a need for more 
international governance research [around the Great Lakes] and comparison with 
other trans-boundary water governance areas like the Baltics‖ (RSC, 2005).  Finally, 
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there is an element of theory testing within the case study.  The competitive-city 
paradigm (Brunet-Jailly 2004) posits that severe market pressures and lack of 
mediating supranational institutions in North America preclude local government 
cross-border cooperation from becoming institutionalized.  Identifying a functioning 
transnational municipal network around the Great Lakes basin and demonstrating its 
increasing embeddedness within the governance structure represents a least likely 
scenario that would challenge the competitive-city paradigm. 
 
Case Two: The British Petroleum Refinery Dispute 
The second case study will focus on the dispute surrounding the British 
Petroleum refinery expansion which ignited in the summer of 2007.  British 
Petroleum was granted a pollution permit by the State of Indiana to dump fifty-
percent more waste into Lake Michigan after it completes a $3 billion expansion of its 
refinery thereby allowing it to process Canadian oil sands petroleum.  Support came 
from all levels of government and industry.  This is a clear case where environmental 
concerns yielded to strategic and economic considerations.  Nonetheless, opposition 
was mobilized to the permit and to the expansion, and it succeeded in reducing 
discharges while instigating a comprehensive regulatory review by the State of 
Indiana to improve accountability.  The purpose of this case study is to analyze the 
degree to which local government, and the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities 
Initiative, were involved in mobilizing the opposition and to measure the effects of 
the opposition on the policy result and the policy process.  A significant portion of the 
chapter is dedicated to establishing the political and economic context surrounding 
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the British Petroleum refinery dispute, specifically, the unfavorable political climate 
where intense pressure at the highest levels of government for expeditiously 
expanding the petroleum supply made any opposition delaying refinery expansion on 
the part of local government risky and highly unlikely, particularly when considering 
that the case involved dimensions of energy, economic, security and environmental 
policy and simultaneously affected local, regional, sub-national and federal 
governments across the continent. 
This study begins with a ‗within case study‘ with a theory testing objective.  It 
addresses a central question raised by the second branch of multilevel governance 
theory focusing on the democratic quality of network governance: can non-central 
state actors affect policymaking in multilevel governance systems and under what 
conditions are they most effective (Peters and Pierre 2004).  The first part of this 
second case study sets itself up as a difficult or least likely case.  Local governments 
traditionally conceived as appendages of federal and sub-national governments and 
captives of industry are not expected to successfully mobilize opposition to a refinery 
expansion project backed by both government and industry.  Furthermore, the 
competitive-city paradigm (Brunet-Jailly 2004) predicts that cross-border local 
government cooperation is expected to dissolve in the context of high material 
interdependencies where jobs and investment are at stake (Blatter 2001).  Even if they 
do mobilize, however, local governments are subsequently not expected to have 
influence over the policy process or policy results which, within a multilevel 
governance setting, are expected to be driven by dominant actors (Peters and Pierre 
2004).  Hence, we focus on two dependent variables.  The first dependent variable is 
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the ability of local governments to mobilize opposition to the permit.  The second 
dependent variable is the policy process and the policy result.  To analyze the second 
dependent variable, the case study incorporates a ‗before-and-after‘ approach, using 
Bukowski‘s (2004) five-criteria for the evaluation of the democratic legitimacy of the 
decision-making process to measure the effect of local government involvement in 
the British Petroleum case before and after they inject themselves into the dispute. 
 
Case Three: Comparing the Refinery and the Bridge 
The ‗within-case‘ study of the refinery is subsequently expanded to include a 
‗cross-case comparison‘ with Bukowki‘s (2004) examination of the construction of 
the Vasco da Gama Bridge in Portugal.  In both cases, a process-tracing technique is 
employed to reveal the different causal paths leading to two different outcomes.  The 
opposition mobilized by non-central state actors to the refinery and the bridge 
construction succeeded in altering the policy result and the policy process to varying 
degrees.  The central question in this cross-case comparison is what conditions led to 
the varying effectiveness of European and North American non-central state actors?  
The focus here is not so much on the dependent variable, but on the independent 
variable, specifically on the supranational level as the locus of the causal mechanism.  
We expect to find that the key independent variable, the development of 
supranational institutions and their relationship with non-central state actors, provides 
additional political opportunities and resources for European non-central state actors 
not available to North American ones, which makes the former more effective in 
altering the policy result and policy process than the latter.   
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Comparing the refinery and the bridge is an example of a controlled 
comparison utilizing the most-similar case design.  In both cases, non-central state 
actors mobilized in opposition to both the policy process and the policy result of a 
project undertaken by heavily invested higher tiers of government and industry.  In all 
three countries involved—Portugal, Canada, and the United States— non-central state 
actors such as local government are limited in their authority and very little authority 
has been transferred downward to them.  Bache observes that in Portugal ―despite 
incremental shifts towards greater sub-national and non-state participation and the 
creation of new regional structures, the central government retained a firm grip over 
much of the important decision-making‖ (2008, 62).  Thus, one would expect the 
Portuguese non-central state actors to be even less effective within such a centralized, 
unitary state with decades of conditioning under an authoritarian regime than non-
central state actors in North America. 
 
Limits of the Case Studies 
A drawback of the cross-case comparison of the bridge and the refinery is that 
whereas in the refinery case we focus explicitly on the role of local government and 
transnational municipal networks as the main players in the opposition, the 
Portuguese bridge case focuses on environmental groups as the main ‗local actors‘.  
We identified other near-identical cases to the refinery case, for example, the Fairbass 
and Jordan (2004) analysis of the effects of EU directives and institutions on the 
mobilization of non-state actors in environmental policymaking in the United 
Kingdom, but we failed to locate a case study which focused attention specifically on 
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local governments and transnational municipal networks in Europe.  Therefore, we 
acknowledge that the comparison of the refinery and bridge cases operates on the 
assumption that non-state actors, local governments and transnational municipal 
networks would respond similarly to the political opportunities and resources 
provided through cooperation with supranational actors.  Hence, we must temper our 
conclusions for the time being. 
Furthermore, we accept the fact that by selecting case studies which positively 
identify the impact of non-central-state actor mobilization on policy results and policy 
process that we run the risk of introducing a selection bias by sampling along the 
dependent variable.  Selection bias ―is commonly understood as occurring when some 
form of selection process in either the design of the study or the real-world 
phenomenon under investigation results in inferences that suffer from systematic 
error‖ (Collier and Mahoney 1996, 59).  Consequently, we must be careful about 
generalizing our findings.   
However, Homer-Dixon (1999) argues that especially in the early stages of 
research, as with the study of transnational municipal networks, it is appropriate to 
select on both the independent and the dependent variables because it can 
demonstrate, for example, ―any cases in which the independent variable is causally 
linked, in a significant and important way, to the dependent variable‖ (172-173).  This 
case study will test the hypothesis that the development of supranational institutions 
and the degree of cooperation between supranational and non-central-state actors are 
intervening variables which increase the effectiveness and policy capacity of non-
central state actors such as local government.  Homer-Dixon also argues that selecting 
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on the independent and dependent variables can help identify which variables are not 
necessary or sufficient.  By selecting the Cities Initiative as our unit of analysis this 
dissertation will seek to demonstrate that supranational infrastructure, shown to be 
nearly non-existent in the North American context, is neither necessary nor sufficient 
in the initial emergence of transnational municipal networks nor is it necessary for 
their effectiveness. 
 
Data Collection 
Within these case studies, a triangulated approach incorporating multiple 
methods of data gathering identified by Stake (1995) and Yin (1994) is employed 
including (1) interviews with public officials and confidential interviews with key 
observers (2) documents such as newspaper articles, personal correspondence, 
memos, agendas, websites, independent reports, and congressional records (3) 
archival records of the Cities Initiative (4) Direct observation of the Annual 
Meetings of the Cities Initiative in 2008 and 2009, as well as the 2009 Biennial 
Meeting of the International Joint Commission (IJC) (5) Participant Observation of 
the workshops held during the 2009 Biennial Meeting of the International Joint 
Commission (6) Physical artifacts such as CD-ROMs, flyers, pamphlets and 
brochures collected during the meetings of the Cities Initiative and the IJC.  Snow 
and Anderson (1991) argue that  
the basic argument [for triangulation] is that social reality is too complex 
to be adequately grasped by any single method.  Consequently, rather than 
debate the merits of one method vis-à-vis another…one does better to 
combine multiple strategies so that they can supplement one another‘s 
weaknesses (158). 
 
86 
Furthermore, multiple sources permit the corroboration of evidence from any one 
single source.  Primary sources of information are crucial with regards to the 
multiple case studies under consideration, particularly in terms of the Cities 
Initiative and the British Petroleum refinery where little to no scholarly work 
(Barnes 2007; Augustine 2008; Augustine 2008b) has produced a nearly non-
existent historical record of both phenomena.   
The type of interview used varies in structure depending on the 
researcher‘s objective, the stage of the research process, and the interviewer‘s 
level of expertise on the subject (Aberbach and Rockman 2002).  The interviews 
conducted were exploratory in nature, reflecting the nascent body of literature 
surrounding transnational municipal networks, and semi-structured guided by 
several pre-determined questions but not limited to them.  The interviewees were 
encouraged to move beyond those questions and provide additional insights, 
reflecting the observation by Leech (2002) that ―in elite interviewing…the 
investigator is willing, and often eager, to let the interviewee teach him what the 
problem, the question, the situation, is…‖ (54).  This was true of members of 
regional environmental non-governmental organizations who were asked to 
explain the complex regulatory process surrounding the permit process. 
Ten mayors from the Cities Initiative were interviewed representing small, 
medium and large cities.  Seven out of the ten mayors were board members, 
including both founding chairs—the mayors of Chicago and Toronto (See Table 
2: Interviews Conducted and Declined).  Two mayors declined interviews.  The 
Executive Director of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative was 
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interviewed.  One city official from the City of Toronto was interviewed, while 
two officials from the City of Chicago declined including one from the office of 
the Commissioner of the Department of the Environment.  In compliance with 
IRB ethics standards, the identity of non-elected officials remained confidential. 
The key questions directed at mayors included: (1) Why did your city join 
the Cities Initiative? (2) What was the significance of the British Petroleum case 
for the Cities Initiative and for environmental management of the Great Lakes 
basin? (3) What impact did the Cities Initiative have on the resolution of the BP 
dispute? (3) How important are supranational institutions such as the IJC and the 
CEC to the Cities Initiative? (4) How have local-federal, local-state or local-
provincial relations changed in the last decade? (5) What impact has the Cities 
Initiative had on local government policy capacity in the region?  An interview 
with the Vice-President of the Union of Baltic Cities, Urve Tiidus, who is also the 
Mayor of Kuressaare, Estonia, was conducted during the annual meeting of the 
Cities Initiative in Trois-Rivieres, Quebec in 2009. 
 
 Table 2: Interviews Conducted and Declined 
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Canada 6 1 0 4 1 0 1 1 14 
U.S. 3 0 1 5 1 0 0 2 12 
Other 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Total 1 1  9 1 1 10 2 1 1 3 28 
Decline 2 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 11 
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Eight semi-structured interviews were conducted with key members of 
prominent non-governmental organizations around the Great Lakes basin who 
were also involved in the British Petroleum case, as well as one journalist from a 
regional newspaper who broke the story and covered the duration of the British 
Petroleum case.  The purpose of these interviews was to gain a different 
perspective on the course of the events, but mostly in order to explain the 
regulatory system, demystify some of the technical and scientific jargon, and 
explain the changes in the policy process and regulatory system wrought by the 
opposition.   
The key questions posed to this constituency included: (1) In what ways 
can you term the opposition to the British Petroleum refinery expansion in 
Whiting, Indiana a ‗victory?‘ for industry, for the Indiana Department of 
Environmental Management and for environmental groups (2) What 
improvements did the Indiana Department of Environmental Management anti-
degradation Draft Rule introduce over the current policy? (3) What was the role 
of local government in the opposition to Whiting?  Specifically, what was the role 
of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative?   
Three more exploratory inquiries via email were also conducted in order 
to identify key contacts and resources in the basin, including an official from the 
Federation of Canadian Municipalities, as well as a person who tracks 
environmental politics in the basin through a web-blog at 
www.thepoliticalenvironment.blogspot.com. 
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Interviews meant to gather regional and local perspectives were 
supplemented with broader perspectives in terms of Canada-United States 
bilateral environmental relations through an interview with the Canadian Chair of 
the International Joint Commission.  Furthermore, a brief exchange of 
correspondence was initiated with the former Chair of the Joint Public Advisory 
Council (JPAC) of NAFTA‘s Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) 
in order to gain insight into the operation of this supranational institution. 
One of the challenges of gathering data by conducting interviews is 
declines or failures to respond.  It would have been beneficial to speak with 
members of the United States and Canadian legislatures involved either 
specifically in the British Petroleum case or more broadly in terms of bilateral 
water quality issues.  Five congresspersons who were involved in the British 
Petroleum case were contacted and failed to respond or declined.  Of particular 
interest to this case study was Congressman Mark Kirk (R-Il) who organized a 
Shoreline Mayors Task Force, comprised of local officials from ten North Shore 
communities to oppose the British Petroleum permit, but could not be reached.  
Another interviewee of interest who could not be reached was Member of 
Parliament Francis Scarpaleggia who is the Vice-Chair of the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development which is 
currently studying the effects of the oil sands on water quality.   
Despite these declines, the 27 interviews conducted complemented data 
gathered from other sources, such as newspapers, which did provide a federal 
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angle and which, together, established a reliable picture of both the transnational 
municipal network and the case. 
Much of the contextual information and contact information was provided 
by reviewing newspapers relying in part on Lexis-Nexis as a meta-search engine.  
The Gary Post-Tribune, the Chicago Tribune, Chicago Sun-Times, the Milwaukee 
Journal-Sentinel, and the Northwest Indiana Times provided the most extensive 
coverage of the British Petroleum dispute, although a wide range of other 
newspapers were examined in order to provide as broad a perspective as possible 
on the relationship between the Alberta oil sands, British Petroleum, and the Great 
Lakes including the Indianapolis Star, the Financial Times, Canadian newspapers 
such as the Globe and Mail, the National Post, and international newspapers such 
as the International Herald Tribune and The Guardian. 
In order to gather more insight into how the British Petroleum case fits 
into the relationship between the Alberta oil sands and the Great Lakes, various 
position papers from government, industry and non-governmental organizations 
were analyzed.  Government reports were examined, for instance, from 
international sources such as the International Energy Agency, the International 
Joint Commission, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation under 
NAFTA; American national sources such as the U.S. General Accounting Office, 
U.S. Congressional Research Service, Congressional Task Force, the EPA; 
Canadian national sources such as the Government of Canada, the National 
Energy Board, the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable 
Development within the Office of the Auditor General; as well as sub-national 
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sources such as the Indiana Department of Environmental Management, the 
Government of Alberta, in addition to the Federation of Canadian Municipalities 
and the City of Toronto. Particularly informative were the various written 
testimonies and reports submitted to the Ontario Ministry of Environment‘s 
Walkerton Commission, such as the Ontario Public Service Employees Union 
(OPSEU) report which gave a good overview of the evolution of the province‘s 
water quality governance system.  Industry reports were examined produced by 
the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, the Alberta Federation of 
Labour, and British Petroleum.  Non-governmental position papers examined 
were published by, for example, the Alliance for the Great Lakes, Greenpeace 
UK, the Pembina Institute, Save the Dunes, and the Environmental Law and 
Policy Center.  Independent analyses from academia were analyzed, for example, 
reports by the Purdue University Calumet Water Institute-Argonne National 
Laboratory Task Force, the ERB Institute for Global Sustainable Enterprise at the 
University of Michigan, and the University of Toronto‘s Program on Water 
Issues.  The broad swathe of perspectives mobilized from these position papers 
helps to minimize the bias of any one organization and provides a basis for the 
corroboration of evidence. 
Of great value was an independent report commissioned by Indiana 
Governor Mitchell Daniels, the so-called ―Barnes Report‖, published by Professor 
James Barnes of Indiana University which provided an in-depth analysis of the 
British Petroleum case from the perspective of the regulator, industry, and the 
public.  In addition, a report titled ―How the Oil Sands Got to the Great Lakes 
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Basin‖ (Israelson, 2008) published by the Program on Water Issues at the Munk 
Center for International Studies deserves to be singled out as integral for an 
understanding of the link between the oil sands and the Great Lakes.  The findings 
in the report form the contextual basis for Chapter Six of this dissertation. 
In addition to newspapers, legislative records were examined.  For 
example, the debate over a resolution passed by Congress condemning the British 
Petroleum permit process was studied.  These records also included the United 
States Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works, as well as 
Canada‘s House of Commons Standing Committee on Environment and 
Sustainable Development, specifically, the public meetings and testimonies held 
for the Oil Sands and Canada‘s Water Resources study.  The findings of this last 
study will be released in a report sometime in 2010.  Public notices related to the 
British Petroleum case and the subsequent anti-degradation policy review 
published by the EPA and the IDEM on their websites were also examined. 
The vast majority of information on the structure and behavior of the 
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative was found on its website which 
contains a wealth of information including a comprehensive running update of 
membership, recent activities, resolutions, statements, and programs from 
November 2002 until the present, including whole sections dedicated to the Water 
Conservation Framework, Best Practices and Restoration Projects, and Annual 
Meetings. 
Direct observation of the activities of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Cities Initiative was undertaken on two separate occasions during two annual 
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meetings.  The first Annual Meeting was held in Toronto, Ontario (July 16-18, 
2008) and the second Annual Meeting was held in Trois-Rivieres, Quebec (June 
17-19, 2009).  On both occasions, access was granted to all the events involving 
the General Assembly, as well as the Board of Directors meetings, which provide 
invaluable insights into how the organization develops and discusses strategy and 
votes on courses of action.  Furthermore, the majority of the interviews were 
conducted face-to-face during the course of these annual meetings.  A secondary 
benefit of attending the annual meetings was the opportunity to acquire contacts 
as well as physical artifacts such as brochures, CD-ROMs, and other physical 
documents which provide further insights into how the organization carries out its 
external relations and interacts with the outside world.  Finally, meeting the 
mayors, city officials, and other participants at these meetings helped to establish 
trust which provided the basis for future data gathering opportunities.   
Direct observation was also employed during the Biennial Meeting of the 
International Joint Commission (IJC) organized in Windsor, Ontario, on October 
7-8, 2009.  The Biennial Meetings exemplify multilevel governance around the 
Great Lakes basin as participants include members from all levels of government, 
bureaucrats, academia, the scientific community, industry, non-governmental 
organizations and the public.  Furthermore, the Biennial Meetings provided the 
opportunity for participant observation during the workshops that were organized 
around particular issues such as beaches and waterfront recreation where a broad 
cross-section of participants discusses problems, current policy, and potential 
solutions.  These discussions are then summarized and communicated to the 
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respective IJC body tasked with developing policies and reports on that particular 
subject. 
Applying the technique of triangulation in the data gathering methods, 
incorporating interviews, documents, newspapers, position papers, and legislative 
records, a picture emerges of the role of local government within the Great Lakes 
basin that is more faithful to the complexity of the phenomenon under study. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
BREAKING THE FORMAL BOUNDS OF FEDERALISM: THE EXPANSION OF 
LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY IN A DYNAMIC 
MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter seeks to explain how and why local governments were able to 
break the bounds of their formal constitutional constraints, improve their standing as 
both domestic and external actors, and as a result play an increasing role in 
environmental governance around the Great Lakes as individual cities and as 
members of transnational municipal networks.  The chapter is divided into three 
sections. 
The first part—the Introduction—describes the severe constitutional 
constraints placed on local government within Canadian and American federal 
systems and the weak status of local governments in formal environmental 
governance structures around the Great Lakes.  This section then shows that local 
governments have partially broken free of the formal bounds of federalism. Although 
this freedom manifests itself predominantly within informal—Type II—governance 
architecture, vital changes precipitating this newfound local government policy 
capacity took place in the formal, Type I, governance sphere within federal-sub-
national intergovernmental relations.  Particular emphasis is placed on the character 
of these changes, or what is referred to as the mode of transition.  Two main 
conclusions are drawn from a comparative analysis of the mode of transition in 
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Europe and North America.  First, in both cases, the expansion of multilevel 
governance, and hence local government policy capacity, is rooted in the re-balancing 
of formal relations between federal, state and provincial governments characterized 
by the adoption of a collaborative model of intergovernmental relations.  Second, the 
formalization and institutionalization of multilevel governance has not gone nearly as 
far or as deep in North America as it has in the European Union.  The ramifications of 
these findings are discussed in subsequent chapters. 
The second section—Domestic Interactions—will trace the actual re-
balancing of formal intergovernmental relations at the federal and sub-national level 
in Canada and the United States as it passed from a period of competition into a 
period of collaboration.  In the process it will provide a picture of how formal 
authority pertaining to bilateral environmental cooperation is dispersed within the 
federal system of the United States and Canada and how, in the case of Ontario, a 
small but significant portion of that authority was delegated to local government, 
paving the way for the institutionalization of cross-border local government 
environmental cooperation in the form of the Cities Initiative. 
The third and final section—Explaining the Turn—will discuss how the turn 
toward collaboration led to the mobilization of local government in its present form.  
Like earlier sections of the chapter, this section will demonstrate that the re-balancing 
of federal-sub-national relations led to the opening of political opportunities for local 
governments. However, this section will emphasize that the re-balancing of these 
relations has also (a) created functional imperatives for local government 
mobilization and (b) provoked local government political entrepreneurialism that 
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sought to maximize those opportunities and address those imperatives.  In this 
manner, incorporating both ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ dynamics as explanatory 
variables satisfies Jeffery‘s (2000) criteria for applying ―a more encompassing 
conception of multilevel governance‖ (9), and parallels a similar shift in the European 
―structure of authoritative decision-making‖ (Marks 1997, 22) which ―has been an 
internal one, rooted in a changed and changing relationship between central and sub-
national authorities‖ (Jeffery 2000, 7). 
 
Differentiating Formal and Informal Policy Capacity 
Understanding the nature of American and Canadian federalism and 
intergovernmental relations is vital to an understanding of the place of local 
government within present environmental policymaking around the Great Lakes.  As 
Andrea Gerlak (2000) observes, ―a struggle between national supremacy and local 
autonomy pervades water management‖ (231).  The fundamental question of who 
governs the waters, the essential balance between national and local policy capacity, 
is complicated presently by the fact there is no single locus of authority directing 
water quality management across the basin or in either country.  Instead, 
environmental policymaking around the Great Lakes is an excellent example of 
multilevel governance.  It is multi-level because authority is dispersed vertically 
between increasingly interdependent supranational, national, provincial, state, and 
local governments, and it is governance because that authority is also shared 
horizontally across borders, with non-governmental organizations and other societal 
actors in ―self-organizing, interorganizational networks‖ (Rhodes 1996, 660).  The 
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end result is that no single actor monopolizes political power over environmental 
policymaking.   
Rather than a free-for-all, however, this system of multilevel governance is 
disciplined by the nature of the federal structure and the tenor of intergovernmental 
relations on either side of the border.  Environmental policymaking, then, is the 
product of formal, constitutionally defined exchanges between actors constrained by 
the bounds of jurisdiction and hierarchy, and informal, contextually defined 
exchanges between the state and societal networks of stakeholders that take place 
outside those set bounds (Peters and Pierre, 2004).  Likewise, local government 
authority draws on both formal and informal powers, hence determining the role of 
local government in environmental policymaking around the Great Lakes must 
account for both informal and formal structures and relations. Such a determination 
must also include a measure of the balance of both formal and informal sources of 
authority, since the former is likely to provide greater political and material resources 
for local governments and thus prove more effective for influencing policy (Jeffery 
2000, 14). 
 
 Threadbare but for a Constitutional Straitjacket: The Weak Formal Powers and 
Severe Constraints of Local Government in Canada and the United States 
 
A formal reading of the relations and structures within the federal institutional 
framework is necessary in order to provide the context for an examination of the 
―severe domestic institutional constraints‖ (Marshall 2005, 674) local governments 
face in exercising their influence on environmental policy around the Great Lakes 
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basin (March and Olson 1989).  Such a reading makes readily apparent the weak 
formal powers ascribed to local governments.   
Local governments in Canada and the United States are said to be creatures of 
the provinces and states.  In Canada, they are barely mentioned in the Canadian 
constitution, except for section 92(8) which grants provincial government exclusive 
control over the creation, structure, policy functions, and financial resources of local 
government.  Historically, in Ontario for example, the province conferred very 
limited and strictly defined powers to local government and maintained considerable 
influence over their day-to-day functioning through substantial conditional and 
unconditional grant programs, as well as through control over the ability of local 
governments to borrow money.  In addition to this steady and predictable influence, 
the amalgamations of cities that took place in Ontario in the 1990s, often against the 
wishes of the local governments, underscored the observation that municipal 
governments are ―vulnerable to capricious actions taken by their provincial 
governments‖ (Tindal and Tindal 2004, 204-5).  Attempts by local governments to 
improve their standing in the constitutional structure have been quashed by the 
provinces.  During the repatriation of the constitution in 1982, the Federation of 
Canadian Municipalities‘ Task Force lobbied unsuccessfully for a formal recognition 
of local government in the new constitution (Tindal and Tindal 2000, 243).  Most 
recently, in 2000, the Province of Ontario denied the City of Toronto the right to hold 
a referendum on becoming a ‗city state‘ and gaining greater autonomy from 
provincial control (Sutcliffe 2004, 90).   
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In the United States, the status of local government within the federal system 
also goes unmentioned in the Constitution, which exclusively outlines the division of 
power between the federal and state government.  States are unitary entities, and the 
degree of control that states maintain over local government is limited only by their 
own laws.  This also means that the autonomy of local governments varies by state, as 
it does by province in Canada.  Some states abide by the principles established by the 
restrictive Dillon‘s Rule doctrine (1865) which holds that local governments can only 
exercise powers which are ―granted in express words‖ by state legislatures, or those 
powers deemed ―essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not 
simply convenient, but indispensible‖.  Courts are able at any time to deny altogether 
even these limited powers (quoted in Vogel 2007, 258).  Canadian courts have also 
traditionally followed Dillon‘s Rule when delineating the limits of local jurisdiction.  
The political capacity of cities under this rule is usually limited to providing 
traditional municipal services such as waste disposal, sewage, zoning, public works 
and public safety.   
Yet, within the last hundred years or so, some states have adopted the 
principle of Home Rule which is ―the power of local government to conduct its own 
affairs—including specifically the power to determine its own organization, the 
functions it performs, its taxing and borrowing authority, and the number, types, and 
employment conditions of its personnel‖ (Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations 1981, 1).  However, Vogel (2007) argues that the effects 
of Home Rule on local authority have been limited since state legislature still 
maintain strict control over local government and Dillon‘s Rule is held up in court 
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cases involving the interpretation of the limits of municipal authority, concluding that 
local government activism still cannot be accounted for by their formal authority 
(259).  In Canada, Home Rule failed to develop at all (Valiante 2007, 1066). 
 
The Weak Formal Role of Local Government within the Great Lakes Basin 
From a narrow legal-constitutional interpretation of local government 
capacity, neither environmental policymaking nor cross-border relations are the 
business of local government in Canada and the United States.  Consequently, 
according to Valiante (2007), the international status of the Great Lakes as a shared 
watershed between two countries has meant that ―local governments are all but 
ignored in the formal agreements establishing the present system of Great Lakes 
governance‖ (1062).  The clearest example of the exclusion of local government from 
formal governance structures around the basin is the fact that one of the foundational 
agreements for the joint management of the water basin by the United States and 
Canada, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
2
 (GLWQA) signed in 1972 and 
amended in subsequent years, only mentions local governments once and only with 
regards to the operation of water treatment plants (Valiante 2007, 162).  This is 
despite the fact that the GLWQA relies directly on local governments for the 
achievement of many of its explicit goals across a broad range of issues (Valiante 
2007).  For example, Annex 2, dealing with the restoration of particular areas of 
concern through the establishment of Remedial Action Plans (RAP) requires the 
direct participation of local governments in whose jurisdictions those contaminated 
                                                 
2
 The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA) between the United States and Canada was 
originally signed in1972 and superseded by an agreement of the same name in 1978.  The GLWQA 
was amended in 1983 and 1987. 
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areas are situated.  Annex 3, dealing with phosphorous control, inherently requires 
municipal cooperation because of its authority over wastewater plants where 
phosphorous is treated.  Annex 13, dealing with pollution from land-based activities 
such as run-off from agriculture, known as Non-Point Source pollution, requires the 
exercise of local government authority over urban planning.   
Further evidence of exclusion is the fact that the bi-national commitments 
made in the GLWQA are implemented by subsequent domestic agreements between 
federal and sub-national governments without the participation of local government.  
For example, in Ontario the aims of the GLWQA are adopted, its programs planned 
and implemented, through a federal-provincial agreement called the Canada-Ontario 
Agreement (COA) which is renewed every five years.  Here again local governments 
have only been given an advisory position within the executive body of COA.  Also 
telling is the fact that the International Joint Commission (IJC), a bi-national 
institution composed of three American and three Canadian commissioners 
established under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 to help resolve bi-national 
water disputes between the two countries and to act as a source of expertise on bi-
national water issues, is planning in 2009 to release, for the first time in its one-
hundred year existence, a report which presents recommendations directly to local 
governments.  This pending report is not only additional evidence of the long-
standing exclusion of local government in formal Great Lakes management and 
exchange structures, but an indication that perhaps local governments have finally 
arrived in the consciousness of the federal, state and provincial governments that have 
until now been the formal environmental stewards of the basin.   
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The general perception of the role local government plays in cross-border 
ecosystem management inside or outside the Great Lakes basin reflects the traditional 
absence of local government within cross-border governance structures.  For 
example, Mingus (2003) surveyed the members of the Pacific Salmon Commission, a 
bi-national, cross-border resource management regime established under the Canada-
United States Pacific Salmon Treaty of 1985, and asked what are the ‗top-ten‘ state 
and non-state actors they have the most contact with.  Whereas the most significant 
organizations were governmental, specifically federal, state and provincial 
governments, and though a broad range of non-state organizations were also 
identified, local governments were mentioned as top-ten actors by less than one per 
cent of the respondents. 
 
 
An Unforeseen Expansion of Local Policy Capacity in Cross-Border Environmental 
Policymaking 
 
And yet, despite little change in their formal standing, local governments have 
been engaging more meaningfully in environmental policymaking across borders 
with greater frequency than a formal reading would predict, either as individual local 
governments, as partners in temporary alliances, or as members of longer-term 
institutionalized forms of cooperation.  A prime example of this invigorated 
participation within the Great Lakes basin is the recent establishment of the Great 
Lakes Regional Collaboration, a kind of task force composed of nine federal cabinet 
ministers, a congressional delegation, Great Lakes governors and mayors, as well as 
leaders of First Nations brought together in 2004 by a Presidential Executive Order 
for the purpose of establishing and prioritizing goals, structures, and steps necessary 
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to address environmental challenges to the basin including the threat of invasive 
species, the degradation of coastal habitat, the continued contamination of areas of 
concern, and  the incorporation of sustainable development programs.  In essence, it 
unofficially sets the groundwork for a much needed formal review and updating of 
the thirty-year old Great Lakes and Water Quality Agreement.  To see local 
government at the policy-making table setting priorities and influencing the direction 
of a comprehensive basin-wide management plan—well before the implementation 
stage—is a new development and an upgrade in its heretofore role in the basin. 
Another formidable example of individual local governments directly 
engaging in cross-border environmental management is the case of American Electric 
Power Corporation (AEP).  In 2001, the City Council of Toronto instructed the City 
Solicitor to seek Amicus Curiae (Friend of the Court) status in a lawsuit against AEP 
launched by the United States federal government, eight states and twelve non-
governmental organizations in a United States court
3
.  The suit claimed that the 
company violated the Clean Air Act (CAA) by not including best available pollution 
reduction technologies when undertaking major modifications to its coal-fired electric 
plants.  As one of the largest utilities in the United States, AEP was already the 
largest emitter of sulfur-dioxide and nitrogen-oxide in the country, pollutants which 
compromise both air and water quality in the basin.  Toronto was granted Friend of 
the Court status in 2001 and filed an Amicus Curiae brief in 2005 demonstrating the 
                                                 
3
 The states include: Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont.  The non-governmental organizations include: Ohio Citizen Action, 
Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Hoosier Environmental Council, Valley Watch, Ohio Valley 
Environmental Coalition, West Virginia Environmental Council, Clean Air Council, Izaak Walton 
League of America, National Wildlife Federation, Indiana Wildlife Federation, League of Ohio 
Sportsmen, Sierra Club and Natural Resources Defence Council.  
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impact of transboundary air pollution from U.S. coal-fired plants on Toronto‘s 
population.  The report estimated that half of all air pollution affecting Toronto comes 
from the United States and particularly from Midwest coal-fired plants like those 
belonging to AEP.  That same year, a report published by the Ontario Ministry of the 
Environment concluded that transboundary pollution contributes to 2,750 premature 
deaths from air pollution (about half the province‘s total) and $5 billion in 
environmental damage (City of Toronto, Staff Report, December 18, 2007, 5).   
In 2007, a landmark out-of-court settlement was reached in the AEP case 
which mandated emissions reductions for nitrogen-oxide and sulfur-dioxide of 69 and 
79 per cent respectively in coal-fired plants belonging to AEP, $4.6 billion of 
upgrades, $15 million in environmental penalties and $60 million in clean-up costs 
(City of Toronto, 2007, 3).  According to a staff report from Toronto‘s Medical 
Officer of Health, ―this is the largest pollution reduction ever obtained from the 
owner or operator of a Clean Air Act stationary source‖ (City of Toronto, 2007, 3). 
This was also the first time that the City of Toronto had initiated such a cross-
border activity, using the American political and judicial system to achieve its 
domestic environmental and health policy aims.  A high ranking official from the 
Environmental Protection Office (EPO) within the Toronto Public Health department, 
stated ―I am not aware of other municipalities in Ontario, or elsewhere in Canada that 
have used this approach to deal with a transbounary air pollution problem‖ (City of 
Toronto, EPO correspondence December 1, 2008).  It is also worth noting that the 
idea for filing an amicus brief originated from within the City of Toronto, from a 
report released by the Toronto Medical Officer of Health in 2000 and 2004 which 
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studied the economic and personal impacts of illness resulting from air-pollution.  
This report by a local government was quite novel at the time because its concern 
with the environment and health matters went beyond the traditional, narrow, 
constitutionally defined concerns of local government.   
More importantly, the actions by the City of Toronto had an impact on the 
political and judicial process of a foreign country.  The official at the EPO states that 
the brief was influential in assisting the parties in the United States to articulate their 
concerns about pollution from coal fired plants, in that ―they could articulate the risks 
for health on not only American residents living downwind of old coal-fired power 
plants in the U.S., but could also demonstrate tremendous concern by Canadians 
living downwind.  It demonstrated long-range transport issues, especially for ozone 
and particulates‖ (City of Toronto, EPO 2008).  See Figure 5. 
Furthermore, according to the EPO official, the multi-year consultations and 
preparations before the filing of the brief ―enabled collaboration and knowledge 
exchange with American NGOs and legal colleagues, and greater publicity of the 
impact of transboundary pollution on both sides of the border, through enhanced 
media attention in both countries‖ (City of Toronto, EPO 2008).  Finally, the EPO 
official argues that the publicity that was generated from the case put pressure on the 
Ontario Minister of the Environment to engage transboundary pollution and health 
issues.  At the very first Shared Air Summit in 2005, a one-day meeting of experts 
and public officials from all levels of government across Canada and the United 
States hosted by the Ontario Minister of the Environment, Premier Dalton McGuinty 
announced that the province was seriously considering joining one of the fifty 
107  
lawsuits dealing with air pollution that were taking place in the United States.  
Finally, the EPO official also stated that another intended purpose of filing the amicus 
curiae brief was to influence the sentencing stage had the lawsuit not been resolved 
out-of-court. 
 
 
Figure 6: Transboundary Air Flows into Great Lakes  
Source: Vincent and Fick 2000, 32-33
4
 
                                                 
4
 Data Sources: Natural Resources Defense Council (Benchmarking Air Emissions of Electric Utility 
Generators in the Easter U.S.); Environment Canada; Health Canada; Ontario Power Generation; Nova 
Scotia Power; Pollution Probe; Ontario Clean Air Alliance; Ontario Medical Association; David 
Suzuki Foundation 
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An indication that the strategy of using American political and judicial 
instruments to attain domestic aims by local governments in Canada was not an 
isolated incident but has became an embedded strategy, was the filing in November 
2006 of a petition with the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
make a finding under section 115 (a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) that air pollution 
emitted from 150 coal fired plants located in seven Midwestern states including Ohio, 
Illinois, West Virginia, Indiana, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania was endangering the 
health and welfare of Canadians (Ecojustice, letter to EPA dated Wednesday, July 30, 
2008).  The petition was organized by a Canadian nongovernmental organization 
called Ecojustice Canada, but its signatories included thirteen Canadian cities and 
municipalities from Ontario and Quebec including the local or regional governments 
of Windsor, Essex, Halifax, Chateauguay, Peel, Chatham-Kent, Cornwall, Durham, 
Ajax, Laval, Goderich, Gatineau and Toronto which played a central role in the 
initiative.  A counsel for Ecojustice involved in the case stated that ―Toronto 
encouraged others to sign on‖ (Ecojustice, phone interview November 27, 2008).  
Mayor Miller of Toronto states, ―Both cases [AEP and EPA] are examples where the 
city of Toronto chose to act independently of the position of national governments.  
In a post free-trade world, where so many institutions are linked together, it is logical 
for cities to spread out‖ (GLSLCI interview David Miller 2010). 
This was the first time that Canadian local governments had filed such a 
petition across the border directly with the EPA.  It also signaled a change in local 
government consciousness and strategy.  Rather than engaging American political 
and judicial actors as individual cities, local governments realized that there was 
109  
strength in numbers and formed a temporary alliance.  The EPA petition brought forth 
by thirteen Canadian municipalities garnered intense media scrutiny and brought 
transboundary pollution again to the fore of the domestic political agenda on both 
sides of the border. 
Furthermore, local government participation in cross-border environmental 
management has moved beyond these ad hoc and isolated activities and such 
participation is becoming increasingly institutionalized, which contradicts the 
findings of a Policy Research Institute (PRI) report sponsored by the Government of 
Canada which concluded that local government cross-border cooperation is sparse, it 
is predominantly bilateral in nature (i.e. between individual or very small groups of 
cities), and lacks institutionalization (PRI 2005).   The most important example, of 
course, is the emergence of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative in 2003 
as a transnational municipal network (TMN).  The internal and external dynamics 
will be analyzed in more detail in subsequent chapters, but the key point here is that 
the Cities Initiative is increasingly engaged by all levels of government in 
environmental policymaking from both sides of the border and it is through this 
transnational municipal network that local governments have attained even greater 
access to both formal and informal decision-making structures.   
For example, the Great Lakes Regional Collaboration Strategy mentioned 
earlier incorporated local government participation not on an ad hoc basis but through 
the inclusion of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative as a member of its 
Executive Committee and as the sole representative of regional local government 
interests.  When state governors and state legislatures began deliberations in 2005 on 
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the creation of a Great Lakes Water Compact Council to regulate out-of-basin water 
diversion and other water quantity issues, the Executive Director of the Cities 
Initiative was the sole representative of regional local governments on its Advisory 
Committee.  In March, 2005, Mayor Daley and Mayor Miller, as the founding chairs 
of the Cities Initiative, took part in a joint address before the Great Lakes 
Congressional Breakfast in Washington, D.C.  It was the first time that a Canadian 
mayor had addressed this annual gathering of congressmen, governors, mayors, and 
other stakeholders.  Miller notes, ―I met a number of congressmen, Rahm Emanuel 
among them.  I can call him up now if we need to reach the Obama administration‖ 
(GLSLCI, interview David Miller 2010).  The Executive Director was also appointed 
by President Bush in 2006 to the joint United States and Canada Great Lakes 
Fisheries Commission which has been managing fisheries in the basin since 1954.  
The Executive Director of the Cities Initiative also represented the local government 
perspective on the Agreement Review Committee (ARC) set up by the Bi-national 
Executive Committee, working alongside officials from the Environmental Protection 
Agency and Environment Canada to formulate ideas on improving the Great Lakes 
and Water Quality Agreement.  As a result, the Committee adopted a principle 
recognizing that local governments play a key role in the development and the 
implementation of the Water Quality Agreement.  
The work of the ARC may appear symbolic, except when seen in the light of 
recent developments.  United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Canadian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence Cannon agreed on June 13, 2009, that both 
countries would undertake a formal review of the Great Lakes Water Quality 
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Agreement for the first time in more than two decades.  This announcement was 
based in part on the recommendations made by the Agreement Review Committee 
(ARC).  If those recommendations relating to local governments are adopted by the 
new Water Quality Agreement, it will mark the first formal recognition of the role of 
cities in environmental management around the Great Lakes and surely a sign of their 
growing importance. 
The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative in particular exposes the 
deficiency of a purely formal reading of local government policy capacity in cross-
border environmental policymaking.  Hence, a formal reading does not explain the 
range of roles and the degree of influence local governments have attained over time, 
nor can it explain why or how the expansion of local policy capacity has taken place 
around the Great Lakes because these changes have not stemmed from changes in 
constitutionally defined formal relations.   
This observation in this North American context accords with observations 
about the formal basis undergirding the expansion of the policy capacity of non-
central actors in the European context.  For example, Peters and Pierre (2004) observe 
that ―the constitutional definitions of institutional competencies have remained 
remarkably intact…we have seen very few cases of constitutional reform 
accompanying the emergence of multilevel governance‖ (80). 
 
A New Playground for Local Government Activity: Contrasting Type I and Type II 
Multilevel Governance 
 
If not within the bounds of formal, constitutionally reinforced structures, then 
where has local policy capacity expanded?  What we in fact see operating around the 
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Great Lakes are parallel and interdependent polities.  Marks and Hooghe (2004) have 
demonstrated the simultaneous existence of two types of multilevel governance 
structures.  On the one hand, we see the nested, non-intersecting, limited jurisdictions 
and defined responsibilities of the Type I multilevel governance structures that most 
closely resemble what we have come to understand as traditional federal 
arrangements.  As stated, these formal arrangements have remained relatively stable 
and durable with local governments largely confined to playing the role of 
appendages of state and provincial governments—although some nascent changes are 
detected.   
Rather, the expansion of local policy capacity around the Great Lakes has 
taken place most dramatically in the other, less formal, functionally specific, and 
jurisdictionally flexible Type II governance structures best described as exchange 
networks with the added characteristic that they also operate horizontally across 
national borders.  These open structures provide more access-points for non-central 
actors to influence the decision-making process.  A prime example of Type II 
governance structures is the aforementioned Great Lakes Regional Collaboration. 
Acknowledging that Type I and Type II governance structures operate 
alongside each other, and that the expansion of local government policy capacity has 
taken place for the most part in the latter, does not tell the complete story because it 
does not examine the dialectical relationship between the two types of structures.  
This relationship has a direct impact on the behavior of transnational municipal 
networks.  The more informal, Type II governance structures did not arise, nor do 
they operate, independently of the more formal Type I structures.  Changes in the 
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style of policymaking, and the tenor of intergovernmental relations, within Type I 
arrangements preceded and prepared the ground for the emergence of Type II 
arrangements, which continue to operate within the confines of the formal Type I 
architecture (Marks and Hooghe 2004, 25).   
In other words, the informal Type II structures are the product of a transition 
that has and continues to take place within Type I architecture, and the character of 
that transition within Type I relations still shapes the actors operating within those 
informal spheres.  At the same time, the significant growth and increasing credibility 
of Type II governance structures has had a ‗spillover‘ effect, precipitating greater 
institutionalization and formalization of previously informal local government 
relations within the Type I architecture.  This ‗spillover‘ of local government 
authority into formal structures is much more pronounced in the European context.  
More on this continental difference shortly. 
If we follow a path dependent analysis approach and accept, for example, the 
observation by Munck and Leff (1997) in the field of comparative democratization 
that ―transitions…are formative or founding moments‖ (343), then we become very 
interested not only in describing and comparing local government policy capacity in 
Type I and Type II architecture as separate spheres, but we become interested in the 
process of transition within the former in order to understand how it has spawned and 
shaped the latter.  This is due to the fact, as Munck and Leff argue, ―transitions matter 
because they generate fairly durable legacies that affect the post-transitional regime 
and politics.  Different modes of transition are likely to have distinct consequences 
for a country‘s politics‖ (1997, 345).   
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Although we are primarily interested in describing in this chapter the mode of 
transition in the North American context, it is here that a brief comparative multilevel 
governance approach proves especially enlightening.  Type I structures in Europe and 
North America have both undergone a period of decentralization, and a transition 
towards a collaborative style of policymaking, that has opened up political space for 
the emergence of informal Type II governance structures and the increased 
participation of non-central actors such as local government.  This is what Jeffery 
(2000) meant when he stated that the mobilization of sub-national actors in Europe is 
rooted in the changing relationship between central and sub-national authorities.   
However, it is important to keep in mind that the mode of transition in Europe 
and North America has played out differently with unique consequences for the 
development of multilevel governance and local government policy capacity on these 
two continents.  Type II governance structures emerged decades earlier in Europe 
simply because the transition toward collaboration between higher tiers of 
government and hence toward multilevel governance occurred much sooner and with 
greater intensity under the auspices of the European Union.  The major impetus for 
the explosive proliferation of Type II governance structures such as transnational 
municipal networks was the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987 which 
introduced a new redistributive mechanism—Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds—
and brought the European Community directly in contact with local governments for 
the first time by establishing a partnership principle which mandates that the massive 
amounts of structural funding be administrated through partnerships between all 
levels of government including the local.  In both Europe and North America, the 
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move towards a more collaborative model was initiated by elites located at higher 
tiers of government, not at the level of local government.   
However, the expanding role of local government was embedded more 
formally in the European Union, for example through the partnership principle, 
through institutionalized programs such as Cohesion policy, through alliances with 
supranational actors such as the European Commission, and through their 
participation in formal intergovernmental forums such as the Committee of the 
Regions (COR).  Only silhouettes of such formal relations are beginning to emerge in 
the North American context, hence local government participation in policymaking is 
not as embedded in formal, Type I governance structures in North America. 
This point is important because transnational municipal networks in Europe 
and North America may share similarities of membership composition and policy 
concerns, since they are both composed of local governments that pursue similar 
goals in their internal and external relations, but as a result of these different 
exogenous conditions they differ in how their internal governance structures are 
organized, in their capacity to attain certain goals and their ability to interact with the 
external environment, and thus the style in which they pursue those goals also differs.  
Since the expansion of local government policy capacity in North America is 
embedded predominantly in informal, Type II, governance structures rather than 
formal, Type I governance structures, it stands on less certain ground.  To repeat 
Jeffery‘s previous argument, the quality of intergovernmental relations matter and 
―formal structures…of intergovernmental relations are likely to provide more 
effective channels for policy influence than more informal interactions‖ (2000, 14).   
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Consequently, whatever position cities have achieved within the policymaking 
circle within the Great Lakes, whatever opportunities have been opened up for local 
governments to use their own creativity to break the bounds of their constitutional 
constraints, increase maneuverability, and participate in environmental management, 
cities are acutely aware of the tenuousness of their standing and it is this 
understanding that conditions their behavior.  The weak-to-absent legal-constitutional 
basis for the existence of transnational municipal networks is more pronounced in the 
North American context.  Therefore, what the next chapter will examine in more 
detail is that North American transnational municipal networks are, first and 
foremost, bridge-builders, eschewing conflict in favor of compromise and 
cooperation, and as such they have become important catalysts of closer regional 
integration because they seek out positive-sum gains. 
 
Rebalancing Federal-Sub-national Relations and its Local Effects: Collaboration and 
Decentralization 
 
The next part of this chapter sets out to describe the re-balancing of federal-
provincial and federal-state relations, hence the changes in the formal type I 
structures, what Marshall (2005) calls the ―shifting institutional tableau surrounding 
urban governance‖ (675).  The dynamic perspective presented in this chapter comes 
from tracing the evolution of intergovernmental relations between the dominant 
actors in Type I governance structures—federal, state and provincial governments.  
This will demonstrate that as formal intergovernmental relations passed from a period 
of competition, with federal and sub-national relations determined by concerns with 
jurisdiction and structure, into a period of collaboration where the actors begin to 
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concern themselves with the quality of the decision-making process, specifically, it‘s 
openness and accessibility, and also begin to concern themselves with finding ―a 
strategic alternative to zero-sum power struggles, directed towards building new 
frames for intergovernmental consensus‖ (Gualini 2003, 619),  that it was this new 
emphasis on the process of collaboration and positive sum relations which opened the 
way for Type II structures like transnational municipal networks to be erected, 
tolerated and accepted.  To echo an earlier quote by Bache (2008), this is a case of 
―dominant actors changing their values and preferences‖ (36).  Federal, state, and 
provincial governments that had heretofore been preoccupied with jealously guarding 
their jurisdictions ‗loosened up‘ and became permissive and even accommodating of 
new players, new governance structures, and new interactions.   
This opening up of the political sphere (Heinelt and Niederhafner 2005, 76), 
in turn, provided an avenue for greater local government engagement in the decision-
making process even though the formal institutional structures remained largely 
intact.  Bache (2008) described the same move toward collaboration but in the context 
of the European Union‘s cohesion policy, arguing that ―what began as a strategic 
response‖ (167) to the European Union‘s experimentation with a new redistributive 
mechanism ―led to a deeper transformation in actor preferences over time.  The most 
obvious example here is the acceptance of multilevel and cross-sectoral partnerships 
as part of the institutional architecture in states where this was a novel or 
underdeveloped mode of governance‖ (167) and, more importantly, ―where little or 
nothing previously existed‖ (167).  In North America too, we witness the emergence 
and acceptance of brand new informal governance structures on the shores of the 
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Great Lakes, such as the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, where such 
involvement was previously non-existent. 
 
 
Domestic Interactions: Intergovernmental Relations in the Context of Canadian and 
American Federalism 
 
 
 
 The Evolution Towards Collaborative Intergovernmental Relations 
Over the last sixty years, several models of intergovernmental relations have 
emerged to describe the patterns or periods of intergovernmental relations in Canada 
and the United States in the twentieth century.  For example, in Canada, Harvey 
Lazar (1997) describes the different periods of intergovernmental relations as 
cooperative, competitive and collaborative.  Andrea Gerlak divides U.S. 
intergovernmental relations into five periods.  Both models locate periods of 
intergovernmental relations along a competition-collaboration spectrum defined by 
the prevailing dynamic, although different dynamics can and often do co-exist (Elazar 
1990).   
This chapter divides the twentieth century into two periods, a period of 
competitive-cooperation followed by a period of collaborative-cooperation.  This 
simple typology acknowledges the rather obvious fact that some form of cooperation 
is always present in intergovernmental relations.  What differentiates the two periods 
is that the former category entails intergovernmental relations that are defined by a 
preoccupation with durable governance structures and the exclusivity of jurisdictions, 
which gives these relations a competitive hue, while in the latter period the actors 
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begin to focus more on the quality and openness of the policymaking process, a 
flexibility of institutional design, intersecting membership at different jurisdictional 
levels, and the attainment of positive sum results conducive to collaboration. 
 
(i)  Competitive Cooperative Federalism in the United States 
In varying degrees throughout the twentieth century the central player in 
United States environmental policy was the federal government. The centralization of 
authority in environmental policy at the federal level was not explicitly defined in the 
American constitution, but was enshrined in several separate articles that deal with 
commerce, property, and resources, which forms the legal basis both for the 
economic interests that have historically underpinned United States environmental 
policy and the federal government‘s dominant role.  The primary source of federal 
authority on the environment is the commerce clause (Article I sec. 8) which gives 
Congress the authority to regulate interstate and international commerce.  The federal 
government has used the commerce clause to uphold minimum environmental 
standards in order to remove a potential source of trade distortions and inter-state 
competition that could generate pressures for a regulatory ‗race to the bottom‘.  For 
example, state and local governments have recently asked the federal government to 
harmonize ballast water regulations which would force all freighters entering any port 
in any Great Lakes state to undertake the same measures to prevent the release of 
harmful invasive species from discharged ballast water.  Such harmonization would 
not only protect Great Lakes water quality but it would prevent ports from profiting 
financially from less rigorous standards.   
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Other powers include the tax and spending clause (Article I sec. 8), which 
gives the federal government the ability to fund environmental programs and to 
regulate state and local environmental policy by attaching conditions on federal 
monies transferred to states, thereby entrenching the imbalance of intergovernmental 
relations in environmental policy.  The tax and spending clause has become a 
powerful regulatory instrument.  The percentage of total federal outlays, transfers to 
state and local government, has steadily increased since Lyndon Johnson‘s Great 
Society, rising to a fifth of all federal expenditures during the administration of G.W. 
Bush. State and local governments depend on these transfers for roughly twenty per 
cent of their revenue (Benton 2007).  The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
alone spent $60 billion on municipal sewage treatment in the period 1972-1990 
(Deason et al. 2001, 186).   
The property of the United States clause (Article IV sec. 3) gives Congress the 
authority to regulate the use of all lands belonging to the United States, which is 
significant in itself considering two-thirds of all land in the United States belongs to 
the federal government.  Most importantly, the federal government has authority over 
natural resources.  Finally, the supremacy clause (Article VI sec. 2) not only makes 
federal law the supreme law of the land, but provides the basis for the pre-emption 
principle which dictates that in a case where federal and state laws conflict, the 
former trumps the latter.  These constitutional provisions give the federal government 
the potential for acquiring a commanding position in United States environmental 
policy, a position it began to seek only at the start of the twentieth century. 
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It took the federal government some time to fully assert its formal authority 
and become the central actor in resource management which was originally a 
responsibility for the most part taken up by state and local authorities.  Centralization 
moved forward after the turn of the last century as the federal government was called 
upon to carry out immense projects for irrigation, navigation, power production and 
flood control which outstripped the administrative capacity of states and local 
government (Gerlak, 235).  The significant steps toward centralization of resource 
management was perhaps best illustrated by the establishment of river basin 
authorities such as the Tennessee Valley Authority in 1933—the first and to this day 
largest regional planning agency of the federal government.  During the 1950s, the 
federal government also began using the courts to assert its sovereignty over water 
quality management when faced with opposition from states and local government.   
The strong current of centralization carried over into the period of 
competitive-cooperation which characterized American intergovernmental relations 
from the 1960s to the 1980s capped by the creation of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in 1970.  Crampton (1984) states, ―in 1970, EPA wrote the 
regulations, set the standards, issued the permits, and did most of the monitoring, 
inspection, and enforcement work involved in ensuring compliance with national 
environmental rules‖ (4).   Indicative of the current of centralization of this period, 
the passing of the 1972 Clean Water Act (1972) gave the EPA the task of regulating 
the discharge of pollutants at the state and local level.  Gerlak (2006) argues that ―the 
CWA was the first environmental law to place heavy burdens on local government … 
and represented the first time that state actions had ever been subject to such complete 
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federal control‖ (231).  The increasing federal intrusion into sub-national regulatory 
policy coincided with a twenty-five per cent increase in federal transfers to states and 
local government between the years 1973-74 under the Nixon administration (Benton, 
376).   John Kincaid (1990) explains that the imbalance in intergovernmental 
relations in the command-and-control environmental regulatory system prevailed ―by 
compensating state and local officials for federal intrusions into their authority with 
fiscal assistance and with federal assumption of policy decisions too painful to be 
made by some state and local authorities‖ (143).   
On the other hand, a counter-current also emerged during the period of 
competitive-cooperation, as the federal government began to delegate decision-
making power with regards to implementation and enforcement to the states.  
Granted, the states were largely seen as the ―primary operational arm of a national 
network for environmental protection‖ (Crampton 1984, 5), but they were more than 
just an appendage of the federal government.  The Water Resources Planning Act 
(1965), for instance, gave states equal standing with the federal government in river 
basin commissions set up to coordinate water management, while the National Water 
Commission (1968) recommended the expansion of local water management.  The 
concurrent centralizing and decentralizing tendencies collided over where 
jurisdictional lines should be drawn.  Fierce debates surfaced about the proper 
division of decision-making power framed as zero-sum games between a centralized, 
federal command-and-control model and a model that gave states greater leverage. 
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(ii) Competitive-Cooperation in Canada 
A period known as competitive-cooperation also existed in Canadian 
federalism, where a preoccupation with structure and protecting government 
jurisdiction dominated environmental policymaking.  However, unlike the United 
States, what fueled the competition was not burgeoning federal authority coming up 
against increasingly assertive states, but that dominant provincial governments were 
being asked to accommodate a role for an otherwise weak and timid federal 
government.   
The Canadian constitution set the ground for one of the most decentralized 
environmental policies in the Western world (Rabe 1999) in terms of authority 
granted sub-national governments.  As in the United States, control over the 
environment was not explicitly addressed in the Canadian constitution, and the 
allocation of authority over environmental policy emerged by piecing together the 
division of powers between the federal government and the provinces outlined in 
Section 91 and Section 92.  The constitution gave the federal government control over 
criminal law, sea coast and inland fisheries, navigation, shipping and foreign 
relations, while delegating authority over natural resources, property rights and 
provincial public lands to the provinces.   
This bifurcation of constitutional jurisdiction weakened the Canadian federal 
government‘s position in environmental policy and brought about several key 
differences between the allocation of American and Canadian environmental 
policymaking authority.  A major difference between the two countries is that the 
supremacy clause allows the United States federal government to overrule state law, 
124  
while the Canadian government cannot implement treaties which affect provincial 
jurisdiction.  Hence, the lack of a supremacy clause in such a diffuse, cross-
jurisdictional policy field means that environmental policymaking in Canada has 
required federal-provincial diplomacy from the very beginning whereas in the United 
States the constitutional strength of the federal government has brought about 
command-and-control in environmental policy.   
Furthermore, Canadian federal-provincial diplomacy has largely been marked 
by federal restraint and deference towards provincial governments, partly on account 
of the latter‘s control over natural resources including lakes and rivers.  As Fafard 
argues, ―although both orders of government have the constitutional jurisdiction to act 
[on environmental policy], on balance provinces have been more aggressive in 
asserting their jurisdiction….the federal government has been comparatively timid to 
assert or even to test the full extent of its constitutional authority‖ (1998, 205). 
Initially the meekness of the federal government in environmental policy was 
attributed to its weak constitutional position (Gibson 1973; Lundquist 1974), but over 
time other forces were seen to be at play such as fluctuations in the business cycle 
(Hoberg 1993) and fluctuations in the public‘s interest in the environment (Harrison 
1995a).  The emergence of stagflation in the early 1970s sharply turned the 
electorate‘s focus from the environment to the economy.  Since environmental 
protection was no longer a national political priority for voters, it removed the 
political incentive for a confrontation with the provinces.  With no groundswell of 
popular opinion to mitigate the political costs of such a confrontation, the federal 
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government largely surrendered to the economic concerns of the provinces (Harrison, 
1996).   
Yet, rather than painting the federal government as a victim of political 
circumstance, Harrison (1996) argues that, during periods of waning public interest, 
federal governments are more than satisfied to ―take advantage of jurisdictional 
uncertainty by ‗passing the buck‘ to jurisdictionally defensive provinces‖ (162).  This 
deference has been especially pronounced in relations with provinces whose 
economies were heavily dependent on natural resources, for example British 
Columbia (forestry) and Alberta (oil and gas).  Plus, the federal government was 
particularly cautious not to provoke separatist sentiment in Quebec by introducing 
any environmental legislation that could be interpreted as interfering in the province‘s 
hydro-electric and pulp-and-paper industries (Skogstad 1996; Fafard 1998).  The 
result was that environmental policy was in the hands of provincial officials which 
were insulated from any external pressures to adopt extensive environmental 
regulations. 
A noticeable shift occurred towards the end of the 1980s, when a second wave 
of environmentalism hit Canada.  The growing importance of the environment to the 
electorate, and the increased salience of issues such as acid rain, provided an impetus 
for the federal government to play a larger role in the environment, offsetting the 
constitutional constraints and provincial resistance that had stifled federal 
involvement until that point (Harrison, 1996).  Grassroots pressure from local 
environmental groups and coalitions such as Greenpeace and Sierra Legal Defense 
Fund, as well as the strengthening of the overarching international environmental 
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regimes in the wake of the Brundtland Report (1987), the release of the European 
Union‘s Fourth Environmental Action Plan (1987) and the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (1992), combined to create upward 
and downward pressures on the federal government to assert itself on the 
environment. 
As a result, the federal government and the provinces came into direct conflict 
over jurisdiction in environmental policy, most notably in the Supreme Court case R. 
v. Crown Zellerbach (1988).  A forestry company in British Columbia was dumping 
waste in the Pacific Ocean, but still within provincial waters.  The federal government 
argued that the action violated the Ocean Dumping Control Act and thus invoked the 
―national concern‖ aspect of the Peace, Order, and Good Government (POGG) clause 
of the constitution, which, the federal government argued overrides what had been 
historically provincial jurisdiction.  Holland et al. (1996) argue, 
The political ramifications were obvious: acceptance of this argument 
would not only establish a new federal environmental jurisdiction over 
both national and provincial sea water but also confer a prima facie 
legitimacy on federal regulation in almost any environmental policy 
deemed to be of national interest (46). 
 
Despite vehement opposition from British Columbia and Quebec, the Supreme Court 
decided in favor of the federal government.  The effect of international standards on 
the Court‘s thinking can be seen in its reference to several United Nations reports on 
marine pollution in the decision. 
 Emboldened by their expanded powers, the federal government passed several 
pieces of important legislation including the Canadian Environmental Protection Act 
(CEPA) in 1988, an amendment to the Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations in 1990, 
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and the Canadian Environment Assessment Act (CEAA) in 1992 (MacKay 2004, 32).  
These three pieces of legislation affirmed Ottawa‘s role in regulating toxic substances 
which until then was a provincial domain, allowed the federal government to issue 
pollution control permits separate from the provinces, and it created a statutory 
obligation for federal environmental impact assessments for certain development 
projects (MacKay 2004, 32). 
 Two other important cases reinforced Ottawa‘s role in environmental matters.  
In Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (1992), the Supreme Court ruled 
that the federal government was obliged to undertake an environmental assessment 
prior to the construction of a dam in Alberta, arguing that the federal right to regulate 
navigable waters superseded the province‘s control over the river bed.  The case is 
also noteworthy for the fact that it was brought forth by local environmental groups 
who exercised a mandamus order that obliged the federal government to act, 
demonstrating the effects of upward pressure from local environmental groups on the 
mobilization of the federal government. 
The Canada v. Hydro Quebec (1997) case involved a Quebec utility company 
charged with dumping polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) into the St. Maurice River 
and failing to report the discharges.  Both actions were in contravention of the 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA).  The Supreme Court rejected 
Quebec‘s claim that CEPA had intruded into an area of exclusive provincial control, 
arguing instead that the federal government‘s exercise of criminal law power for the 
prohibition of toxic substances was valid. 
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 These three rare examples of environmental litigation in Canada strengthened 
and expanded the federal government‘s powers in environmental matters vis-à-vis the 
provinces by the Court‘s recognition of the principle of national concern, the federal 
exercise of criminal law, and the POGG clause.  However, the Supreme Court was 
also careful in its decisions to limit federal intrusion into provincial jurisdiction and 
thus prevent the pendulum from swinging completely the other way by reiterating its 
longstanding position that protection of the environment required cooperation from 
both levels of government.  In its ruling in Crown Zellerbach, for instance, the Court 
established the principle of ‗provincial inability‘ which stated that federal intrusion on 
provincial jurisdiction could occur only when the failure of one province to act on a 
matter had an effect on other provinces (Baier 2002, 27).  Also, the court ruled that 
any federal legislation referred to for the purpose of justifying federal intrusion must 
also have ―a singleness, distinctiveness, and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it 
from matters of provincial concern‖ (Richards 1991, 60).   
Nonetheless, on balance, the Court‘s decision did soften the relative provincial 
monopoly on environmental policymaking by expanding the federal government‘s 
jurisdiction and thus laid the groundwork for the possibility in the near future of a 
more balanced intergovernmental relationship between the two levels of government 
and for greater collaboration, a relationship which was soon made manifest. 
 
(iii) Collaboration in Canada 
Starting with the signing of the Statement of Interjurisdictional Co-Operation 
(1990), federal and provincial governments in Canada entered a period of 
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collaborative-cooperation with both levels committing themselves to multi-
stakeholder consultation and cooperation on environmental matters.  A preoccupation 
with structure and jurisdictional competition gave way to pragmatism, with both sides 
seeking to minimize intergovernmental conflict.  Collaborative federalism was further 
institutionalized with the establishment of the Canadian Council of Ministers of the 
Environment (CCME) in 1993 as the chief intergovernmental organization 
responsible for coordinating intergovernmental environmental policy comprised of 
federal and provincial environmental ministers.   
The signing of the Canada-Wide Accord on the Environmental Harmonization 
in 1998 not only entrenched the CCME as the location for the drafting of 
environmental standards, but institutionalized the principle of stakeholder 
participation, a goal made explicit in its guiding principles.  Alcantara‘s (2005) 
analysis of this new, more open intergovernmental policy process leading to the 
creation of dioxin and furans standards reveals that ―societal actors did have a 
substantial influence on the process and the outcome‖ (175), an observation in stark 
contrast to previous, closed periods of intergovernmental relations.  Stakeholders 
influenced the policymaking process through various input mechanisms including 
advisory groups composed of representatives from industry, non-governmental 
organizations and local government as well as a series of national stakeholder 
meetings in 1999, 2000 and 2001 (Alcantara 2005, 166). 
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(iv) Towards Collaboration in the United States 
A few years before the Canadian courts were laying the groundwork for the 
rebalancing of intergovernmental relations towards a more collaborative model, the 
Reagan administration began introducing reforms which extended the move away 
from what James Stever (1993) termed the top-down executive-centered 
intergovernmental management model to one that placed a greater onus on sub-
national level initiative, planning and implementation.  Indicative of this period, 
Reagan‘s decision to reduce federal funding of the Water Resource Council and the 
River Basin Commissions suggested, more and more, ―that states were to go it on 
their own‖ (Gerlak, 238).  To illustrate further, the regulation of water quality was 
gradually delegated to the states, starting with the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) which oversees point source discharges into water 
systems.  The 1987 amendment to the Clean Water Act reinforced this 
decentralization by establishing the Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) 
which gave states greater discretion and responsibility in planning, funding and 
implementing wastewater programs.   
As the federal government began its retrenchment, new governance structures 
emerged to fill the void.  Interstate compacts to restore and protect water basins 
emerged.  Most notably, the Chesapeake Bay Agreement was signed in 1983 
establishing the Chesapeake Bay Commission consisting of fifteen state legislators 
and three state governors from Pennsylvania, Virginia and Maryland, as well as three 
citizen representatives to oversee and coordinate environmental efforts related to the 
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protection and restoration of the Chesapeake Bay.  State courts even began to 
adjudicate water rights cases without opposition from the federal government.   
Gerlak (2003) argues that as the federal government continued its retreat 
during the 1980s and 1990s, a century of centralized national water policy gave way 
to an era of ―hyperpluralism‖ (243) where competing interests from an increasing 
number of players created a ―contested and volatile‖ (243) policy landscape. 
As a response to the process of decentralization and fragmentation of national 
water policy and the growing hyperpluralism, intergovernmental relations in the 
United States entered a phase of collaborative-cooperation, or what Gerlak (2003) 
terms ‗pragmatic federalism‘ (Gerlak 243).  According to Gerlak, pragmatic 
federalism ―has evolved to fill the absence of any national guiding water policy.  
Today‘s federalism recognizes the piecemeal and fragmented approach that has come 
to characterize the water policy arena‖ (243).  Pragmatic federalism is characterized 
by expanded consultations between new stakeholders and an adaptable management 
process (Kincaid 1999), a process akin to the International Watershed Initiative (IWI) 
developed by the International Joint Commission.  Structure and jurisdiction are 
deemphasized during this period in favor of shared power and decision-making, 
signaling an increase in the breadth and depth of multilevel governance.  Gerlak 
argues, ―The division of authority or locus of decision making is less important under 
this variety of federalism.  Process reigns supreme.  Relying on a diverse set of 
approaches and tools, it strives to be more accessible, with improved processes and 
greater coordination‖ (Gerlak, 243).  In short, federal and state governments became 
accommodating of new governance structures. 
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A notable outcome of this new approach was the establishment of programs 
and institutions around areas defined by particular problems and particular 
watersheds, areas that are referred to as problemsheds (Gerlak, 243).  Again, perhaps 
the best illustration of this new approach is the International Watershed Initiative and 
its multi-scalar, multi-actor management of particular watersheds including the St. 
Croix River (Maine), the Red River (North Dakota, Minnesota, Manitoba), Rainy 
River (Minnesota, Ontario), and the Souris River (Saskatchewan, North Dakota, 
Manitoba).  Future watershed initiatives are being considered which include the Great 
Lakes.  
In essence, this development signaled the regionalization and further 
fragmentation of national water policy in the United States, illustrated by the 
proliferation of new, informal regional institutions such as the Great Lakes Regional 
Collaboration and the Great Lakes and St Lawrence Cities Initiative (GLSLCI), and 
an increasing profile and presence of existing regional organizations such as the Great 
Lakes Commission, Great Lakes United, and the Council of Great Lakes Governors.  
The division of the policy process according to the unique geographic, ecological, 
political and social circumstances of each problemshed gave rise to an even greater 
fragmentation of national environmental policy as the federal government ceded an 
ever greater share of the responsibility for water management to these informal 
regional bodies.  Illustrating this new era of water policy, in 2003, the Department of 
the Interior‘s Water 2025 initiative on conservation issues stated that the ―principles 
of federalism and fiscal realities make it clear that these decisions cannot and should 
not be driven from the federal level‖ (quoted in Gerlak, 242).  The dramatic re-
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balancing of federal-sub-national relations was complete.  The stage was set for the 
expansion of multilevel governance. 
 
The Impact of Decentralized-Collaboration on Local Government: the case of 
Ontario 
 
The case of Ontario illustrates the impact that the transformation towards a 
decentralized-collaborative model of intergovernmental relations has had on local 
policy capacity around the Great Lakes.  The effects of collaboration that began to 
characterize federal-provincial relations in the late 1990s initially took some time to 
trickle down to local government.  During the Conservative Government of Premier 
Mike Harris (1995-2003), Ontario actually experienced one of the greatest periods of 
provincial-local conflict in Canadian history.  Under the banner of a Common Sense 
Revolution, the Harris government undertook an aggressive policy of 
‗disentanglement‘ which sought to eliminate shared jurisdictions between levels of 
government.  Although the purported goal was greater clarity and efficiency in 
policymaking and service delivery, the unquestionable result was a major 
downloading of services to local government minus the necessary funding.  On the 
positive side, the provincial government, seeking to ameliorate municipal frustration 
at having to carry these new burdens, increased the proportion of unconditional grants 
in provincial transfers, thereby giving local government greater autonomy over how 
those funds would be dispensed.  However, only in the twilight years of the 
Conservative government, when public support for the Common Sense Revolution 
was petering out and popular dissatisfaction with reduced social programs and the 
deterioration of municipal services was leading to almost certain electoral defeat in 
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the 2003 elections, did local governments begin to see the fruits of collaboration and 
the expansion of their policy capacity. 
A new era of local-provincial relations was heralded with the signing of the 
Memorandum of Understanding associated with the Ontario Municipal Act (2001), 
which stated that the provincial government is ―committed to cooperating with 
municipalities in considering new legislation or regulations with a municipal impact‖ 
(Province of Ontario, Memorandum of Understanding between the Association of 
Municipalities of Ontario and the Province of Ontario 2001, 2).  The Municipal Act 
came into force on January 1, 2003, and recognized municipalities for the first time as 
‗natural persons‘ which gave them broad regulatory authority—much like individuals 
and corporations—to conduct their day-to-day business without the need for specific 
legislative authority.  The Act also instructed the courts to interpret their spheres of 
jurisdiction broadly.  Furthermore, municipalities were recognized for the first time as 
responsible and accountable governing bodies.  According to the Ontario Ministry of 
Municipal Affairs and Housing website, the Act ―has brought about a new 
relationship between the municipal sector and the province based on mutual respect, 
consultation and cooperation‖ (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 
2009).   
A string of judicial decisions strengthened the case for expanded local 
government involvement in environmental governance by conferring on local 
government a responsibility for the protection of the general welfare of its citizens 
which explicitly includes health and the environment thus going well beyond the 
specific responsibilities for sewers, water treatment, flooding etc. that previously 
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defined the narrow scope of local jurisdiction under Dillon‘s Rule.  In the Canada 
Ltee v. Hudson case in 2001, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a Quebec 
municipality‘s ban on pesticides arguing that the Town of Hudson could refer to its 
―general welfare‖ powers to pass bylaws protecting the health of its citizens.  In the 
United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary (2004) case, the 
Supreme Court reviewed the new municipal powers and decided, according to Justice 
Bastarache, that ―this shift in legislative drafting reflects the true nature of modern 
municipalities which require greater flexibility in fulfilling their statutory purposes‖ 
(quoted in Valiante 2007, 1069).  The Ontario Court of Appeal ruled in Cropflife 
Canada v. Toronto (2005) that the new municipal powers ―are to be interpreted 
broadly and generously‖ (quoted in Valiante 2007, 1069).   
Following closely on the heels of these decisions, Sutcliffe (2007) argues that 
two subsequent pieces of legislation, the Municipal Statute Law Amendment Act 
(2006) and The Stronger City of Toronto for a Stronger Ontario Act (2006) gave 
municipal governments an even greater legislative flexibility.  By allowing the city 
―to act on any local issues that has not been explicitly identified as a matter of 
exclusive provincial interest‖ (Silva quoted in Sutcliffe 2007, 257), the City of 
Toronto Act significantly softened the ultra vires principle that has historically 
undergirded Ontario law, which states that local governments can only act in those 
areas specifically identified by legislation.  More importantly, both these laws grant 
cities broad, general powers with regards to ―economic, social and environmental 
well-being‖ as well as ―health, safety and well-being of persons‖ (Province of 
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Ontario, An Act to Amend Various Acts in Relation to Municipalities, 2006, chapter 
32).   
In essence, these developments signified a dramatic reinterpretation of 
Canada‘s Dillon‘s Rule.  The decision of Toronto, and other Canadian municipalities, 
to file an amicus brief in an American court in the aforementioned AEP case and to 
subsequently file a petition with the EPA with regards to coal-fired plants in the 
American Midwest, is not only a response to these new mandates to protect health 
and the environment and thus the general welfare of its citizens, but it also drew on 
these new, broadly defined spheres of jurisdiction in their pursuit of these new aims.  
It is this string of legislation and judicial decisions which opened up the sphere of 
environmental policymaking and bilateral environmental policymaking for Canadian 
local governments, and set the ground for them to operate within a transnational 
municipal network institutionalizing cross-border environmental cooperation between 
local governments.  Mayor Miller of Toronto states that the new legislation 
authorized local government to cooperate with other governments other than the 
provinces, and even though he argues that ―the Cities Initiative would have emerged 
regardless of the new laws‖, cities in Ontario feel more secure stepping outside their 
narrow constitutionally defined jurisdictions because ―now we have something to 
point to if we are ever challenged‖ (GLSLCI interview David Miller 2010). 
In 2002, Fowler and Siegel observed that despite the province‘s stubborn 
reluctance to grant municipal governments greater constitutional standing, the period 
of disentanglement and restructuring of local government, coupled with the public‘s 
rejection of the command-and-control style of Conservative rule, has prepared the 
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grounds where ―local government will gradually obtain a de facto status as real 
governing and policy-making bodies, which provincial governments would never 
allow them to attain de jure‖ (14).  Local governments are much closer to attaining 
that status than Fowler and Siegel predicted or imagined. 
Local governments have also sought and attained greater cooperation and 
influence at the federal level, despite the fact that the constitution did not include a 
basis for any formal federal-local relationship, either through individual lobbying or 
collectively through such lobbying organizations as the Association of Municipalities 
of Ontario (AMO) and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM).  Sutcliffe 
(2007) argues there are three fundamental motivations that drive local government to 
seek to influence the federal government.  First, legislative decisions made at the 
federal level have direct impact on local government across a number of policy issues 
including the environment.  Second, the federal government provides some funding 
directly to municipal governments.  Finally, the federal relationship with the 
provinces indirectly affects local government.  For example, cuts to federal transfers 
to provincial governments have led to cuts in provincial transfers to local 
government.  The creation of the Canada Infrastructure Works program in the 1990s 
injected $2 billion for local infrastructure projects, and that money was supplemented 
by the Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund, the Municipal Rural Infrastructure Fund, 
and the Border Infrastructure Fund (Sutcliffe 2007, 258).  Keating‘s observation in 
1991 that, ―the federal level has no direct links with local governments and provides 
virtually no resources for them‖ (59), is therefore no longer accurate at this point, and 
the federal-local relationship has changed in even more important ways since then. 
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Furthermore, in 2002, the Liberal Party Task Force on Urban Issues set up by 
Prime Minister Jean Chretien released its report which concluded with a firm 
commitment to the expansion of the collaboration model down to local government, 
stating that ―strong urban partnerships and tripartite agreements should be developed 
between and among all orders of government as well as with the private sectors.  
Provincial and municipal leaders need to be involved in decisions that affect them‖ 
(quoted in Sutcliffe 2007, 265).  The next Prime Minister, Paul Martin, took up the 
mantle by promising local governments a ―New Deal‖, which he delivered in part 
through the creation of a Minister of State (Infrastructure and Communities) and the 
institution of new funding mechanisms by providing cities with a Goods and Services 
Tax (GST) rebate and a share in the federal gas tax (Sutcliffe 2007, 265) that will 
transfer $7 billion and $1.86 billion respectively to municipalities over the next few 
years, with much of that money for infrastructure projects that meet environmental 
objectives of sustainability.  These new federal-local linkages that have emerged 
during the period of collaborative cooperation are significant if one pauses to consider 
for example that in 1978 the federal government‘s Ministry of State for Urban Affairs 
was dismantled just seven years after its establishment as a result of the Ontario 
government‘s zealous defense of its control over local government and its opposition 
to direct contacts between federal and local governments.   
In stark contrast to previous eras of federalism, Prime Minister Martin 
underlined the spirit of this new collaborative period of intergovernmental relations in 
Canada by stating, ―We cannot as a nation, remain isolated inside the old silos that 
prevent partnership between the orders of government.  If we do so, we risk 
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sacrificing the path ahead for some kind of nostalgia‖ (Sutcliffe 2007, 265).  In May 
2009, the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative published a document titled, 
At the Shoreline: A Mayors’ Collaborative Action Plan to Protect the Great Lakes, 
calling for the establishment of a trilateral collaborative forum for the federal, 
provincial, and local governments on environmental issues.  Such a trilateral forum 
has never existed, and although such an official forum does not yet exist in toto, the 
first tripartite meeting of government officials dealing with environmental issues 
around the Great Lakes was held in October 2009, and this in itself marks a radical 
departure from the previous era of intergovernmental relations. 
 
 
Explaining the Turn Toward Collaboration and the Expansion of Local Government 
Policy Capacity 
 
Alongside the growing trend toward collaboration, the second important 
dimension to the transition occurring within Type I governance structures that 
requires attention has been the process of decentralization in North America because 
it too has factored heavily in the mobilization of local government participation in 
environmental policymaking and in particular the shaping of the structure and 
behavior of transnational municipal networks.  Again moving forward from a 
process-oriented, path-dependent approach that acknowledges the formative effect of 
transitions, Kelleher, Batterbury, and Stern (1999) argue that ―the degree of 
decentralization and the type of de-concentration occurring…inevitably shapes the 
relations between key actors‖ (viii) which in turn determines the breadth, depth and 
contour of multilevel governance (Hooghe 1996).  Canada‘s environmental 
policymaking was already one of the most decentralized in the Western world, with 
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formal policy capacity residing at the level of provincial government.  The degree of 
decentralization in Canadian environmental policymaking was limited in that it did 
not seep past the level of provincial governments downward to local government.  
The most dramatic degree of decentralization of water policy across the Great Lakes 
basin took place on the American side of the border, and this brought 
intergovernmental relations in Canada and the United States into greater alignment as 
the locus of decision-making authority shifted towards the sub-national level. 
The fact that greater authority for environmental policymaking in the basin 
was now located in the provinces and the states was a critical development and had 
two effects on local government.  On the one hand, the significant degree of 
dispersion of authority downward to provinces and states also brought the locus of 
decision-making authority one step closer to local governments.  Local government 
on both sides of the border could utilize already existing local-provincial and local-
state channels of communication to engage their respective sub-national governments 
who could then directly influence environmental policy in the basin.  On the other 
hand, locating more authority over environmental policymaking in provinces and 
states that have traditionally subordinated environmental policy to economic interests 
created a leadership gap and weakened accountability structures as these governments 
failed to step up and fill the void left by federal government retrenchment in water 
quality management.  This accountability gap presented both an opportunity and a 
functional imperative for increased local government mobilization. 
Rabe (1999) early on noted the problems of moving towards a more 
decentralized Canada-model of water governance.  Comparing the pollution 
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prevention programs in four Canadian provinces and four American states, Rabe 
(1999) concluded that a more robust federal presence in United States water policy 
accounted for better pollution prevention measures in the states in part because the 
greater interaction between the two levels of government, even to the point of open 
conflict, had often coalesced ―into a single system of positive-feedback, each 
encouraging the other to enact stronger reforms than might otherwise occur‖ 
(Baumgartner and Jones quoted in Rabe 1999, 291).   
In Canada, the absence of the federal government in water policy has meant 
that provincial officials are autonomous and insulated with little outside pressure put 
on them to innovate.  This stagnation occurs in large part because ―the bottom line is 
not environmental protection here, but economic development‖ (Harrison quoted in 
Rabe 1999, 290). Rabe notes that ―provinces are clearly reluctant in any way to 
alienate industries that might transfer investments to less-rigorous provinces‖ (1999, 
290).   
In contrast, in the United States, Hanson (1992) argues that the ―the force that 
is really moving pollution prevention forward is the federal government‖ (quoted in 
Rabe 1999, 299).  The negative consequences of accelerated retrenchment of the 
federal government from water management was identified by former director of 
EPA, William Reilly, who stated, that ―unless the EPA is pushing state regulators, a 
culture of transgression and apathy sets in‖ (Duhigg 2009), which echoes an 
aforementioned statement by Matthew Crum, a former official with West Virginia‘s 
Department of Environmental Protection, that ―if you don‘t have vigorous oversight 
by the feds, then everything just goes limp‖ (Duhigg 2009).  Similarly, the EPA and 
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other United States federal agencies have been the main drivers of water quality 
regulation in the Great Lakes basin, with the Ontario government following their lead.  
The retrenchment of the federal role within environmental policymaking, and the 
move toward a Canada-model within the Great Lakes, has weakened the regulatory 
system on both sides of the border. 
In part, the turn toward multilevel governance through the dual processes of 
collaboration and decentralization in both countries can be seen as a functional 
response to the growing complexity of environmental policy based on a normative 
assumption that governance based on multiple jurisdictions, which includes local 
government, can deal more efficiently with that complexity than centralized 
government, a logic which underpins the establishment and functioning of so-called 
aforementioned problemsheds.  In support of this thesis, Marks and Hooghe argue 
that, 
…governance must operate at multiple scales in order to capture 
variations in the territorial reach of policy externalities.  Because 
externalities arising from the provision of public goods vary 
immensely—from planet-wide in the case of global warming to local 
in the case of most city services—so should the scale of governance 
(16). 
 
Environmental policymaking around the Great Lakes reflects one of the central 
characteristics of multilevel governance, which is that ―governing does not have a 
uniform pattern but is defined differently owing to the nature of the policy problems‖ 
(Peters and Pierre 2004, 84).  This is especially valid considering that the 
management of water quality is inherently a ‗glocal‘ issue, one that is simultaneously 
local and global in scale, since it requires management of pollution from activities 
taking place at international, national, regional and local scales.  Auer (2000) argues 
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that under these conditions ―the state-centered view offers few insights as to the 
constitutive, organizational and human resource requirements for effective policy‖ 
(175).   
In particular, the development and nurturing of more informal, Type II 
governance structures such as policy networks complements traditional, formal, Type 
I structures and helps alleviate collective action problems that stem from strategic 
bargaining in a complex, interorganizational environment.  Borzel (1998) argues 
―such informal linkages, based on communication and trust, overlap with 
institutionalized structures of co-ordination‖ and ―they provide redundant possibilities 
for interaction and communication (262).  This reasoning echoes, as you may recall, 
the argument by Andersson and Ostrom (2008) that ―a governance system that 
manages to distribute capabilities and duties in such a way that perverse incentive and 
information problems at one level are offset to some extent by positive incentives and 
information capabilities or actors at other levels, will achieve better outcomes than 
either a highly centralized or fully decentralized system‖ (73).  The informal 
networks identified by Borzel are not necessarily sites of decision-making, but ―for 
the information, communication and exercise of influence in the preparation of 
decisions‖ (262) which reduce the transaction costs in complex decision-making 
because ―they provide a basis of common knowledge, experience and normative 
orientation‖ (262).  In part, Type II governance structures provide the kind of 
‗complementary back up institutions‘ which Andersson and Ostrom (2008) argued 
improve polycentric governance systems, as we discussed in Chapter Two.  Hence, 
one way to interpret the expansion of multilevel governance and local government 
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policy capacity is that higher tiers of government recognized the utility of both as 
supplementary resources for the regulatory system. 
A competing and more critical interpretation for the expansion of multilevel 
governance is provided by Peters and Pierre (2004), who argue that ―informal 
patterns of political coordination could in fact be a strategy for political interests to 
escape or by-pass regulations‖ (85), and that, according to the authors, the non-central 
actors, like local governments, find themselves trapped in a Faustian bargain where 
―the capacity to govern has been sold, or at least has been downgraded, in an attempt 
to achieve more open and inclusive bargaining, and in order to circumvent formal 
structures that have been central to governing‖ (2004, 88).  It is a Faustian bargain for 
local governments because, as will be demonstrated shortly, increased decision-
making through informal multi-level governance structures provides local 
government with opportunities for greater participation in the policymaking process, 
but it also increases the costs they bear as a result of the downgrade in the  governing 
capacity of the entire system.   
Peterson and O‘Toole (2001) identify three negative tendencies of shifting 
decision-making to Type II network governance structures which weaken the 
democratic legitimacy of the decision-making process: (1) network governance leads 
to ambiguity in the policy process about ―when and by whom important decisions are 
made‖ (309) which results from a fundamental lack of transparency within the 
process (2) networks suffer from systematic problems of accountability which 
privileges private power (i.e. business) since, ―increasingly ‗hollow states‘, which 
emerge when power shifts from public to private governance and central to sub-
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central levels (see Milward, Provan, Else 1993) may become paper tigers in terms of 
policy compliance‖ (310) and (3) networks composed of multiple stakeholders exhibit 
drift, indecisiveness and general lack of leadership in which ―governments are unable 
to provide clear direction‖ (310), and which consequently leads to incrementalism.  
Consequently, local communities and local governments incur the increasing costs of 
deteriorating water quality in terms of quality of life as well and the cost of having 
greater responsibilities placed on them for environmental management.  Both costs 
are associated with the weakening governance structure precipitated by the 
retrenchment of the federal and sub-national governments from their responsibilities 
in favor of network governance.  In short, participation has a steep price. 
The lack of a coordinating center in environmental policymaking around the 
Great Lakes has indeed been exacerbated by the process of decentralization in both 
federal systems and the transfer of much of the authority over environmental policy 
from the central government to states and provinces who view environmental 
stewardship primarily through the narrow prism of economic development.  Nowhere 
has this been more evident than during the Conservative government of Ontario 
Premier Mike Harris (1995-2003) elected on a neoconservative platform of 
downsizing, deregulation, devolution and privatization (Clarkson 2002, 342).   
With regards to environmental policy, the province undertook an intense 
dismantling of regulatory institutions while transferring management of the 
environment and natural resources to industry and to a lesser extent municipal 
government.  The Harris government reduced the budget for the Ministry of the 
Environment (MOE) by half and cut 40 per cent of the staff.  The Ministry of Natural 
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Resources (MNR)—which is responsible for managing 85 per cent of the land in 
Ontario—shed 2,100 positions.  At the same time, a series of omnibus-style bills, 
such as Bill-26 passed in 1996, increased industry self-regulation and voluntary 
standards, especially in the forestry and mining sectors.  The creation of a Red Tape 
Review Commission implemented a virtual regulatory freeze, while at the same time 
the Commission reviewed and weakened the regulations already in existence under 
Ontario‘s environmental statutes (Clarkson, 342).  
In transferring control over water infrastructure to municipal governments, the 
provincial government downloaded the important responsibility of water testing to 
municipal governments.  At the same time, the Harris government closed the three 
provincial water testing laboratories in London, Kingston and Thunder Bay in 1996.  
A microbiologist working in one of the labs stated, ―the laboratory system is the heart 
of the MOE…and what the government did is cut out the heart of the Ministry of the 
Environment‖ (anonymous source quoted in OPSEU, Renewing the Ministry of the 
Environment 2001, 96). 
Prudham (2004) argues that Ontario‘s dramatic retreat from its regulatory 
functions had the potential ―for progressive devolution of regulatory administration‖ 
(352) had it increased stakeholder participation and strengthened, or even maintained, 
avenues for input from the scientific community or the general public.  However, the 
Common Sense Revolution essentially closed these avenues.  For example, the Harris 
government provided no consultation, and only eight weeks notice, on the decision to 
transfer ownership of water infrastructure and the responsibility of water testing to 
local governments.  Furthermore, the government eliminated advisory boards and 
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multi-stakeholder committees on the environment that provided access to the 
policymaking table for local governments, independent members of the scientific 
community, and concerned citizens such as the Advisory Committee on 
Environmental Standards, the Environmental Assessment Advisory Committee, and 
the Ontario Roundtable on the Environment and Economy (Clarkson, 342).  Clarkson 
argues that ―the Harris government systematically reduced public input and access to 
information while setting up a closed clientalist relationship with the once regulated 
industries as it moved them towards self-regulation and self-monitoring reporting‖ 
(344). 
The eight years of Conservative government accelerated the reorientation of 
the provincial role in environmental management that had begun in the 1970s.  The 
Harris policy symbolizes the province‘s retreat from its role as an active steward of 
the environment and reinforced its standing as a pollution haven in North America.  
Former Environmental Commissioner of Ontario, Eva Ligeti, aptly summed up the 
situation in her final annual report before being fired in 1999: 
Evidence of the deterioration of the province‘s environmental 
protection standards is widespread.  The Ministry of Natural 
Resources‘ much reduced staffing and its reliance on industry self-
monitoring raised questions about the ministry‘s capacity to protect the 
province‘s natural resources effectively…The ministry [MOE] is 
retreating from enforcement of effluent limits and is making little 
progress on applying pollution prevention to hazardous wastes.  It has 
promised to update 70 provincial air quality standards, but in two 
years, has produced only nine guidelines and no new enforceable 
standards.  Less government in this case means less enforcement and 
less environmental protection.  In order to maintain the semblance of 
environmental protection, ministry officials have resorted to describing 
the ‗co-benefits‘ of existing programs, attempting to involve industry 
in voluntary measures and transferring responsibility for 
environmental decisions to municipalities (quoted in Prudham, 355). 
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Further proof of Ontario‘s sliding environmental reputation NAFTA‘s Commission 
for Environmental Co-Operation (CEC) has ranked Ontario the second worst polluter 
among states and provinces in the United States and Canada (Clarkson 342).  
Clarkson argues that the Harris government undermined Ontario‘s environmental 
standards and dispersed the scientific capacity to implement, monitor and enforce 
them (342), stating, ―the dismantling of Ontario‘s once-proud and competent 
environmental ministry proceeded under an ideological fervour unseen in provincial 
history‖ (342). 
The nine years of Conservative Party rule in Ontario illustrates the power 
located at the sub-national level in Canada, and indirectly, the vulnerability of local 
government to ‗ideological fervour‘ at the top.  It also illustrates the reluctance on the 
part of federal and sub-national governments to exercise the full extent of their 
authority in environmental matters and therefore illustrates why there is a palpable 
sense of backsliding from the commitments and improvements made in Great Lakes 
water quality during the 1980s and 1990s following the signing and renewal of the 
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement in 1972 and 1978.  This retrenchment has 
created both a leadership vacuum around the Great Lakes and a lack of accountability 
that together comprise the most critical shortcomings of the governance structure.  
This retrenchment also supports warnings about the ‗dark side‘ of multilevel 
governance (Peters and Pierre 2004). 
The problem with accountability is acknowledged on both sides of the border.  
As early as 2001, a report by the Canadian Commissioner of Environment and 
Sustainable Development on the state of Great Lakes governance stated that the 
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Canadian federal government ―decided to rely on others, and when others failed to 
deliver, it did not assume the lead‖ (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2001, 
10) and that ―limited use of federal powers, weakness in basic management and 
accountability and the politics of federal-provincial relations have all played a part‖ 
(307) in the failure to meet the goals set forth in the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement.  Shortly thereafter, in 2003, a report prepared by the United States 
General Accounting Office on the Great Lakes highlighted the fragmentation and lack 
of accountability in the American governance structure by observing that there were 
148 federal and 51 state restoration programs and that ―the myriad of current 
strategies and coordination efforts makes it difficult to determine which organization 
is in charge‖ (35).   
American and Canadian observations about the gross inadequacies in their 
water governance structures were synthesized and given their most forceful 
expression in the 13
th
 Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality published by the 
International Joint Commission (IJC) in 2006, which for the first time focused 
entirely on the problem of accountability.  The IJC report concluded that ―there is 
now a compelling need to … improve accountability so that persistent and emerging 
challenges to the Lakes can be effectively and definitively addressed‖ (4), arguing 
that the objectives of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement are ―indefinite and 
outdated, and there are few limits and thresholds or schedules for action‖ (8), that the 
―precise roles and responsibilities for achieving the Agreement‘s objectives are 
unspecified‖ (8), that the monitoring system is ―still insufficient as well as 
uncoordinated across jurisdictional boundaries, and fails to provide the 
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comprehensive, focused information required to assess progress under the 
Agreement‖ (8), and that requirements for reporting ―have become outdated and 
…left undone‖ (11).  The holes in the governance structure identified by the report 
leads to the general conclusion that ―we have no collective sense of the progress we 
are making‖ (11) in managing the Great Lakes environment and ―the public has 
neither an accounting of specific progress toward identified goals nor confidence that 
any reports tell the full story‖ (17).  In short, the lack of accountability at the heart of 
water quality management, manifested through poor coordination, monitoring, 
reporting and enforcement, has created something of a crisis of credibility and 
authoritative legitimacy in the water governance structure, so much so that it spurred 
the IJC to call for the United States and Canada to create a basin-wide Framework for 
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement Accountability by June 2008 and immediately 
thereafter to convene a Great Lakes Accountability Summit.    
It would be premature at this point to conclude whether the expansion of 
multilevel governance around the Great Lakes is motivated by a general recognition 
of the merits of polycentricity or by a desire on the part of federal and state 
governments to shirk responsibility and allow industry to avoid accountability.  
However, the litany of shortcomings stated above provides strong evidence that the 
‗dark side‘ to multilevel governance has indeed manifested itself within the Great 
Lakes basin (Peters and Pierre, 2000).  
The important conclusion one draws from either scenario is that the 
mobilization of local government around the Great Lakes and the expansion of their 
policy capacity may well be facilitated by the opening up of political opportunities 
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via a shift towards a more collaborative model of intergovernmental relations, but the 
motivations behind local governments actually acting on those opportunities centers 
around the issue of accountability, and thus the expansion of their policy capacity is 
very much a product of local governments responding to the crisis of accountability 
in environmental governance in the basin.  
The accountability gap presents local governments with two functional 
imperatives in that they seek to avoid shouldering the costs of the yawning 
accountability gap in terms of direct economic, environmental and health 
consequences of decreasing water quality of the basin by engaging directly in 
environmental management of the Great Lakes and thus taking on the role of a 
‗complementary back-up institution‘ (Andersson and Ostrom 2008).  Plus, local 
governments mobilize in order to secure the funding necessary to deal with the 
increasing financial and administrative burden associated with an accelerating 
devolution of water management responsibilities resulting from the retrenchment of 
federal and sub-national governments.  A recent report prepared by the Great Lakes 
Commission for the Cities Initiative entitled Local Investment in the Great Lakes and 
St. Lawrence, concluded that local governments around the Great Lakes collectively 
invest more money ($15 billion) than any other level of government towards 
environmental management of the Great Lakes (Great Lakes Commission 2000).  
Another report released by the Great Lakes Commission emphasized the increasing 
burdens of environmental management being shouldered by municipalities by stating 
that ―local governments cannot pay for it all and should not be disproportionately 
burdened.  Federal, state and provincial governments need to significantly increase 
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their investment‖ (Great Lakes Commission 2000, 1).  The report also highlights the 
disconnect between the financial contributions and the political participation of local 
government within basin governance, stating that ―while Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence agreements have excluded local government as a key partner, many of their 
objectives are being carried out, and paid for, at the local level‖ (2000, 1).   
In response to these two functional imperatives, local governments ―behave 
strategically and purposefully‖ (Fairbass and Jordan 2004, 164) both re-actively and 
pro-actively on their own to push the bounds of that new political space outward, to 
expand multilevel governance and to increase their roles in order to minimize the 
costs associated with weakening accountability structures and in order to secure the 
resources necessary to deal with the burgeoning responsibilities associated with that 
growing accountability gap.  For example, a major rationale for the creation of the 
Cities Initiative, and perhaps the most significant, was the desire to secure funding 
akin to the $8 billion Congress allocated to the restoration of the Florida Everglades 
in 2000.  A high-ranking executive member of the Cities Initiative argues that ―this 
evolved into something called ‗Everglades Envy‘ where people felt that if the 
Everglades were worth $8 billion, the largest source of fresh water in the world, the 
Great Lakes, must be worth at least five times that amount‖ (GLSLCI, interview, 
January 13, 2008).  The aggregation and organization of political pressure across 
multiple levels of government, and the demonstration of a united front to Congress, 
was seen across the basin as a prerequisite for successfully lobbying the federal 
government to release that kind of funding.  Mayor of Grand Rapids, Michigan, 
George Heartwell stated ―we are advocating for federal resources that may come to 
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the Great Lakes from both sides of the border.  I think we have a collectively stronger 
voice looking for money for Great Lakes projects, infrastructure development‖ 
(GLSLCI, interview George Heartwell, June 18, 2009).  Such a strategy illustrates 
what Jeffery terms entrepreneurship. 
Hence, local governments have mobilized around the Great Lakes not simply 
in response to new formal capacities bequeathed them through decentralization since, 
and this bears repeating, such a transfer was limited.  The two developments 
stemming from decentralization—political opportunity brought on by closer 
proximity to a decision-making nodule and the functional imperatives brought on by 
retreating federal and sub-national authorities in environmental policy—provide two 
explanatory factors for the mobilization of local government around the Great Lakes 
and consequently the expansion of Type II arrangements within environmental 
multilevel governance around the basin.  The important conclusion here is that the 
expansion of local government capacity has resulted from both ‗top-down‘ and 
‗bottom-up‘ processes that are both linked to the re-balancing of federal-state and 
federal-provincial intergovernmental relations. 
The present period of collaboration did indeed open possibilities for greater 
involvement of local governments in environmental management around the Great 
Lakes, although it required initiative and political entrepreneurialism in order to 
translate that opportunity into influence.  One manifestation of this expanded 
involvement and policy capacity was the establishment of the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Cities Initiative in 2003, a transnational municipal network, which 
institutionalized cooperation between American and Canadian local governments in 
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environmental matters around the Great Lakes.  The following chapter focuses on the 
way this network governs its internal and external activities and relations as it embeds 
local government deeper into the environmental management structure of the basin.  
Subsequently, in Chapter Six, we return to the nagging problem of the 
Faustian bargain.  Specifically, we focus on the fundamental criticism of multilevel 
governance raised by Peters and Pierre (2004) who argue that the informal basis of 
multilevel governance—and hence the expanded policy capacity of local 
governments—means that the decision-making process is still dominated by more 
powerful actors such as national, provincial and state governments.  They wonder ―to 
what extent informality entails inequality‖ in the sense that for them, ―informality 
will respond to the interests of the weaker constituencies if and when dominant 
players find a reason to do so‖ (88).  Hence, they challenge scholars to demonstrate 
that ―that multi-level governance means something more than multi-level 
participation” (87).  The case study in Chapter Six of this dissertation involving 
British Petroleum will demonstrate that local governments do involve themselves in 
environmental management, and influence environmental policymaking, with greater 
effect than their formal and informal powers would otherwise suggest. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
THE GREAT LAKES AND ST. LAWRENCE CITIES INITIATIVE:  EXAMINING 
TRANSNATIONAL MUNICIPAL NETWORKS IN NORTH AMERICA 
 
 
 
 As authority has been dispersed upwards to the supranational level, and 
downwards to the sub-national level, vertical power relations have been loosened thus 
permitting weaker actors such as local governments to bypass central and sub-central 
governments and establish horizontal links outside national boundaries with other 
actors and levels of government across borders.  One of the clearest manifestations of 
this expanding multilevel governance has been the emergence of institutionalized 
networks of cooperation between local governments across national borders which 
are called transnational municipal networks (TMNs).   
Transnational municipal networks have been studied most extensively in the 
European context where they were first observed.  The first such network, the 
Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), was formed in 1951 and is 
today the most important network composed of over 50 national associations of 
towns, municipalities and regions across 37 countries representing over 100,000 
member cities and regions.  This network addresses every political issue whether in 
the field of regulation (i.e. environment, energy) or redistribution (i.e. cohesion 
policy) from the local to the global.  In the 1980s, Europe witnessed a significant 
expansion of transnational municipal networks and the emergence of different types.  
These new networks were based not on an aggregation of national municipal 
associations, but on direct membership of cities, such as the Eurocities network, with 
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120 members in over 30 countries.  More recently, these general purpose networks 
have been supplemented by the emergence in the 1990s of regionally defined, direct 
membership organizations such as the Union of Baltic Cities, with over 100 cities in 
ten countries, the Alliance of the Alps, with 250 local authorities, as well as direct 
membership organizations centered around specialized issues, such as those dealing 
with climate change including the Climate Alliance, Cities for Climate Protection, 
and Energie-Cites totaling some 1,400 member cities across the continent.   
This chapter extends the comprehensive analytical model employed by 
Heinelt and Niederhafner (2005) and Kern and Bulkeley (2009), which focuses 
attention on the internal structures and functions, as well as external behaviors, of 
European transnational municipal networks, to North America, where the emergence 
of TMNs has been a very recent development.  The first TMN to emerge was the 
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative (GLSLCI or simply Cities Initiative) in 
2003.  The Cities Initiative is a regionally defined, issue specific, direct membership 
TMN that institutionalizes environmental cooperation between American and 
Canadian cities around the Great Lakes.  By analyzing the internal and external 
behavior of the Cities Initiative, this chapter represents the first comprehensive 
analysis of a transnational municipal network in North America.  Consequently, the 
observations made by Kern and Bulkeley (2009) and Heinelt and Niederhafner (2005) 
about European TMNs will form the framework for an examination of the Cities 
Initiative—it‘s internal structures, the way it governs its internal and external 
relations, and how these structures and behaviors are conditioned by the exogenous 
political environment.  Three findings emerge from this analysis.   
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First, we find that although the internal structures of both the European and 
North American transnational municipal networks are strikingly similar, the political 
context is measurably different on two counts.  The institutionalization of multilevel 
governance has gone farther and deeper in Europe than in North America.  As a 
result, European cross-border local government cooperation is embedded in both 
formal Type I and informal Type II structures, while in North America cross-border 
local government cooperation is embedded predominantly in informal Type II 
architecture.  Equally as important, the supranational structures of the European 
Union such as the Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the European 
Parliament all provide European transnational municipal networks with resources, 
political opportunities, legitimacy and powerful allies that are vitally important in the 
formative stages in the development of these networks (Ward and Williams 1997).  
These structures, resources and opportunities are not available nearly to the same 
degree for North American local governments.  As a result, the more complex 
internal structures and expanded policy scope of European transnational municipal 
networks suggests that there is a positive relationship between the development of the 
overarching supranational structure and the development of the structural capacity of 
subsidiarity as it is manifested through the development of transnational municipal 
networks.   
Our second finding reveals important consequences for the behavior of 
transnational municipal networks in North America stemming from the fact that local 
government cross border cooperation in North America is poorly embedded in formal 
Type I architecture and takes place under an underdeveloped and unsupportive 
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overarching supranational superstructure.  These rather meager support structures has 
led to the emergence of vulnerable, under-resourced and therefore relatively stunted 
transnational municipal networks in North America which predisposes them to 
behave strategically as bridge-builders, eschewing confrontation in favor of 
cooperation, searching for positive-sum gains in its relations with other actors, and in 
this manner they have become important catalysts of even deeper integration in the 
basin.   
Finally, our third finding indicates that although the ‗top-down‘ redistribution 
of resources is vital in the formative stages for the development of transnational 
municipal networks, the essentially ‗bottom-up‘ mobilization of the Great Lakes and 
St. Lawrence Cities Initiative demonstrates that such a transfer of resources 
downward is not a prerequisite for the initial emergence of these networks.  The only 
necessary conditions for the emergence of transnational municipal networks are the 
opening up of political space, provided by the process of Europeanization in Europe 
and Collaborative-Cooperation in North America, and an entrepreneurial spirit on the 
part of local governments, consisting of imagination and willpower, to fill that space. 
 
Internal Structures, Characteristics and Concerns 
In 2003, at the direction of Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley, the Great Lakes 
and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative came into existence, becoming the first 
institutionalized transnational network of local government in North America 
dedicated to addressing environmental issues.  As of 2009, this transnational 
municipal network consisted of 64 mayors from American and Canadian local 
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governments located within the eight states and two provinces bordering the Great 
Lakes including Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Ontario and Quebec.   
It introduced a completely new layer to the transnational environmental 
cooperation already taking place at different levels of government around the Great 
Lakes, joining an already dense web of networks including the Council of Great 
Lakes Governors, the Great Lakes Legislative Caucus, and the Great Lakes 
Commission, which operate at the regional level, as well as the International Joint 
Commission (IJC) and the North American Free Trade Agreement‘s Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation (CEC), both bi-national agencies that operate at the 
supranational level above the level of the nation state.  These sub-national and 
supranational networks operate beside more traditional forms of bilateral cooperation 
between the federal, state and provincial governments in both countries, as well as 
beside non-state actors, for example, the non-governmental organization Great Lakes 
United. 
Kern and Bulkeley (2009) argue that transnational municipal networks have 
three defining characteristics.  First, they are self-governing, ―non-hierarchical, 
horizontal and polycentric‖ (310).  Second, its member cities are autonomous and can 
exit the organization at their choosing.  Third, member cities vote on and implement 
decisions taken by the network.  Though such a conceptual definition was conceived 
by analyzing transnational municipal networks primarily in the European context, its 
validity is confirmed in our North American case as all three characteristics describe 
the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative.   
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The bureaucratization of the Cities Initiative follows the established ‗non-
hierarchical, horizontal and polycentric‘ pattern typical of transnational municipal 
networks. Three standard levels or groups of actors emerged: (i) an international 
secretariat located in Chicago (ii) the executive composed of chairpersons, a board of 
directors comprising the mayors of member cities selected to those posts, and a 
general assembly of all the member cities who gather annually to vote on resolutions; 
and (iii) the individual member cities themselves (Kern and Bulkeley 2009, 315).  See 
Figure 7. 
 
   
 
Figure 7: Structure of Transnational Municipal Networks 
Source: Kern and Bulkeley 2009, 315 
 
The secretariat is headed by the Executive Director, a position that has been 
held from the beginning by David Ullrich, a thirty-year veteran of the Environmental 
161  
Protection Agency and former deputy regional administrator for the Great Lakes 
region.  The administrative capacity of the Cities Initiative was augmented as the 
membership and agenda grew, and the position of Deputy Director was created in 
2007 and filled by Nicola Crawhall who previously worked for the Ontario Minister 
of the Environment and the Association of Municipalities, thus bringing a Canadian 
perspective into the secretariat.  The position of Program Manager was also 
established at this time.  The executive director and his staff are in charge of day-to-
day operations including governing the internal affairs of the network and 
coordinating external relations.   
As in the European transnational municipal networks, the Cities Initiative has 
established sub-networks to deal with specific issues, although these are less formal 
than the separate governance structures operating in European TMNs which deal with 
specific national territories or policy areas.  For example, the Climate Alliance and 
Energie-Cites have decentralized structures with national satellite offices spread 
throughout various European countries.  In contrast, discussions within the Cities 
Initiative about locating a permanent separate office in Toronto and Quebec in order 
to coordinate Canadian and regional issues have not fully crystallized.  The internal 
complexity of the European transnational municipal networks reflects a larger 
resource base.  Nonetheless, informal regional meetings of Cities Initiative members 
do occur, for example, as when Toronto hosted a meeting of Ontario member cities in 
2007 in order to discuss regional issues.  In addition, certain board members of the 
Cities Initiative have regional designations based on four geographical quadrants— 
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Lower Lakes, Upper Lakes, St. Lawrence/Quebec, and Great Lakes/Ontario—and a 
responsibility to coordinate and represent issues pertaining to those sub-regions. 
The executive of the Cities Initiative is composed of the Board of Directors 
made up of 16 mayors including the two permanent founding chairs—Richard Daley, 
mayor of Chicago, and David Miller, mayor of Toronto—an elected chair serving a 
one-year term, a vice-chair and a secretary-treasurer.  The Board elects new members 
to the executive.  The Board meets mid-winter to assess progress and to bring new 
issues to the table.  These issues are presented to the General Assembly at the Annual 
Meeting in the summer.  At the Annual Meeting, and with help of the Executive 
Director, common policy positions, resolutions, and a general agenda are proposed 
which are debated, voted on and adopted by the Board of Directors.  These common 
positions or resolutions are then presented and voted on by the member cities 
attending the General Assembly at the annual conference.  In addition to fulfilling 
internal governing functions, the members of the Board of Directors also represent 
the Cities Initiative in its external relations by speaking at conferences, taking part in 
regional stakeholder meetings, publishing editorials in newspapers, or engaging in 
advocacy.  For example, on July 30, 2008, Mayor George Heartwell of Grand Rapids, 
Michigan, testified on behalf of the Cities Initiative as its vice-chair in front of a 
United States Senate Committee deliberating on the ‗Water Compact‘, essentially a 
groundbreaking piece of water diversion legislation. 
The local governments comprising the Cities Initiative vary in size 
representing large cities such as Chicago (pop. 2,837,000) and Toronto (pop. 
2,500,000), regional municipalities such as Niagara (pop. 427,000), towns such as 
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Wasaga Beach (pop. 15,000) and appropriately named townships like Tiny (pop. 
10,750).  It also includes one village called Spring Lake (pop. 2,514).  The cities are 
geographically dispersed, stretching from the most northern city, Nipigon, at the top 
of Lake Superior, as far east as Rimouski, Quebec, on the St. Lawrence River, to 
Sheffield Lake on the southern shores of Lake Erie, and Duluth on the western tip of 
Lake Superior (See Figure 3).   
However, as is often the case in European networks, there is a clear territorial 
pattern within the Cities Initiative.  In Europe, language is often the ‗critical issue‘ in 
setting territorial patterns (Kern and Bulkeley 2009, 317).  For instance, Climate 
Alliance, the largest transnational municipal network dealing with climate change 
issues, has faced problems recruiting members from countries other than Germany 
and Austria because its working language is German (Kern and Bulkeley 2009, 317).  
The working language in the Cities Initiative is English, but this has not presented a 
difficulty as evidenced from the fact that nine member cities come from Quebec, 
though it is possible that some smaller, rural French speaking towns may well have 
found language to be a barrier to membership.   
Territorial patterns have emerged in a distinct clustering effect with two 
groups of cities concentrated around the most powerful members—Chicago on Lake 
Michigan and Toronto on Lake Ontario including a cluster of cities north of Toronto 
along the southern shore of Georgian Bay.  This pattern reflects the influence that 
these two major cities have had on the recruitment process and their gravitational 
power as global cities (Sassen 1991).  Recently, Foreign Policy ranked Chicago and 
Toronto within their top global cities index (Foreign Policy 2008).  Recognizing the 
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influence of these two global metropolises, Denis Lapointe, the Mayor of Salaberry-
de-Valleyfield, a Quebec town with a population of 30,000, said that ―we realized that 
with the capacity to pressure government of the mayor of Chicago and Toronto, 
things have changed, we were finally listened to‖ (GLSLCI, interview Denis Lapointe 
June 18, 2009).  The clustering effect around Toronto and Chicago may be due to the 
fact that smaller local governments within the vicinity of these two cities have even 
more incentive to collaborate with Toronto and Chicago because they have a better 
chance of having their localized issues taken up and placed on the national agenda.   
In addition to a patterned dispersal, there is also a marked Canadian bias in the 
membership.  Forty out of the sixty-four members—or 62.5 per cent—come from 
Canada, with Ontario alone enlisting nearly half—31 members.  However, the Board 
of Directors is divided equally between eight Canadian and eight American mayors.  
The cities represent both rural and urban interests, different geographical concerns 
based on their proximity to a particular Great Lake, varied socio-economic statuses, 
different cultural-linguistic backgrounds, and they voluntarily join for a number of 
reasons including potential access to information, funding, and political support. 
Cities that join transnational municipal networks distinguish themselves from 
other cities in that they already tend to be highly motivated and active in a certain 
policy field, to the degree that Kern and Bulkeley (2009) argue that TMNs are 
―primarily networks of pioneers for pioneers‖ (311).  Nonetheless, even transnational 
municipal networks can be further divided into active and passive members, with the 
latter forming the majority.  As a result, the typical polycentric governance structure 
in these networks also appears in the Cities Initiative.  In its 2007 Annual Report, the 
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Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative acknowledged that it had purposefully 
undertaken the ―development of a core membership base‖ (GLSLCI Annual Report 
2007, 7) which was strategically cultivated because ―establishing a central group of 
committed members has helped the organization focus its efforts around key issues 
throughout the Basin‖ (7).   
Over the last three years, the most active members, the so-called policy 
entrepreneurs, who have the most frequent contact with the secretariat and individual 
member cities, who feature most prominently in its external relations, have emerged 
as a kind of ‗core-of-the-core‘ executive.  This unofficial subgroup of the Board of 
Directors includes Mayors Richard Daley (Chicago) and David Miller (Toronto) who 
are designated Founding Chairs and thus have permanent chairmanships on the 
Board, as well as Lynn Peterson (Thunder Bay), Gary Becker (Racine), and George 
Heartwell (Grand Rapids) who together over the last three years have filled the 
position of elected Chair, Vice Chair and Secretary.   
As one moves outward from the centre of the polycentric circle to the next 
ring of the core executive, one can add mayors who have sat on the last three 
consecutive Boards including Ellen Anderson (Blue Mountains, Ont.), Rudolph Clay 
(Gary, Ind.), Robert Duffy (Rochester, N.Y.), Carleton Finkbeiner (Toledo, Oh.), 
Eddie Francis (Windsor, Ont.), Denis Lapointe (Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, Que.), 
Brian McMullan (St. Catharines, Ont.), Joseph Sinnott (Erie, Pa.), and Gerard 
Tremblay (Montreal, Que.).  Due to the election cycle, this group also includes the 
different mayors who held office in the Quebec Metro Community (Andree Boucher, 
Regis Labeaume) and Duluth, Minnesota, (Herb Bergson, Don Ness) over the last 
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three years.  The geographical location of these board members provide an equitable 
representation of the four regional quadrants on the Board—Upper Lakes, Lower 
Lakes, Great Lakes/Ontario, and St. Lawrence/Quebec—so that the issues pertaining 
to each of the Great Lakes are represented.  The fact that the core executive has 
changed minimally over the last five years has provided continuity and a kind of 
institutional memory which provides the organization with stability and an ability to 
learn and adapt their strategies without expending much energy on bringing new core 
members ‗up to speed‘, thereby maximizing their limited resources. 
Maintaining the network‘s internal cohesion has been a central preoccupation 
for the executive of the Cities Initiative.  A high ranking official within the 
organization stated that ―we can recognize regional issues, but it is important that we 
speak with one voice‖ (GLSLCI, interview official, June 9, 2008).  According to 
Dave Ross, the Mayor of Superior, Wisconsin, a city with a population of 27,000 
people, most local government organizations suffer from a long-standing division 
between small cities and big cities, but he argues that this cleavage has been managed 
successfully in the Cities Initiative.  According to Mayor Ross, ―we have an equal 
seat at the table.  We have an equal voice.  There is no hierarchy within this 
organization‖ (GLSLCI interview David Ross June 18, 2009).  Mayor Ross credits 
Chicago Mayor Richard Daley for promoting small cities, citing as an example his 
invitation from Mayor Daley to attend the Conference of Western Hemisphere 
Mayors he organized in 2006, noting that ―I sat at the table with mayors from large 
metropolitan cities not only in North America but the Western Hemisphere and he 
chose to invite a mayor like myself and mayor Peterson from Thunder Bay, both 
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small cities, and not only was there this idea that we all have the same problems no 
matter what our size is, we really did have an equal voice‖ (GLSLCI, interview Ross, 
2009).   
Rather than being overshadowed by larger cities such as Toronto or Chicago, 
small cities find that the Cities Initiative actually levels the playing field.  Mayor 
Steve Parish, from the Town of Ajax with a population of 100,000, argued that, with 
regards to a disagreement involving his city and the City of Toronto, ―if we were 
doing this bilaterally, Toronto has the size to make decisions without Ajax‘s input.  
Doing it in front of the general assembly puts an onus on them to not act as the big 
fish‖ (GLSLCI, interview Steve Parish, June 18, 2009).  Small cities are represented 
on the Board of Directors, and a special award of $5,000 was instituted to recognize 
the environmental efforts of small cities with a population under 100,000 people 
called the Wege Small Cities Sustainability Best Practices Award. 
Another rift occasionally surfaces between port-cities and non-port cities, 
especially over issues related to the regulation of the shipping industry.  Cities that do 
not have ports, including cities like Chicago and Toronto which have ports that are 
largely inoperable and irrelevant, favor strong regulation on shipping, for example, 
that would control the discharge of ballast water from incoming transport ships thus 
preventing the introduction of non-native, or invasive, species of fish.  Many port 
cities, although recognizing the problem of invasive species, view extensive 
regulations as a threat to the shipping and maritime industry which forms the 
economic basis of their communities and their cultural identity. Mayor Ross, of 
Superior, Wisconsin, argues that initially, as more and more non-port cities began 
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joining the Cities Initiative, ―there were some concerns among port-cities whether we 
were diluting our effectiveness‖ (GLSLCI, interview Ross 2009), but that those 
concerns were quickly dissipated.  On the contrary, Vance Badawey, the Mayor of 
Port Colborne, Ontario, a city with a population of 19,000, argues that the Cities 
Initiative provides a platform for port cities to promote their unique interests and 
assets, and ―not only to showcase but to work together to communicate what those 
assets are‖ (GLSLCI, interview Vance Badawey,  2009). 
The most recent, and perhaps most controversial, fissure to emerge centers 
around the proposed creation of a sub-network called the Forum Des Municipalites 
Riveraines au fleuve Saint-Laurent initiated by a group of Quebec cities spearheaded 
by the Mayors of Montreal, Sorel, and Beaconsfield.  This faction had begun informal 
meetings in 2006 to discuss regional issues pertaining to their narrow geographical 
location along the St. Lawrence River and specific to Quebec politics.  At the 2009 
Annual Meeting of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative in Trois-
Rivieres, Quebec, representatives of the Forum sought formal recognition from the 
Cities Initiative as a separate sub-network and also sought support for its plans to 
establish their own direct contacts with the Provincial Government of Quebec.   
The most vociferous opposition to the Forum was voiced by Mayor Regis 
Labeaume of the Quebec Metropolitan Community who viewed it as an unnecessary 
duplication of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative structures and, 
furthermore, viewed it as a splinter organization that threatens the internal cohesion 
of the Cities Initiative.  Mayor Labeaume argued that in the case of two parallel 
organizations operating simultaneously in Quebec—the Forum and the Cities 
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Initiatives—the Quebec government will choose to negotiate with the former, thus 
undermining the legitimacy and influence of the latter.  Mayor Labeaume took further 
exception to the fact that Quebec City was not invited to take part in the Forum nor 
informed of its designs until a separate side-meeting of the Forum was held during 
the Annual Meeting of the Cities Initiative at Trois-Rivieres in 2009.  In protest, 
Mayor Labeaume walked out of that meeting, and at the subsequent meeting of the 
GLSLCI Board of Directors, he declared that he ―strongly opposes‖ the Forum’s 
resolution calling for a formal recognition, and stated that he would work very hard to 
make sure ―this deal won‘t happen‖.   
Similar concerns were expressed by other Board Members.  Mayor Anderson, 
of Blue Mountains, argued ―It is not a good thing to recognize any particular group.  
As soon as we tie ourselves to an alliance we lose flexibility‖ (GLSCI, Board of 
Directors Meeting, July 18, 2009), a sentiment echoed by Mayor Ross, of Superior, 
who stated, ―if we focus on more narrowly focused groups we lose our distinctive 
voice and our message can be compromised especially if our purposes diverge at 
some point‖ (GLSLCI, Board of Directors Meeting, July 18, 2009).  Mayor Heartwell 
of Grand Rapids, stated, ―I share Mayor Anderson‘s concern with fractionalizing the 
organization.  When we focus on local or regional issues, we begin to divide 
ourselves.  If we divide ourselves on jurisdictional lines we lose cohesiveness,‖ 
(GLSLCI, Board of Directors Meeting, July 18, 2009).  The disagreement was serious 
enough that the executive of the Cities Initiative decided to postpone a decision on the 
location of a satellite bureau it intended to open in Quebec, so as not to add further 
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fuel to the fire while the matter of the Forum was set aside for further study and 
dialogue. 
Concern over internal cohesion also surfaces not only with regards to internal 
structure and membership, but also with regards to specific policies.   For example, 
concerns over cohesion were raised during the Board of Governors meeting July 16, 
2008, in Toronto, specifically during the deliberations over Resolution 17 whose 
purpose was to frame the Cities Initiative response to the Order of Approval released 
by the International Joint Commission (IJC) in March 2008.  Through the Order of 
Approval, the IJC gave its formal blessing to a construction project altering a dam 
located in Cornwall, Ontario, which would alter the flow of water from Lake Ontario 
to the St. Lawrence River.  Although it was determined through detailed scientific 
and technical reviews that the project would benefit Lake Ontario, the Quebec 
Metropolitan Community and surrounding areas were seeking reassurances that 
changing the flow of water would not harm their region.  During the discussion on the 
framing of the resolution, the Secretary of the Cities Initiative George Heartwell, 
Mayor of Grand Rapids, wanted the board members to consider ―does it have the 
potential to divide us into upper and lower Great Lakes?‖ (GLSLCI, Board of 
Directors Meeting, 2008). 
 
 
Transnational Municipal Networks as Sui Generis and the Internal and External 
Governing Behaviors that Result 
 
There is a need to analyze the behavior of transnational municipal networks 
on their own terms as a distinct phenomenon from the concepts that have been put 
forth thus far to explain their structure and behavior.  According to Kern and 
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Bulkeley (2009), the conceptualization of transnational municipal networks as 
intergovernmental (Rhodes 1997; Ward and Williams 1997), inter-urban (Leitner and 
Sheppard 2002) or transnational (Bennington and Harvey 1998) policy networks 
(Marsh and Rhodes 1992) has inadequately described the distinct nature of TMNs for 
three reasons: (i) they disregard their homogeneity (ii) they overemphasize resource 
dependencies as a driving motor (iii) they overemphasize lobbying as the main 
function (313).  Each of these three is discussed below. 
 
Homogeneity 
 
(i) The Double Helix: Homogeneity and the Defining Duality of Transnational 
Municipal Networks 
 
The crucial characteristic that distinguishes transnational municipal networks 
from all other policy networks is that whereas the latter are predominantly 
conceptualized as a mix of different actors, transnational municipal networks are 
homogenous in the sense that they are composed exclusively of local governments.  
This is the key characteristic and a vital distinction.  Variants of policy networks, 
such as the global civil society and advocacy network approach, privilege the role of 
non-state actors.  For example, Risse-Kappen (1995) observed that networks include 
―regular interaction across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state 
agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or intergovernmental 
organization‖ (3) while Keck and Sikkink (1998) state that ―NGOs play a central role 
in all advocacy networks‖ (9).  Even though some European transnational municipal 
networks such as the Climate Alliance and Energie-Cites do include NGOs, regional 
governments, and even public utilities as associated members, the conceptualization 
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of networks as heterogeneous units excludes by definition transnational municipal 
networks which do not count non-state actors as full members, and in particular such 
a conceptualization excludes pure TMNs such as the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Cities Initiative which do not contain associated members at all. 
To illustrate the distinct nature of transnational municipal networks, an 
organization institutionalizing cross-border relations between Canadian and American 
local governments around the Great Lakes already existed before the Cities Initiative 
called the International Association of Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Mayors.  
However, it cannot be considered a TMN because its governance structure was 
composed of and dependent upon actors from industry as well as provincial and state 
governments.  At best it can be considered a proto-network.   
The International Association of Mayors was established in 1987 in Quebec 
City by the St. Lawrence Economic Development Council (SODES) which endowed 
this new organization with a near-total economic orientation focused almost 
exclusively on issues related to the shipping industry.  SODES is an organization that 
promotes the interests of the shipping and maritime transportation industry.  It‘s 
executive is composed of a Chairman of the Board, Pierre Prefontaine, who is the 
Vice-President of Canada Steamship Lines, a Vice-President, Jocelyn Fortier, who is 
also the Vice-President of the Societe des Traversiers du Quebec, which is an 
organization representing ferry services, a Secretary, Jean Gregoire, who is an 
associate of the law firm Langlois Kronstrom Desjardins, which specializes in 
maritime and admiralty law, and a Treasurer, Michel Tosini, who is also Vice-
President of Fednav Ltd., which is an international shipping company.  An official at 
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the Cities Initiative stated privately that the International Association was ―just a 
show‖ and a platform ―for industry to wine and dine mayors‖ (GLSLCI, conversation 
with member of executive, July 18, 2008).  Mayor Ross, of Superior, Wisconsin, who 
was a member of both the International Association and the Cities Initiative noted 
that the former organization was mostly composed of small, port cities, and he 
noticed in his first annual meeting that there were ―a good number of shipping 
presentations by shipping organizations‖ and that the International Association was 
―more balanced towards industry, and less balanced towards environmental‖, a 
balance he determined to be ―80/20‖ economic versus environmental  (GLSLCI, 
interview Ross 2009).   
The Co-Secretariat of the International Association of Mayors was composed 
of the SODES and also the Great Lakes Commission.  The Great Lakes Commission 
is a public agency formed in 1955 by an interstate compact between eight Great 
Lakes states and two associated provinces Quebec and Ontario principally in order to 
oversee the expanding maritime industry resulting from the construction of the St. 
Lawrence Seaway.  Although broadening its scope of interests, the traditional concern 
of the Commission has been shipping.  Consequently, the International Association of 
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Mayors was a creature, first and foremost, of industry, 
and second, of the states and provinces with shipping interests.   
A prominent American environmentalist and former head of the Great Lakes 
Basin Commission appointed by President Carter, who also worked for the EPA and 
Chicago‘s Department of Environment, states that the International Association of 
Mayors ―did not participate in the Great Lakes community, it was not a force, it was 
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not even an actor, it just existed, and it did not do anything except for proposing 
resolutions that were put forth by the Great Lakes Commission‖ (ex-Great Lakes 
Basin Commission, interview October 1, 2009).  In essence, the International 
Association of Mayors existed to legitimize policies of the Great Lakes Commission. 
Chicago was the first big city to join the organization which until that time 
had been composed primarily of small port cities.  According to the former head of 
the Great Lakes Basin Commission, ―when Mayor Daley found out how ineffective 
and trivial it was, he transformed it‖ (ex-Great Lakes Basin Commission, interview 
October 1, 2009).  Meeting in Chicago in July 2003, the International Association of 
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Mayors and the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities 
Initiative agreed in principle to merge the two organizations.  Many of the member 
cities of the International Association joined the Cities Initiative and assumed 
positions on the Board of Directors.  The merger was completed in 2005.  The 
headquarters was moved from Quebec City to Chicago.  Mayors Badawey and Ross, 
who were members of both organizations, noted that after the merger an even 
orientation between economic and environmental concerns exists within the Cities 
Initiative. 
Network concepts that are based on the assumption of heterogeneity such as 
transnational advocacy coalitions (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) or epistemic communities 
(Haas 1992) do capture dimensions of how transnational municipal networks operate, 
but they fail to account for the unique political standing of transnational municipal 
networks that stems precisely from their homogeneity, which is, that transnational 
municipal networks govern their internal and external relations as non-state actors, 
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yet as a constellation of individual local governments they remain anchored to the 
hierarchical federal structure and are thus themselves governed by the inherent 
hierarchical intergovernmental power relations of the federal system.  It is precisely 
in this manner that transnational municipal networks are fundamentally hybrid actors, 
which Hocking (1996) and Blank (2006) faintly alluded to but never quite identified. 
Transnational municipal networks, such as the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Cities Initiative, are non-state actors in at least two important ways.  First, the Cities 
Initiative has the legal standing of a non-state actor.  It is registered as a 501(c)3 non-
profit charitable organization with the United States government, a designation held 
by other non-state advocacy networks such as Greenpeace, the Environmental 
Outreach and Stewardship Alliance, and the Environmental Working Group.  
European transnational municipal networks are also registered as non-profit 
associations.  For example, the Union of Baltic Cities, headquartered in the Polish 
city of Gdansk, is registered as a non-profit association with the government of 
Poland.  The 501(c)3 status applies to corporations, funds or foundations which 
operate exclusively in order to promote religious, charitable, scientific, educational 
and public safety purposes, and it carries significant restrictions on the scope of action 
for the Cities Initiative.  Section 501(c)3 organizations are ‗absolutely prohibited‘ 
from influencing political campaigns for public office, other than to educate voters on 
specific issues in a non-partisan manner.  For example, the Cities Initiative sent letters 
to both United States presidential candidates and all the major Canadian federal party 
leaders before their respective elections in 2008 asking them to present their positions 
on a series of policy questions pertaining to the Great Lakes, for example, their 
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position on renegotiating the Great Lakes and Water Quality Agreement by 2010.  
Although the Cities Initiative published their responses, they refrained from 
endorsing a candidate.   Furthermore, the charitable status also states that ―no 
substantial part‖ of the Cities Initiative activities can be devoted to lobbying.   
The second non-state behavior pertains to self-sustenance.  In order to remain 
in operation, transnational municipal networks must seek out and compete for funding 
outside traditional funding streams flowing from higher tiers of government, and 
these funds constitute a significant proportion of their total operating revenue.  Keck 
and Sikkink (1998) highlight the importance of charitable foundations as sources of 
revenue for advocacy networks.  The Cities Initiative is largely dependent on private 
grants from such organizations as the Wege Foundation, the Joyce Foundation, the 
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, as well as the City of Chicago‘s Environmental 
Fund.  The income of the Cities Initiative varies from year-to-year, depending on the 
amount of grants it receives.  For example, in 2007, the Cities Initiative received a 
large grant from the Joyce Foundation of $500,000 to be disbursed over two years.  In 
general, however, using fiscal-year 2009 as an example, the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Cities Initiative relies on grants for approximately one-third of its total 
revenues, and membership dues for the remaining two-thirds (GLSLCI Consolidated 
Financial Reports, 2008). 
While transnational municipal networks such as the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Cities Initiative display typical non-state characteristics and behaviors, 
their formal position within the state has three consequences that distinguishes them 
from all other non-state actors and all other heterogeneous networks.   
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First, transnational municipal networks are composed of members that are 
directly elected, have direct links to citizens, and that represent public interests which, 
when aggregated, grants them a greater degree of legitimacy than non-state actors like 
Greenpeace who represent the narrow interests of particular stakeholders.   
Second, Valiante (2007) argues, for example, that ―even though municipalities 
are invisible in international law, if they act in a way that is inconsistent with 
Canada‘s international obligations, Canada could be liable to claims‖ (1073).  
Therefore, although transnational municipal networks behave like non-state actors, 
their behavior has direct consequences for the state. Due to the position of its 
constituent members within the state, it has the potential to compromise national 
sovereignty, and as a result their behavior draws greater scrutiny from higher tiers of 
government.   
Third, and most importantly, if the network acts in a way that is inconsistent 
with the interests of the higher tiers of government, it exposes itself and individual 
local governments to retaliation from federal, provincial and state governments which 
possess not simply a credible threat but total blackmail potential over local 
governments.  A provincial government facing an insubordinate local government, for 
example, may not have the constitutional power to reduce private funding for the 
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative in its guise as a 501(3)c non-
governmental organization, but it can directly reduce provincial funding to the 
individual local governments in question—which is a significantly greater threat 
considering provinces and states are the single largest sources of revenue for local 
governments.   
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In addition, retaliation may not necessarily come in the form of tightened 
purse strings.  The higher tiers of government can simply withhold political 
legitimacy by closing down lines of communication between them and local 
government.  In short, they can restrict access to policymaking.  Particularly for cities 
in Ontario, the Conservative government‘s ‗reign of terror‘ fueled by an ‗ideological 
fervor‘ in the 1990s which closed down many of the major avenues for direct 
provincial-local government interaction is not far from their minds.  Ultimately, 
provinces and states can resort to the ‗nuclear option‘ of rearranging or dissolving 
local government altogether, a danger which non-state actors do not have to 
contemplate.  North American local governments especially lack the power of 
immunity which is ―the power of localities to act without fear of the oversight 
authority of higher tiers of the state‖ (Clark 1984, 198).   
Consequently, transnational municipal networks such as the Great Lakes and 
St. Lawrence Cities Initiative pursue strategies that avoid arousing political concerns 
and provoking reactions which could threaten its independence and legitimacy.  The 
general behavior, and the strategies employed by the Cities Initiative, derives from 
their keen understanding of the two different conceptualizations of power.  In the 
traditional, rationalist conceptualization of power as one actor having ―power over” 
another actor, local governments understand their vulnerability in the federal system 
due to the fact that their autonomy is neither well-entrenched nor supported 
constitutionally, and this understanding of their severely limited political latitude 
results in behavior that can be described as positive-sum seeking, collaborative, 
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integrationist, and one that contrasts starkly with the more confrontational or even 
brash behavior of non-state actors such as Greenpeace or Ecojustice.   
This constitutional vulnerability translates into their heightened sensitivity to 
the interests of federal, state, and provincial governments, as well as industry, and a 
strong impulse to avoid behaviors that could be interpreted as threatening those 
interests.  Local governments within the Cities Initiative seek the safe ground of 
positive sum gains to the point that even in their deliberations over issues in the 
Board of Directors meetings mayors spend considerable time and energy framing 
resolutions in non-threatening language.  One of the Board Members, the Mayor of 
the Town of Blue Mountains, Ellen Anderson, exemplified this understanding of their 
constitutional vulnerability by stating ―we have to be careful when we put forth these 
resolutions so that we don‘t close doors‖ (GLSLCI, Board of Directors Meeting 
2009).  Local governments eschew talking about power in terms of ―power over‖ 
because they are usually on the losing end of that equation in the federal system. 
Rather, local governments, and the Cities Initiative in particular, prefer to hew 
to conceptions of power from the governance approach defined in terms of the 
―power to‖ accomplish certain ends or policy goals.  In this conceptualization, local 
governments are able to embed themselves into the policymaking process around the 
Great Lakes because of the unique resources or services they provide other, more 
powerful, actors.  Mayor Anderson again illustrates local government‘s dual 
understanding of power by stating, ―I hate the word power because it turns people off.  
What we have is good information.  I think we are a source of information.  We can 
help them [government, industry etc.] make choices where they‘re not going to end 
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up on the front page‖ of a newspaper in a negative way (GLSLCI, interview 
Anderson 2009).   
This sophisticated appreciation of the dual dimensions of power as they relate 
to local government underpins the modus operandi of the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Cities Initiative which Mayor Anderson sums up by stating that ―the vision 
is to eventually be known as a positive and constructive resource for provincial, 
federal, and state governing bodies as well as industry‖ so that they ―look at us as a 
balance‖ (GLSLCI, interview Anderson 2009).  In a sense, because of its 
constitutional vulnerability the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative plays 
the role of the diplomat of the basin, educating state and non-state actors about the 
possibility of striking a better balance between both environmental and economic 
considerations in matters pertaining to the Great Lakes, identifying issues where the 
interest of disparate actors intersect, and providing both the political legitimacy and 
political pressure for joint action. 
From a theoretical standpoint, taking into consideration the dual character of 
transnational municipal networks blurs the distinction between state and non-state 
actors which underpins most of the concepts used to explain transnational networks 
(Betsill and Bulkeley, 2003).  In a sense, whereas governance is still traditionally 
conceived as ―governing with and through networks at the boundary of the state and 
civil society‖ (Bevir and Rhodes 2003, 9), and consequently, policy networks and 
transnational networks are traditionally viewed as bridges spanning and connecting 
the opposite shores of state and civil society, transnational municipal networks must 
be viewed not as bridges but as a double-helix that combines, or melds together, the 
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genetic material of both state and civil society in one organism.  Transnational 
municipal networks do not so much penetrate or perforate the boundary between the 
state and civil society but, rather, they efface it.  Hence, transnational municipal 
networks are not identical to either parent—state or non-state—but share traits that 
belong to both.  It is this duality stemming in part from its homogeneity which is the 
defining and distinguishing feature of transnational municipal networks and the key 
to understanding its internal and external behavior. 
 
(ii)  Internal Governing as a Non-State Actor 
Since transnational municipal networks lack the traditional forms of authority 
such as regulation, sanction and force, granted state actors located higher on the totem 
pole of intergovernmental relations, these networks rely on soft power to achieve 
their aims both internally and externally.  Internally, transnational municipal networks 
employ three key strategies (1) communication and information (2) recognition, 
benchmarking, and certification (3) program funding and cooperation (Kern and 
Bulkeley 2009, 319). 
As Mayor Anderson alluded to earlier, information and communication are 
the fundamental pillars of transnational municipal networks. Internally, the exchange 
of best practices is one of the principal aims of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Cities Initiative and one of the principle reasons local governments join the network.  
Their website (www.glslcities.org) contains a section titled ―Best Practices and 
Restoration Projects‖ where local governments are encouraged to share information 
on projects and policies they have undertaken under headings such as climate change, 
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pollution reduction, stormwater/wastewater, waterfront vitality, and beaches.  Some 
of the best practices advertised include Hamilton‘s ongoing leak monitoring and 
watermain rehabilitation project to conserve water, Chicago‘s rooftop gardening to 
increase energy efficiency, and Rochester‘s combined sewer overflow abatement 
program.  Kern and Bulkeley (2009) dub this the ‗laissez-faire‘ approach to self-
governing because it demands few resources from the network or the city.  One of the 
advantages of such a strategy is that it does not impose obligations which could turn 
passive, or less resourceful, members away, although the drawback is that there is 
little verification whether in fact these are best practices or whether they are even 
replicable. 
The exchange of best practices is also good example of how information 
exchange combines with the strategy of recognition and benchmarking to provide the 
Cities Initiative with a more interventionist approach to internal self-governing. The 
Cities Initiative initiated in 2007, with financial assistance from a private foundation, 
the Wege Small Cities Sustainability Best Practices Award.  Cities with populations 
under 100,000 submit descriptions of a best practice project they are undertaking and 
compete with other small cities for a grant of five-thousand dollars.  Such systems of 
recognition are common in European transnational municipal networks, for example, 
with the Climate Alliance distributing ―Climate Star‖ awards, and this strategy helps 
―to reach beyond the network core‖ (Kern and Bulkeley 2009, 322) to engage the 
passive members and those with fewer resources.  In 2009, the recipient of the Wege 
Award was the City of Sheffield Lake, Ohio, which will use the money to defray the 
costs of its rain-barrel program used to recycle water and reduce storm water runoff.  
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The award may be small, but as the Mayor of Sheffield Lake, John Piskura, notes, 
―pride in recognition and participation in a program that can be incorporated Great 
Lakes-and-St. Lawrence-River-wide is more valuable than the prize‖ (GLSLCI, letter 
from John Piskura, April 29, 2009). 
In addition to exchanging best practices, a voluntary program called the Water 
Conservation Framework adopted by the Cities Initiative in 2007, is another excellent 
example of strategies which combine information exchange with recognition and 
benchmarking.  The Water Conservation Framework was a response to a recent piece 
of legislation sponsored by the Great Lakes governors called the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact and Sustainable Water Resources 
Agreement which addresses at the state level water quantity issues especially 
conservation and out-of-basin diversions.  Through the conservation framework, local 
governments voluntarily adopt goals set at the state-level and provincial-level and 
commit themselves to reduce total water usage by 15 per cent of 2000 levels by 2015.    
There are 33 member cities who are voluntarily participating in the program, 
and to date half of them have collectively achieved a 12 per cent reduction in water 
usage totaling some 82 billion gallons of water.  The conservation framework 
employs a rudimentary benchmarking system.  The framework participants are 
divided into Group One, those who have a water conservation plan in place, and 
Group Two, those who have yet to put in place such a plan.  Both groups must submit 
detailed plans to the secretariat for review and annual progress reports.  The 
framework provides an opportunity and platform for local governments to share 
information, best practices, and to collaborate on water conservation projects, and to 
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measure the progress of local conservation efforts.  It also demonstrates the desire of 
local governments to set policy goals independent of higher tiers of government.  As 
Mayor David Miller of Toronto notes, ―we should set standards ourselves in line with 
our desire to have a seat at the table, and not just ask for the higher ups to give us the 
standard‖ (GLSLCI, Board of Directors Meeting 2008).   
Although practicing recognition and benchmarking, the Cities Initiative has 
not incorporated the advanced strategy of certification common in Europe and 
exemplified, for example, by the ‗Swiss Energy City‘ certification given to over 160 
Swiss local governments that have attained the strictest level of energy conservation 
(Kern and Bulkeley 2009, 322).  Kern and Bulkeley (2009) argue that certification is 
a more interventionist approach which can serve to widen the gap between those 
cities that have the resources and administrative capacity to pursue certification and 
those that do not, in essence creating a two-speed network composed of pioneers and 
laggards.  The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative has been careful to 
maintain its internal cohesion, and for this reason, it is more likely to continue 
pursuing a softer approach. 
The one element of these three core strategies missing from the Cities 
Initiative repertoire is project funding and cooperation.  The numerous European 
Union funds dedicated to local government cooperation (i.e. EU Recite) and 
transnational cooperation (i.e. INTERREG) spurs European transnational municipal 
networks either to submit bids on behalf of their members for project financing or to 
facilitate member cities to collaborate and submit their own individual joint bids.  For 
example, Energie-Cites has joined BELIEF (Building in Europe Local Intelligent 
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Energy Forums) which is financed by the European Commission (Kern and Bulkeley 
2009, 321).  In North America, there is no dedicated funding for transnational 
cooperation between Canadian and American local governments either at the national 
level or at the supranational level through the IJC or NAFTA‘s Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation (CEC).  More about the relative lack of external 
resources will be said later in this chapter.  It is enough to state at this point that none 
of the mayors interviewed could identify any such external funding, though all of 
them indicated that if such funding was available, they would most definitely submit 
project proposals and bids. 
 
(iii) External Relations as a Non-State Actor 
In its external relations the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative 
employs the four tactics used by transnational advocacy networks and other non-state 
actors described in Keck and Sikkink‘s (1998) typology—information politics, 
symbolic politics, leverage politics and accountability politics (16).   
In line with its internal governing strategies, the Cities Initiative engages in 
external information politics generating ―politically useable‖ information and moving 
it ―where it will have the most impact‖ (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 16).  For example, in 
2008, the Cities Initiative published a comprehensive 84-page report titled Local 
Investment in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence, calculating for the first time the total 
local government investment in Great Lakes water quality protection and restoration.  
The report was the result of a year-long collaborative investigation in partnership with 
the Great Lakes Commission and funded by the Joyce Foundation.  A survey of 143 
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American and Canadian local governments revealed that they had invested $3.3 
billion in environmental protection and restoration programs in 2006, and if these 
figures are extrapolated to the 688 local governments who received the survey, it is 
estimated that local governments around the Great Lakes had invested over $15 
billion that year (Great Lakes Commission 2008, iii).   
The report was part of an overall strategy to secure greater federal funding for 
the Great Lakes.  Hence, the report‘s major accomplishment was that it ―sheds light 
on an overarching disconnect between bi-national and national stated goals for the 
resource and their achievement‖ and specifically on the enduring injustice that ―while 
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence agreements have excluded local government as a key 
partner, many of their objectives are being carried out, paid for, at the local level‖ 
(Great Lakes Commission 2008, 1).  The report was directed at Congress, where the 
information would have the most effect.  This strategic awareness on the part of the 
Cities Initiative is evidenced in the report‘s introduction which establishes a major 
justification, if not the justification, for publishing the report, by stating ―it is 
customary for Congress and federal agencies to desire, if not require, commitment at 
other levels of government before spending federal tax dollars on programs‖ (Great 
Lakes Commission 2008, i). 
In order to secure federal funding, the Cities Initiative also engages in 
information politics by reframing the debate.  In the Board Meeting held on July 16, 
2008, Mayor Daley of Chicago stated, ―our problem is convincing legislatures that 
water projects are as important as roads and bridges‖, adding that the Cities Initiative 
should ask for the federal government to include environmental projects in its 
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stimulus bill by framing the request in terms of an investment in infrastructure not 
simply as ―handing out cheques‖ (GLSLCI, Board of Directors Meeting, 2008).  
Following this strategy, the Cities Initiative has been advocating strongly for the 
establishment of dedicated federal funding for water infrastructure in the form of a 
National Clean Water Trust Fund since it is estimated that 80 per cent of local 
government expenditure on water quality management goes to maintaining 
wastewater infrastructure (Great Lakes Commission 2008, iii).   
Water infrastructure is also where a significant federal investment gap exists.  
A Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities report released in 2008 attempts to frame 
federal funding of the Great Lakes as an urgent infrastructure problem by quoting a 
study released by the Environmental Protection Agency in 2008 titled Clean 
Watersheds Needs Survey: 2004 Report to Congress, which estimates that $276.8 
billion of investments are needed to maintain existing water and wastewater 
infrastructure in the United States and quoting the Great Lakes and Regional 
Collaboration Strategy estimate that $13.7 billion is required to upgrade wastewater 
infrastructure in the Great Lakes region alone (Great Lakes Commission 2008, 4).  
The report also quotes a study released by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities 
which estimates that water and wastewater infrastructure in Canada requires a (CDN) 
$31 billion investment.  Therefore, the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative 
has tried to reframe the debate over dedicated funding for the Great Lakes in terms of 
an urgent infrastructure problem.  As an official with the Cities Initiative stated in the 
July 16, 2008 meeting of the board of directors, ―it‘s all about the economy.  We need 
to link it to the economy‖ (GLSLCI, Board of Directors Meeting, 2008). 
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Also indicative of reframing behavior is the concerted effort by the Cities 
Initiative to frame Great Lakes management as a national concern.  Gilbertson and 
Watterson (2007) state that ―within the United States, the Great Lakes tend to be 
regarded as a local or regional issue rather than a national or international one‖ hence 
―Congressional attitudes about funding have been ambivalent‖ (210).  During a full 
committee hearing in front of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee 
on March 16, 2006, the executive director of the Cities Initiative was asked by 
Senator Barack Obama to respond to these widely held assumptions that ―restoration 
of the Lakes is a regional issue‖ (GLSLCI 2006, 9).  Ullrich responded that 
―restoration of the Great Lakes is clearly a national issue.  Much as the Everglades, 
the Rockies, Chesapeake Bay, and other features of our landscape help define us as a 
country, the Great Lakes are very much a part of the identity of the United States‖ (9). 
The reframing of the Great Lakes as a national issue is one of the central 
tenets of the mission of the Cities Initiative and the comparisons to the Everglades 
and Chesapeake Bay are intentional.  The elevation of the environmental protection 
of the Chesapeake Bay to a national concern led to the signing of the Chesapeake Bay 
Agreement in 1983 which set in motion three decades of intense and committed 
federal involvement in the bay‘s restoration and, most importantly, the provision of 
$300 million of federal funds.  Similarly, the successful framing of the Florida 
Everglades as a national treasure led Congress to pass the Water Resources 
Development Act (2000) which committed $8 billion of federal funds to the 
restoration of the Everglades.  Many observers from the Great Lakes region viewed 
the Everglades restoration funding as an attempt to sway the Florida vote before the 
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upcoming 2000 U.S. presidential elections and this perception stoked resentment in 
the region.  An official at the Cities Initiative argues, that ―this evolved into 
something called ‗Everglades Envy‘ where people felt that if the Everglades were 
worth $8 billion, the largest source of fresh water in the world, the Great Lakes, must 
be worth at least 5 times that amount‖ (GLSLCI, official, interview, January 13, 
2008).  Thus, the leadership of the Cities Initiative views the successful reframing of 
Great Lakes restoration into a national concern as the necessary first step to securing 
federal funding on the scale of the Chesapeake and the Everglades. 
The Cities Initiative also contributes to reframing Great Lakes issues by 
engaging in symbolic politics, for example, by using images of pristine waterfronts, 
marinas, children playing on sandy beaches, and recreational fishing on its website 
and in its publications to communicate to their audience the value of what is at stake 
and, furthermore, to emphasize that the quality of Great Lakes water not only has an 
economic dimension, but a social, cultural, and health dimension as well.  This is an 
important task since as Dave Dempsey (2004) observes in On the Brink: the Great 
Lakes in the 21
st
 Century, American and Canadian governments are ―quick to 
recognize the Great Lakes as a treasure for human commerce‖ (133) and little beyond 
that.   
Finally, Mayor Daley of Chicago explains that a public awareness campaign 
also needs to overcome the geographical bias against the Great Lakes, stating that 
―most capitals are located away from the Great Lakes, hence most politicians do not 
see the Great Lakes as an asset thus they never paid attention to the Great Lakes.  
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Smaller lakes take precedence over the Great Lakes‖ (GLSLCI, Board of Directors 
Meeting 2008). 
Other forms of information politics include recruitment and public relations 
drives typical of non-state actors engaged in advocacy coalitions.  In 2008, the Cities 
Initiative hired a communications firm with extensive experience with non-profits and 
local government—Carolyn Grisko & Associates Inc.—in order to ―strengthen the 
membership‖ (GLSLCI Annual Report 2008, 9) by improving its ability to effectively 
communicate information about the network and to disseminate it more broadly.   
The Cities Initiative also implemented an outreach program in 2007 to 
broaden membership, which included sending high level delegations to regional 
stakeholder meetings such as the Rural Ontario Municipal Association Conference in 
2007 to identify potential recruits.  During the most recent Annual Meeting in Trois-
Rivieres, Quebec, in 2009, the Board of Directors emphasized recruitment as a top 
priority, recognizing that an expanded membership base is needed to pay for an 
expanded agenda.  An official with the Cities Initiative observed, ―we have moved 
from a narrow focus on water quality and quantity, thus we will need more horses‖ 
(GLSLCI, Board of Directors Meeting 2008).   
Specifically, the Cities Initiative is anxious to finally recruit the City of 
Detroit which is the largest city on the Great Lakes and the city with the worst 
environmental record.  Shortly after the Annual Meeting, David Ullrich and Mayor 
George Heartwell were scheduled to meet with the new Mayor of Detroit, David 
Bing, to discuss membership.  As to why Detroit has resisted membership, Mayor 
Heartwell stated, ―It was just not on [former mayor] Kilkpatrick‘s radar.  I‘m hopeful 
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that with Bing we have a new opportunity to fill this big, gaping hole‖ (GLSLCI, 
interview Heartwell 2009). 
The Cities Initiative also engages in leverage politics, calling on more 
powerful actors, such as members of Congress and state legislatures, even its own 
influential member cities such as Chicago and Toronto, to provide political muscle 
without which the efforts of the weaker members of the network would prove 
ineffectual.  In 2004, President Bush issued an Executive Order calling on the EPA to 
organize ―a regional collaboration of national significance for the Great Lakes‖, in 
essence a task force, which would bring together key stakeholders across all levels of 
government including non-state actors to develop a protection and restoration 
strategy.  When the Cities Initiative sought a seat within the Collaboration, they 
encountered resistance from federal agencies involved, a reminder of the previous era 
of competitive intergovernmental relations.  As an example of leverage politics, an 
official with the Cities Initiative explains that ―we had some help from the start from 
the States, because the Feds wanted to exclude us from the Executive Committee, and 
we pushed hard to be on, and the States supported us.  We wound up on the Executive 
Committee, which really drove the process‖ (GLSLCI, interview, official, January 13, 
2008). 
Finally, the Cities Initiative engages in accountability politics, to ―hold 
powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles‖ (Keck and Sikkink 
1998, 16).  We demonstrate the use of accountability politics in the next chapter 
dealing with refinery expansion.  Briefly, local governments opposed the granting of 
a pollution permit by the State of Indiana for the expansion of a British Petroleum 
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refinery in Whiting, Indiana, on the grounds that it would increase discharges of 
effluent into Lake Michigan.  They were successful in large measure because they 
framed their opposition using language and arguments contained in previous 
environmental agreements, specifically the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA).  This lends support to the argument by 
Peters and Pierre (2004) that weak actors such as local governments are most 
effective when their informal actions are embedded in a regulatory framework, which 
they can lean on to support their position vis-à-vis more powerful actors (89). 
 
Beyond Resource Dependence as a Motivating Factor 
The second reason that previous conceptualizations of policy networks are 
insufficient is the fact that the emergence and behavior of policy networks is 
considered mainly to be driven by resource dependencies, the notion that actors are 
dependent on each other for certain resources in order to be able to achieve their aims, 
and that in the case of policy networks the redistribution of these resources is the 
‗explanatory motor‘ for why different levels of government and non-state actors 
interact.  In this so-called Rhodes model, these resources include funding, 
information, organizational capacity, political support and legal-constitutional powers 
(Rhodes 1997, 3).   
Granted, resource-sharing is often cited as an important reason why local 
governments joined the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative.  For example, 
Mayor Vance Badawey, of Port Colborne, Ontario, states that the Cities Initiative 
serves as a platform for port cities to coordinate and showcase their assets to 
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international investors.  Mayor Heartwell states, ―for me the principle reason to be a 
member is our collective advocacy around policy issues.  Our little voice of 200,000 
people is suddenly magnified through our collaboration into 13 million people.  It 
gives us clout around issues that are important to Grand Rapids‖ (GLSLCI, interview 
Heartwell 2009).   
Yet the Rhodes model underplays the role of ideas in network creation and 
operation, and as Kern and Bulkeley (2009) observe transnational municipal networks 
in particular appear to be bound together ―more by cognitive than bargaining 
processes‖ (313).  For example, in the most recent Board of Directors meeting, the 
issue came up whether the Cities Initiative should take a strong stance in calling for 
the elimination of phosphorous loading from agricultural sources into the Great Lakes 
or whether to temper their demands and their language.  In response, Mayor 
Heartwell argued that, ―we are an organization whose business is to protect the water 
of the Great Lakes, why shouldn‘t we be a strong voice?‖ (GLSLCI, Board of 
Directors Meeting 2009).  Toronto Councilman Gordon Perks recalled the political 
battles over phosphorous in the 1970s and argued that ―I think these principles we 
have to stand up for,‖ (GLSCLI, Board of Directors Meeting 2009).  Thus, taken 
together these sentiments reflect an ideological, normative motivation behind their 
decision to collaborate within the Cities Initiative to protect the Great Lakes that goes 
beyond simple resource dependency and rational, utility self-maximization. 
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Beyond Lobbying 
The third reason that traditional conceptualizations of policy networks are 
insufficient is that they overemphasize lobbying as their primary function, whereas 
transnational municipal networks divide their energy between a wide variety of 
internal and external relations.  Furthermore, especially in North America, the same 
tax law which provides the Cities Initiative with charitable non-state status, 501(c)3, 
explicitly forbids the network from dedicating significant time and resources to 
lobbying, which explains why the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative does 
not have a lobbying office in either the federal, state or provincial capitals nor does it 
employ a lobbyist, unlike transnational municipal networks in Europe which more-
often-than-not have opened up bureaus in Brussels.  For example, the Union of Baltic 
Cities opened up an Antennae Office in Brussels in 2006 with its central mandate to 
direct member city lobbying of the European Union.  Nonetheless, lobbying 
represents only a small fraction of the internal and external repertoire of transnational 
municipal networks even in Europe. 
 
External Recognition, Political Opportunities and Support Structures: A Tale of Cities 
on Two Continents 
 
Political opportunity literature states that ―exogenous factors enhance or 
inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather 
than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for movements 
to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy‖ (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 
1458).  A fundamental exogenous factor in the development and behavior of 
transnational municipal networks is the overarching supranational institutional 
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structure above the level of the nation state, and the main difference between 
European and North American transnational municipal networks are the different 
opportunities and obstacles presented by the political and institutional structures 
operating at the supranational level under the auspices of the European Union and the 
North American Free Trade Agreement.  As Duina (2006) points out in The Social 
Construction of Free Trade, just as ―traditions, structures, values, and norms, along 
with the preferences of powerful actors, define the range of what is possible‖ (3) and, 
consequently, how each free trade area functions, these same trade areas in turn have 
a profound impact on those same traditions, structures, values, norms, and 
preferences of the actors who live under its shadow. 
Illustrating the different effects of these distinct supranational institutional 
structures on the mobilization of collective action is best served by offering here a 
brief account of the development of the women‘s rights groups in Europe and North 
America in comparative perspective contained in Duina‘s (2006) study of the two free 
trade areas.  Europe experienced a dramatic surge in women‘s rights groups in the 
1960s and 1970s which transformed national domestic law across the continent, but 
most of the groups and legal changes were largely national in character with little 
transnational activity across borders.  The European Union began to respond by 
replicating many of the principles established at the domestic level into the 
supranational level in the form of directives i.e. the 1975 directive (76/207) 
establishing the principle for equal treatment of men and women regarding 
employment.  The following year, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) intervened, 
ruling that Article 119 in the Treaty of the European Union (1957) regarding equal 
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pay for equal work had direct effect, meaning that every EU member state was legally 
obligated to enact and enforce this Article domestically even in the absence of 
national laws or even if it contravened national law.   
By becoming active and visible in the debates surrounding women‘s rights, 
the European Union, a transnational institution, had made itself a target for lobbying 
and thus acted as a catalyst for the mobilization of a transnational women‘s rights 
movement in Europe.  In 1990, the largest and most prominent group—the European 
Women‘s Lobby (EWL)—was established linking over three thousand member 
organizations across the continent representing over one hundred million individuals.  
The rise of the EWL can be tied to the symbiotic relationship that was forged between 
the supranational structures of the European Union and the women‘s movement.  The 
EWL is not only financially supported by the European Commission, but serves as a 
policy advising body for the European Parliament which provides the group with 
instant political legitimacy.   
The availability of these political opportunities and resources in Europe, and 
their relative absence in North America, led to the diverging development of these 
transnational networks.  As Duina points out, ―this impressive mobilization on the 
part of European women has no parallel in NAFTA.  To this date, in North America 
there simply does not exist a truly transnational organization dedicated exclusively to 
the representation of women at the NAFTA level‖ (Duina 155).  The lack of similar 
legal-institutional structures at the supranational level under NAFTA meant there was 
no target above the nation state—no EU-type Commission, Court or Parliament—to 
serve as a mobilizing and legitimizing factor for transnational cooperation and to 
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serve as a source of funding.  In short, the same resources, political opportunities and 
pressures generated by the European Union, which spurred the organization and 
operation of a truly transnational women‘s movement in Europe, were absent in 
NAFTA.  Consequently, the political-institutional structures of the EU promoted 
transnational integration in the area of women‘s rights while NAFTA did not.   
If these fundamental political-institutional differences are, as Duina argues, 
“systematic, meaningful, and enduring” (186), one would expect that these same 
kinds of differences will manifest themselves in the emergence and development of 
transnational municipal networks in Europe and North America.  This research 
demonstrates that such is in fact the case but with the crucial caveat, however, that 
although supranational structures are important factors in the subsequent development 
of transnational municipal networks, they are not necessary for their initial 
emergence.  By this argument this dissertation distinguishes itself from both Duina 
(2006) and Brunet-Jailly (2004), who view the presence of supranational structures as 
a precondition for the emergence of transnational networks. 
 
Rich Soil, Deep Roots, Ample Sun: the Effects of Institutionalization and 
Supranational Support on the development of TMNs in Europe 
 
The political opportunities and resources afforded local governments by 
European integration and specifically its supranational institutions goes hand-in-hand 
with, and is reinforced by, a broader and deeper integration in general of local 
government policy capacity, local government cross-border cooperation, and 
transnational municipal networks in the more formal, Type I governance architecture.  
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Long before the creation of the European Union, the position of local 
government in European integration was recognized, in particular by the Council of 
Europe, which established the ―Conference of Local Authorities in Europe‖ as early 
as 1957.  In 1994, the Conference became the ―Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities‖ and this institution continued to provide a forum for regional and local 
governments to present their interests before higher authorities (Kern 2007).  In 
addition, the Council of Europe adopted a ―European Charter of Local Self 
Government‖ in 1985 which guarantees a significant measure of local government 
independence.  The level of respect shown the Charter is measured by the fact that it 
is signed by all current member-states of the European Union and all future members 
as a condition of membership.  More pertinently, Article 10 of the Chapter provides 
the legal basis for the establishment of transnational municipal networks and 
municipal foreign policy by stating that ―the entitlement of local authorities…to 
belong to an international association of local authorities shall be recognized in each 
State.  Local authorities shall be entitled…to cooperate with their counterparts in 
other States‖ (quoted in Kern 2007, 6).  Such a formal document embedding local 
governments within the very process of integration has yet to appear in North 
America, thus transnational municipal networks such as the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Cities Initiative lack that formal recognition, that formal legitimacy, that 
institutional anchor, which could provide them with some measure of protection and a 
sense of permanence. 
The proliferation of direct membership transnational municipal networks in 
Europe during the 1980s can be accounted for by the signing of the Single European 
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Act (1986), which transformed the Commission and other EU institutions into 
mobilizing and legitimizing factors for transnational local government cooperation, in 
large measure because the Commission began to have a direct impact on local 
governments.  According to Kern and Bulkeley (2009) ―there were almost no (direct) 
impacts of European legislation on subnational governments before the Single 
European Act of 1986‖ (312).  The Single European Act dramatically changed that 
fact, as did the subsequent Maastricht Treaty (1993), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) 
and the Treaty of Nice (2003), which expanded the competencies of supranational 
actors, especially the Commission and the European Parliament, to the degree that 
decision-making in these supranational arenas became ―far more important than 
domestic policy-making‖ (Kern and Bulkeley 2009, 312) and more pertinent to local 
government where roughly two-thirds of all laws implemented by local governments 
now originate (Kern 2007).  The Commission in particular attained a central position 
within the legislative process through its formal right of initiating and drafting 
legislation (Heinelt and Niederhafner 2005, 77), thus it also became a target for the 
mobilization of local governments.   
Consequently, local governments and transnational municipal networks 
underwent a process of ―Europeanization‖, for example, by adapting their 
organizational structures to the decision-making structures of the European Union, 
most obviously by locating offices in Brussels, dedicating staff members to 
interpreting EU policy, and directing their lobbying efforts at the Commission.  For 
example, the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) was founded 
in 1951 with a secretariat in Paris, but the office established in Brussels in 1969 has 
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since attained de facto headquarter status, again illustrating the effects of 
Europeanization (Heinelt and Niederhafner 2005).   
Far from a unidirectional interaction, the Commission has actively cultivated a 
symbiotic relationship with local government which has provided them with an 
expanded role within European decision-making structures.  In part, the expanded 
role of local government is a product of the Commission‘s small bureaucracy and 
limited administrative capacity which makes it dependent on external resources that 
come from local governments, in particular their on-the-ground expertise.   
Cities are the implementing agents of EU legislation and as such provide the 
Commission with invaluable information about ground-level conditions before policy 
is crafted.  Furthermore, as implementing agents that have an electoral mandate, cities 
can ―generate legitimacy for and increase the acceptance of the Commission‘s 
initiatives‖ (Heinelt and Niederhafner 2005, 77).  Once the policy is in the 
implementation stages, the cities act as watchdogs, making sure that national and sub-
national governments are applying EU law properly, thereby assuming ―the role of a 
functional equivalent of monitoring agencies of the Commission‖ (Heinelt and 
Niederhafner 2005, 79), in essence as the oft-repeated ‗complementary back-up 
institutions‘ (Andersson and Ostrom 2008).  Furthermore, the Commission prizes the 
ability of transnational municipal networks to aggregate the interests of local 
government and speak with one voice.  Therefore, cities are far from being passive 
recipients of top-down dynamics, or simply ―affected objects‖ (Kern 2007, 4) that 
adapt to EU structures, but they themselves influence the behavior and structure of 
the European Union and hence actively take part in the top-down and bottom-up 
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dynamics of Europeanization which Radaelli describes as ―co-evolution between the 
domestic and the European level‖ (2006, 59). 
Several key institutional changes took place in the 1990s which cemented this 
‗two-way‘ exchange of resources.  Since the original Treaties made no mention of 
regional or local government, much as the American and Canadian constitutions 
ignored local government, their first formal recognition came in the Maastricht Treaty 
(1993) which contained a provision for the creation of the Committee of the Regions 
(CoR) in 1994.  The Committee is a consultative forum for representatives of regional 
and local governments to present their policy positions and interests to the 
Commission, and the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) obliges both the Commission and the 
Council to consult with it in various policy areas including the environment.  
Furthermore, in 2004, the Commission introduced a ―systematic dialogue‖ with local 
governments to,  
involve regional and local actors—via European and national 
associations of regional and local authorities—by giving them the 
opportunity to express their views on the European policies they help 
to implement before the formal decision-making processes start (and) 
to ensure a better understanding of the policy guidelines of the EU and 
European legislation, thereby making the activities of the Union more 
transparent and meaningful to the public‖ (Commission of the 
European Union, COM 2003: 3). 
 
The systematic dialogue opened yet another official channel of communication 
between local governments and the Commission.  Consequently, as Heinelt and 
Niederhafner (2005) argue, ―European cities gain new room for political maneuver 
because the process of Europeanization implies an opening up of a political sphere as 
a result of which traditional structures of domestic policymaking … can…be 
bypassed‖ (76).   
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Finally, intensive lobbying by networks such as the Council of European 
Municipalities and Regions, with support from the European Parliament, proved 
successful in including Article I-5 into the EU‘s Constitutional Treaty which states, 
―The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Constitution as 
well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
constitutional, inclusive of regional and local government‖ (quoted in Kern 2007, 7).  
This provision is significant considering that neither the previous Treaties, nor any of 
the constitutions in the North American context, contain a constitutional recognition 
of local government which embeds local government so firmly within the governance 
structure. 
These connections with the Commission provide the transnational municipal 
networks not only with political legitimacy and a raison d‘etre, but the Commission 
also provides tangible resources in the form of substantial project funding.  The Cities 
for Climate Protection Campaign, for example, depends on EU funded projects for 45 
per cent of its revenues (Kern and Bulkeley 2009, 324).  Membership fees only 
account for approximately one-third of European transnational networks, which 
means that without some government and EU funding, these networks ―could not 
maintain their services and campaigns without these resources‖ (Kern and Bulkeley 
2009, 324).  The most important source of revenue is the Cohesion Fund which is a 
redistributive mechanism that funds environmental and infrastructure projects in 
regions that have lower-than-average socio-economic status.  Important reforms in 
the late 1980s introduced a ‗partnership principle‘ requiring cooperation between all 
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levels of government, including the local, in the planning implementation of projects 
funded by the European Union, including the Cohesion Fund.   
Of particular importance were the so-called Community Initiatives which 
required little input from national governments other than general approval by the 
member states, but instead fostered the creation of direct relations between the EU 
and local government and thereby allowed local governments to bypass higher tiers of 
government and gain a new measure of independence.  Within this sub-set of 
programs, the INTERREG program has been particularly effective in fostering 
transnational cooperation of local government.  The INTERREG program provides 
funding for cross-border projects that mostly involve public authorities and non-
governmental organizations.  It differs in its requirements from all other Cohesion 
Policy initiatives in that these projects must involve participants from at least two-
member states and the submission of joint bids for funding.  The partners can belong 
to contiguous or non-contiguous regions.  The current INTERREG IV program 
(2007-2012) has a budget of roughly $11 billion.  For example, the INTERREG III 
program (2000-2006) provided $277 million in funding for the Baltic Sea Region 
Neighborhood Program which covered 120 projects.  The program encouraged local 
and regional governments across eleven Baltic Sea countries to submit joint bids for 
project funding in the area of sustainable development.  Projects included, for 
example, the establishment of a network or association of cities and research centers 
in countries located across the region dedicated to the promotion of research, 
innovation, and construction of wind farms.  The EU contribution to this one 
collaborative project alone was close to $500,000.   
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Other programs fostering transnational cooperation between local 
governments include RECITE (Regions and Cities for Europe) which had a budget of 
$6 million between 1991-1994 to promote the exchange of information and best 
practices, and URBAN which fosters the regeneration of economically depressed 
cities with the help of $1.3 billion in EU funds. 
The Commission has also fostered cooperation between transnational 
municipal networks.  The European Sustainable Cities Towns campaign, created in 
1994, was funded in part by the Environment Directorate of the European 
Commission.  The campaign provides a framework for over 1,800 local and regional 
authorities to implement sustainable development policies and thus fulfill the mandate 
of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in 1992 in 
Rio.  The campaign brought together eight European transnational municipal 
networks including among them the Council of European Municipalities and Regions 
(CEMR), the Union of Baltic Cities (UBC), the Climate Alliance, and the Energie-
Cites.  Although networks do cooperate together without assistance from EU funds, 
as when the Climate Alliance and the Energie Cites collaborated on a ―Car Free Day‖ 
campaign, Kern (2007) argues that ―it has proven relatively difficult to maintain co-
operation between the networks in the absence of EU support‖ (326).   
The proliferation of these networks in Europe, and in certain policy fields 
such as climate change, has resulted in competition between networks for EU 
funding, access, and representation, which in turn has added pressure and incentive 
for these networks to improve their internal efficiency and external efficacy.  At the 
same time, EU funding of both bilateral local government cross-border cooperation 
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and funding for transnational municipal networks has mitigated the ‗competitive city 
paradigm‘ described by Brunet-Jailly (2004).  According to Marshall (2005), the 
―regional management of successive Structural Fund initiatives—a bedrock 
requirement of European Commission regulations—has…served to lessen intra-
metropolitan rivalries‖ (677), thus preparing the ground for the cultivation of new and 
expanded networks and cross-border cooperation. 
Finally, in addition to the Commission, the European Parliament has also 
become an important venue for the mobilization of local governments and networks, 
particularly after its original consultative role was expanded to include cooperative 
and co-decision competencies alongside the Council of Ministers.  When it is time to 
make amendments to legislation affecting local governments, the Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) will approach transnational municipal networks for 
expertise.  Cities also join parties and groupings in debates surrounding the 
legislation. 
 
Poor Soil, Shallow Roots, Little Sun: The Effects of Weak Institutionalization and 
Anemic Supranational Support on the Development of Transnational Municipal 
Networks in North America 
 
Relative to the European Union, the institutionalization of local government 
and transnational municipal networks within the Great Lakes environmental 
governance structure runs shallow, and the overarching supranational superstructure 
is far less developed in the North American context and hence far less supportive of 
transnational municipal networks and other forms of cross-border cooperation 
between local governments.   
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Starting with the supranational structures, there is no equivalent to the 
European Commission, the European Court of Justice, or the European Parliament in 
North America and nothing really approaching these institutions.  However, there are 
two institutions above the level of the nation-state—the International Joint 
Commission (IJC) and the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC)—
which provide minimal resources for local government but who have nonetheless 
played a significant role in opening up political space for non-central government 
actors in the policymaking process.  Furthermore, the IJC, and especially the CEC, do 
have some influence over environmental and economic policy in a way that directly 
affects local government, hence it serves as a target above the level of the nation 
state, much like the European Commission, and therefore as a mobilizing and 
legitimizing factor for non-central state actors such as transnational municipal 
networks.  In addition, their own, weak policy capacity and limited resources forces 
them to seek closer collaboration with non-central state actors such as local 
governments on whose resources and political legitimacy these institutions have come 
to rely to achieve their aims.  Nonetheless, compared to the institutions in the 
European Union, their potential utility as catalysts of multilevel governance and 
champions of transnational municipal networks has never been fulfilled and, more 
accurately, has been purposefully curtailed rather than cultivated by federal and sub-
national governments. 
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(i) Between Mobilization and Marginalization: The International Joint Commission as 
an Instrument of Multilevel Governance 
 
The International Joint Commission (IJC) was created in order to administer 
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, which was the first environmental treaty to 
address international water rights.  The IJC is the first permanent joint institution 
between the United States and Canada.  It is composed of three American and three 
Canadian commissioners that are appointed by their respective governments.  The 
two principle purposes of the Treaty it to guarantee that the boundary waters are 
shared equitably and that jurisdictions are held responsible for any injury to health or 
property from pollution to the other party.   
Although the IJC was not given any enforcement powers, it was given a broad 
mandate and broad authority to disseminate information and data on water quality, 
coordinate activities across jurisdictions, set the research agenda, recommend water 
management goals and assess progress of bi-national agreements.  One instrument in 
particular has been influential.  Article IX established a quasi-judicial reference 
procedure whereby the two governments can refer a concern or conflict to the IJC and 
request that the IJC produce a non-binding comment or decision.  In its first seven 
decades of operation, the IJC was involved in one hundred cases including the high 
profile Garrison Dam project and the Trail Smelter dispute (Parrish 2006, 11).  Early 
critical references relating specifically to the Great Lakes included a determination of 
the health risks of transboundary pollution in 1912, an investigation into pollution 
levels in Lake St. Clair and the Detroit River in 1946, and an analysis of water quality 
in Lake Erie and Lake Ontario in 1964.  During the IJC‘s ‗golden era‘ from 1945 to 
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1965, its powers were expanded and the IJC was mandated to provide continuing 
supervision over the Great Lakes basin.   
By the 1970s, during the period of competitive-cooperation, the activism of 
the IJC began to be interpreted as an encroachment on government jurisdiction and a 
threat to sovereignty (Parrish 2006), and as a result it began to be marginalized.  
Between 1977 and 1991, the two countries referred only two cases to the IJC for 
investigation (Parrish 2006, 15) and only three more between 1995 and 2001 (Klinke 
2008), which demonstrates that both federal governments were interested in reining in 
the IJC.  Parrish (2006) argues that ―in the last few years, the IJC has been bypassed 
completely‖ (15) and that in the most recent major disputes ―the IJC was rendered 
powerless, or at least kept out of the picture‖ (16).  Parrish adds that the recent 
ratification of the Great Lakes Water Compact, which transfers oversight over out-of-
basin water diversions from the IJC to a Council composed of states and provinces, 
essentially replaces a longstanding international regime with a sub-national regime, 
and provides further evidence that the ―the IJC is in disfavor and has lost much of its 
political effectiveness‖ (4). 
With diminished political clout, a very limited budget and limited staff, the 
International Joint Commission at present cannot provide the level of resources, 
access to decision-making structures, or the political legitimacy that European 
transnational municipal networks draw from supranational actors such as the 
European Commission in the European Union.  However, the IJC does serve and 
support the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative in three significant ways.  
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First, the story of the rise-and-descent of the IJC provides a good template for 
the kind of strategy the Cities Initiative should employ and which strategies to avoid.  
The agenda-setters within the Cities Initiative understand that it must be careful not to 
overstep its bounds or move too far ahead of what federal, state and provincial 
governments are willing to consent to or they will face the same kind of ‗push-back‘ 
experienced by the IJC.  Throughout its history, the authority of the IJC has been 
highest when it is takes a ‗low-key‘ approach, helping to nudge governments towards 
solutions they are prepared to accept (Schwartz 1992).  Gradualism is very much the 
only speed the bi-national structures around the Great Lakes are able to bear.  Mayor 
Anderson, of Blue Mountains, echoes this approach by stating, ―plans for the future 
have to be gradual, realistic and solid so that they can actually proceed.  It‘s an 
evolution‖ (GLSLCI, interview Anderson 2009).   
Furthermore, there is a recognition that the authority of the IJC, and the 
authority of transnational municipal networks, is based very much on the power of 
persuasion, specifically, on its ability to provide bi-national advice ―relying on the 
best scientific and socio-economic expertise available from the government and 
private sectors as well as from affected or concerned interest groups‖ and formulating 
that information ―in a less adversarial atmosphere than would exist in [traditional] 
binational discussions‖ (Chandler and Vechsler 1992, 281).  Mayor Ross, of Superior, 
echoes this approach when describing the strategy employed by the Cities Initiative in 
its standoff with British Petroleum and the State of Indiana over the expansion of the 
refinery in Whiting, Indiana.  He states, ―I tell you what gave us credibility.  There 
are organizations that get up and just scream, and they tell tales of disaster and 
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impending calamity without coming to the table with science, or reasoning, for their 
opposition.  The credibility of the Great Lakes mayors happens because we came to 
the table with real science‖ (GLSLCI, interview Ross 2009).   
In addition to adopting the strategy of gradualism and non-confrontation, 
while embracing its role as a source of information and expertise, the Great Lakes and 
St. Lawrence Cities Initiative has been very careful to also establish itself as an 
organization that rises above the special interests either of government, non-state 
actors, or industry, and to cultivate an organizational identity that is independent and 
impartial.  Mayor Ross points out what could very well be the mission statement of 
the Cities Initiative when he states, 
As mayors we want to be responsible for the environment in our cities, 
but we are also responsible for the economic development of our 
cities, the vitality that we bring to our city that creates jobs and 
livelihood.  So the balancing part of the cities organization is that all of 
us wear more than one hat.  We don‘t come from a strictly special 
interest viewpoint that says our viewpoint and only our viewpoint is 
the lens which we interpret everything we see.  We are balancing the 
interest of every single group (GLSLCI, interview Ross 2009). 
 
To underline the similarities of the IJC and the Cities Initiative, the Commissioner of 
the IJC, Pierre Trepanier, in a recent speech underscored the structural similarities 
between the two organizations and their similar strategies for reaching out to people 
and fostering cooperation (GLSLCI, General Assembly 2009). 
The second way in which the IJC supports the Cities Initiative, is that it has 
been an early champion of, and a significant contributor to, the institutionalization of 
a multilevel governance system in North American environmental policymaking, in 
which, according to Klinke (2008), the participation of multiple actors across all 
jurisdictional levels both inside and outside government is ―systematically and 
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purposefully developed and structured‖ (10).  Klinke (2008) identifies several 
instruments employed by the IJC to enhance multilevel governance including (i) 
public hearings (ii) workshops and roundtables (iii) public advisory bodies.   
The IJC organizes biannual public hearings to raise a wide-spectrum of issues 
related to the basin, and these hearings are open to all American and Canadian 
citizens, attracting on average 400-500 participants, including senior government 
officials, the scientific community, representatives of industry and non-governmental 
organizations.  The most frequent platforms for collaboration provided by the IJC are 
workshops and roundtables which bring together 20-30 carefully selected people to 
deliberate on specific issues and these are structured more as focused and dialectical 
exchanges of ideas.  The IJC deliberately selects the participants of these workshops 
based on their expertise and background.  Finally, the IJC also helps to coordinate 
public advisory bodies on lakes Superior, Erie and Michigan composed of public and 
private actors which help develop and implement Lakewide Management Plans 
(LaMP) as well as Remedial Action Plans (RAP) for heavily polluted Areas of 
Concern (AOC).   
These three broadly defined instruments constitute part of the governance 
structure around the Great Lakes which are similar to the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) practiced in the European Union, and discussed in the previous 
chapter, and which complements the traditional, formal, rationalist decision-making 
structures, since, according to Klinke (2008), these instruments are ―characterized by 
equal standing of the members, equal rights to speak, freedom of expression, and 
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argumentative practice towards consensus orientation‖ (10).  The International 
Watershed Initiative (IWI) also reflects these more open governance instruments. 
Consequently, one of the prime functions of the IJC is to act as a catalyst or 
incubator for the development of epistemic communities which are ―networks of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge‖ (Haas 1992, 3).  These epistemic 
communities are organized around the system of comitology already situated within 
the IJC structures such as the Water Quality Board (WQB), the Science Advisory 
Board (SAB), the Council of Great Lakes Research Managers (CGLRM) and the 
International Air Quality Advisory Board (IAQAB).  In turn, these networks ―can 
counterbalance power asymmetries by providing additional channels of influence 
beyond the formal structures‖ (Borzel 1998, 262) for non-central actors and 
organizations such as the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative.  For 
example, during the IJC‘s Biennial Meeting held October 7-8, 2009, in Windsor, 
Ontario, the Executive Director of the Cities Initiative, David Ullrich, addressed the 
delegates and ran a workshop on Beaches and Recreational Water Quality, an issue so 
central for local government that Ontario municipalities have called for the 
establishment of an office within the Ministry of the Environment dedicated to 
beaches.  This issue would not have appeared on the agenda of the IJC‘s Biennial 
Meeting without the participation of the Cities Initiative. 
Finally, the IJC has supported the Cities Initiative by actively promoting the 
organization, externally and also within its own institutions, and bestowing its 
political legitimacy upon its activities.  For example, since 2005, the Executive 
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Director of the Cities Initiative has served as a member of the Great Lakes Water 
Quality Board (WQB) which is the principal advisory body to the IJC, making sure it 
understands its roles and fulfills its obligations under the Great Lakes and Water 
Quality Agreement (GLWQA).  In addition, as mentioned earlier, a pending IJC 
report will address local government directly for the first time in its history.  This 
reflects a new approach which, according to IJC Commissioner Pierre Trepanier, 
―reflects the IJC belief that cities must be at the decision-making table‖ (GLSLCI, 
Trepanier speaking at General Assembly 2009).   
At the same time, the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative has taken 
great care to reciprocate and thus help shore up the political clout of its humble yet 
erstwhile ally.  Commissioner Trepanier noted that when the IJC began its public 
consultations on the pending review of the GLWQA in 2005, fourteen mayors offered 
the use of their offices and public buildings thereby leveraging the limited resources 
of the IJC in order to expand the number of meetings held at venues across the basin 
thus permitting more than 4,000 people to take part (GLSLCI, General Assembly 
2009).  Out of the 14 public meetings, 11 were held in cities belonging to the Great 
Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative. 
Furthermore, in 2008, the Cities Initiative supported a plan initiated by one of 
its active members, the Regional Municipality of Niagara, to nominate the IJC for the 
2009 Stockholm Water Prize, which is the most prestigious international award for 
water-related activities, in hopes of augmenting the IJC‘s political clout, increasing its 
international standing, and cementing its partnership with local governments.   
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Finally, the Cities Initiative has been a strong proponent of revitalizing the IJC 
by urging both federal governments to use the neglected Article IX mechanism of the 
Boundary Waters Treaty which invites the IJC to mediate transboundary conflicts 
between Canada and the United States.  For example, in 2005, the Cities Initiative 
called on the United States to join Canada in referring their heated dispute over 
Devil‘s Lake to the IJC after the United States had chosen to reject that option.  In a 
speech, Canadian Minister of the Environment, Stephane Dion, praised the Cities 
Initiative for supporting the IJC, stating that ―failing to use the IJC appropriately 
would undermine one of the most significant international environmental agreements 
ever signed‖ (Dion, speech May 26, 2005). 
 
(ii) Untapped Potential and Bottled Ambitions: NAFTA‘s Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation 
 
The most important and visible component of the supranational infrastructure 
is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which went into effect on 
January 1, 1994.  In addition to regulating trade between Canada, Mexico and the 
United States, NAFTA included two sub-agreements called the North American 
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) and the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) which contributed their own unique 
supranational governance structures to the continent.   
The NAAEC established the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
(CEC) which was the first, truly North American international organization dealing 
with environmental management, and it was endowed with broad and autonomous 
authority and resources.  In their evaluation of the CEC‘s first decade in existence, 
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Kirton and Richardson (2006) argue that the CEC has become ―the premier North 
American institution for environmental issues‖ (26).  The mandate of the CEC is to 
carry out the broad aims of the NAAEC, which is to promote sustainable 
development, increase cross-border cooperation, improve environmental laws, 
enhance compliance, promote transparency, and in the process avoid erecting new 
trade barriers.  Consequently, Kirton and Richardson (2006) argue that the creation of 
the CEC ―represented an acknowledgement of the deep environmental 
interdependence of the countries of North America in the context of their economic 
interdependence‖ (6) and instigated for the first time an institutionalized integrated 
dialogue on trade and environmental matters—the economic-environmental nexus—
at a senior level (5).   
As is the case with the International Joint Commission, the preferred approach 
utilized by the CEC parallels the European Union‘s Open Method of Cooperation 
(OMC), in that, according to Kirton and Richardson (2006), 
the CEC has provided a safe harbour for Canadian government 
officials to communicate with US government officials they may not 
otherwise be authorized to contact, on matters they would not 
otherwise be authorized to discuss, and to explore these in an informal, 
non-committal, more open way.  It has provided a forum to explore 
partnerships on a neutral, third-party ground, without first engaging 
the formal machinery of all three national governments (12). 
 
The bulk of the activities of the CEC are intergovernmental, carried out 
predominantly by representatives of the federal governments in consultation with the 
provinces and the states.  However, within the formal, Type I governance structures, 
the CEC also opens up informal political space for Type II governance structures.  
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The CEC is made up of three pillars, the Council, the Secretariat and the Joint 
Public Advisory Council.  The Council is the intergovernmental, governing body of 
the CEC, which meets once a year and is composed of the environmental ministers 
and the representatives of federal departments and agencies in their respective 
countries.  The Council sets the agenda parameters and the budget, it is responsible 
for general oversight of the CEC‘s work, and also establishes external links with other 
organizations such as the International Joint Commission and the International 
Boundary and Water Commission (Kirton and Richardson 2006).  Working groups, 
such as the Sound Management of Chemicals (SMOC), have been established which 
include state and provincial government representatives engaged in a multilevel 
dialogue or, perhaps more appropriately, a two-level dialogue.  The Secretariat, 
headquartered in Montreal with a satellite office in Mexico City, provides technical 
and operational support to the Council and the working groups, and it is headed by an 
executive director.  The Council and the Secretariat comprise the powerful, 
intergovernmental machinery of the CEC.   
The third major pillar of the CEC is the Joint Public Advisory Council (JPAC) 
and it introduces a multilevel governance approach to the NAAEC which is inclusive 
of non-central state and non-state actors.  The fifteen members appointed to the 
Advisory Council equally by the three parties to the NAAEC are independent of 
government.  The official role of the JPAC is to advise the Council on any issue 
related to the NAAEC and to fulfill any function assigned to it by the Council.  Over 
the years, however, the JPAC has expanded its role.  As the main channel of public 
input and participation, JPAC has become the main interface connecting government 
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and civil society.  Consequently, its connection to the grassroots level has allowed it 
to quickly identify emerging issues, such as invasive species, and transmit them to the 
Council and thus raise their profile.  Less frequently, the JPAC has served as a critic 
of the Council.  As a result, according to Kirton and Richardson (2006), the JPAC has 
become ―the leading instrument to ensure the NAAEC‘s commitment to 
inclusiveness, transparency, and public participation in CEC governance‖ (10).  The 
JPAC comes together on average four times a year, in addition to more informal 
interactions through workshops, public meetings, and conferences.  The JPAC is 
unique, in that the formal meetings often take place in different locations across North 
America, thereby improving the CEC‘s accessibility. 
 In addition to acting as a platform for broader trilateral intergovernmental 
interactions, the CEC has three distinct instruments which have set the ground for the 
expansion of multilevel governance in the region and the inclusion of non-central 
actors in environmental governance.   
Under Article 13, the Secretariat has the authority to initiate and conduct 
independent studies investigating any issue under the scope of the NAAEC.  The 
issues investigated are complex and the process consumes significant resources, 
which is why the CEC on average releases one such report every two years.  
Although resource intensive, the facts established by Article 13 reports are potential 
‗game-changers‘, affecting the substance and style of bilateral relations.  For instance, 
two reports entitled Continental Pollutant Pathways (1997) and Environmental 
Challenges and Opportunities of the Evolving North American Electricity Market 
(2002) established the link between transboundary pollutants and health, and 
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confirmed that the United States transmits significant air pollution to Canada.  The 
findings in these reports were used by Canada in its bilateral relations with the United 
States.  These reports were also directly relevant to local government bilateral 
relations around the Great Lakes.  For instance, the petition submitted by the thirteen 
Canadian municipalities to the EPA in 2006 regarding transboundary pollution from 
Midwestern coal-fired plants was based on, and directly quoted, these and other CEC 
reports.  Findings from the Continental Pollutant Pathways (1997) and the Long-
Range Transport of Ground-Level Ozone and Its Precursors (1997) reports, which 
concluded that pollutants from the upper Midwest and the Ohio River Valley travel 
upward across Southern Ontario, were used to justify the petition process under 
Section 115(a) of the US Clean Air Act.  Section 115(a) states, that the EPA must 
respond when it receives reports or studies from ‗any duly constituted international 
agency‘ which indicate that transboundary pollution from the United States is 
endangering the public health or welfare of citizens in a foreign country.  The CEC 
satisfied the requirement of a ‗duly constituted international agency‘, therefore these 
Article 13 reports were used as a basis for the mobilization of non-governmental 
organizations and local government in the basin. 
Kirton and Richardson (2006) argue the process employed in producing the 
Article 13 reports has been more important than their content.  The resource intensive 
nature of the process, and its reliance on principles and methods found in the 
physical, natural and social sciences, forces the CEC to mobilize external 
stakeholders in support of their projects, thereby creating epistemic communities by 
fostering communication and cooperation among government officials, business 
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leaders, academics, scientists, and non-governmental organizations.  These epistemic 
communities provide rare forums for experts from different policy fields, such as 
energy, trade, and the environment, to collaborate.  For example, according to Kirton 
and Richardson (2006), the report on the electricity market in North America, for 
instance,  
served as the only way for the trilateral environmental community to 
react to a highest-level, ad hoc intergovernmental economic 
development initiative, and to inject environmental considerations into 
trilateral discussion on energy from which environmental actors were 
institutionally shut out.  In this case, the CEC engendered a move from 
primary national identities and conceptions of interest to transnational 
ones.  It provided a way, not otherwise available, for environment 
departments in North America to react to the intergovernmental 
process on energy co-operation initiated by heads of government and 
state (14). 
  
The CEC has yet to cooperate with the Cities Initiative directly on an Article 13 
report, and thus the potential for supranational-local cooperation in this manner 
remains untapped. 
In addition to Article 13, the CEC possesses two legal mechanisms which 
endow it with ‗soft law‘ enforcement capacity.  Article 5 is a government-to-
government dispute resolution mechanism, whereby any one of the three signatories 
to NAFTA can request the Council to concur that ―a persistent pattern of failure‖ by 
any other party to enforce its environmental laws has occurred.  In the case of such a 
positive finding, the Council proposes a plan to remedy such non-compliance and has 
the authority to assess fines and suspend benefits under NAFTA to any party in 
breach of its environmental laws and in non-compliance with the Council‘s remedial 
plan.  Although giving the CEC some potential ‗teeth‘, the Article 5 process has never 
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been used and ―is widely expected to remain a dead letter under a de facto non-
aggression pact in which no country will initiate the first dispute for fear of 
unleashing a spiral of retaliation‖ (Kirton and Richardson 2006, 18).   
The second legal instrument, Articles 14 and 15, has great potential to extend 
multilevel governance by authorizing non-governmental organizations or persons to 
make a submission to the Secretariat against a government failing to enforce 
environmental laws.  After investigating the submission, the Secretariat can 
recommend to the Council that a factual record of the violation be developed.  The 
Council then determines, by a two-thirds vote, whether the Secretariat should proceed 
with the factual record and whether to make it public.  As a result, Kirton and 
Richardson argue that the process does embed the participation of civil society within 
a process traditionally monopolized by governments.  Furthermore, the ability of a 
citizen of one country to bring a case forward against any one of the three national 
governments means that they can ―behave as if they are North American 
environmental citizens‖ (15).  In a sense, these two articles have the potential to 
catalyze the mobilization of non-central state actors as has the European Court of 
Justice and the European Commission. 
However, although in theory these two articles have the potential to expand 
multilevel governance and mobilize non-central-state actors, they have had limited 
practical effect.   Kirton and Richardson (2006) argue that ―under this process, there 
is no further remedy for the submitter through the CEC and no ultimate challenge to 
national sovereignty‖ (15).  Furthermore, the ―slow, cumbersome, government-
controlled process that produces, at best, a factual record‖ (15) shorn of any real 
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consequences, makes it a less effective instrument.  The process is quite lengthy, and 
a factual record on average takes three years to produce.  In two cases, the Council 
has rejected recommendations by the Secretariat that a factual record be produced, 
thus demonstrating the persistent and powerful role of states as ultimate gatekeepers.  
Over the first decade, only 11 factual records were produced, meaning, roughly 20 
per cent of the submissions reached a successful conclusion for the submitter.   
Consequently, the lead counsel for the thirteen Canadian local governments in 
the 2006 EPA petition case stated that his non-government organization, Ecojustice, 
had submitted more petitions to the CEC than any other group, but had decided 
against filing the petition with the CEC in this particular instance in favor of the EPA 
route because the CEC ―litigation is prohibitively expensive‖ and that ‗there is no 
accountability with the CEC route‖ (Ecojustice, interview, November 27 2008).  In 
addition, the counsel argues that the main problem with the CEC is political 
interference which causes undue delays in the process. 
For these and other reasons, Hsu and Parrish (2006), in a paper entitled 
―Embracing Reciprocity: Revisiting Domestic Legal Solutions to Ontario‘s 
Transboundary Pollution Problems‖ argue that Canadian governments at all levels, 
including non-state actors, should depend less on supranational mechanisms such as 
the IJC and NAFTA and make more use of the U.S. domestic courts when seeking 
redress for transboundary pollution violations. At least at this point, non-
governmental organizations and local governments seem to prescribe to these 
guidelines and eschew NAFTA instruments in favor of the domestic route, which can 
be interpreted as a sure sign of their severe practical limitations as vehicles for 
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increased participation by non-central state actors and local governments.  
Furthermore, the Article 14 and 15 route only provides a post hoc enforcement 
instrument, however feeble, and does not provide a mechanism for planning long-
term strategies for basin management. 
 One of the major structural bases for the ineffectiveness of the CEC is its 
inadequate budgetary resources.  The Council agreed in 1994 to set the annual budget 
of the CEC at $9 million, with each government contributing one-third of the total, 
and this level has not changed despite the institution‘s expanding roles and despite 
annual inflation.  Furthermore, voluntary contributions by any one party above and 
beyond the agreed upon budget are subject to agreement by the other two parties.  
Secondments, where officials are paid directly by national governments instead of 
from the CEC budget, have not been considered, nor have private sector donations, in 
order to alleviate the fiscal strain on this institution (Kirton and Richardson 2006, 25). 
Taking together, in their study Greening NAFTA: The North American 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Markell and Knox (2003) come to the 
rather harsh conclusion that, ―the CEC has no great budget to induce others to follow 
its lead, and in practice it cannot impose environmental standards or economic 
sanctions‖ (309) and thus ―the CEC has largely failed to create an environmental 
voice within the NAFTA institutions‖ (309).  Asked about the relationship between 
his city and the CEC, the Mayor of Toronto responded, ―There is no relationship with 
the CEC.  None of us know what it really is.  They are not down the street, and they 
don‘t do anything‖ (GLSLCI, interview David Miller, 2010). 
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(iii) Cut Short: The North American Fund for Environmental Cooperation (NAFEC) 
 
It has been argued in this dissertation that both the intergovernmental relations 
within Type I governance structures and the overarching supranational structures 
affect the development of multilevel governance and the development of informal, 
Type II governance structures.  These, in turn, provide political opportunities and 
resources for non-central state actors such as non-governmental organizations and 
local governments to increase their policy capacity and take part in the governance 
structure.  In the North American case, the three federal governments pursued policies 
that have led to a truncated CEC thereby leading to a truncated multilevel governance 
structure, with truncated Type II governance structures that limit the participation and 
policy capacity of non-central state actors.   
Nowhere in North America is this relationship between Type I and Type II 
multilevel governance structures more evident than in the creation and elimination of 
the North American Fund for Environmental Cooperation (NAFEC).  It demonstrates 
both the potential of the North American multilevel governance system and the reality 
of its deliberate restriction.  It also demonstrates the role federal governments and 
supranational actors play in determining the size of the gap between that potential and 
reality. 
The Fund was an un-mandated program established by the CEC in 1995 and 
operated from 1996 until its elimination in 2003 with the purpose of funding 
grassroots environmental projects across Canada, Mexico and the United States.  In 
the first four years of operation, the NAFEC received 2,014 proposals from various 
non-governmental organizations and in that time awarded 142 grants, illustrating the 
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terrific hunger on the part of grass-roots organizations for EU-style supranational 
funding.  By 2003, a total of $9.36 million dollars were dispensed in its eight years of 
operation.  Furthermore, during this time, the NAFEC was exceptionally successful at 
leveraging additional funding in the amount of $4,592,800.  Projects included citizen 
monitoring of pollution and health hazards, improving access and dissemination of 
environmental information, conservation of migratory species and habitat, and 
fostering sustainable development through the promotion of green goods and 
services.   
Compared to the $11 billion the EU INTERREG program is set to dispense 
between 2007-2012, the total NAFEC funding is meager, but it is significant when 
considering that no such prior supranational funding mechanisms existed, and 
significant when considering the scale of mobilization it precipitated.  Furthermore, 
close to half of the grants awarded ranged between USD $77,000 and $100,000.  To 
illustrate the value of such a grant to a non-governmental organization or 
transnational municipal network, a grant of $100,000 would represent 25 per cent of 
the annual expenses of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative.  On 
average, NAFEC funding represents 45 per cent of any one project‘s funding.  
Almost half of the grants were awarded to organizations with an annual budget 
between $100,000-500,000, a category that would include the Cities Initiative (CEC 
2000, 5). 
More relevant to the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, the 
NAFEC placed a special emphasis towards fostering transboundary cooperation, 
targeting those organizations which build cross-border or regional networks (CEC 
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2000, 18). Almost half of the projects funded brought two or more organizations 
together. Approximately thirty projects funded by NAFEC explicitly involved the 
establishment and development of cross-border networks including six between 
Canada and the United States and ten between Canada, Mexico and the United States 
(CEC 2000, ii).   
Furthermore, special attention was given to cross-border management of 
shared ecosystems between Canada and the United States.  For example, NAFEC 
gave two grants to the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society for their Yellowstone-
to-Yukon Conservation Initiative (YTY) which conserves and restores grizzly bear 
habitat.  A complementary project was also funded by NAFEC to support binational 
cooperation between the East Kootenay Environmental Society and the Montana 
Wilderness Association (CEC 2000, 16).   
An internal review of the NAFEC conducted by the CEC in 2000 argued that 
the NAFEC fulfills a particular role as a ‗transboundary grantmaker‘, concluding that 
―NAFEC‘s support of transboundary environmental work is not currently funded by 
other groups.  NAFEC‘s niche allows it to support NGOs to work across borders on 
shared environmental issues and reinforce CEC objectives‖ (CEC 2000, ii).  What is 
particularly relevant to the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, is that in 
addition to its emphasis on cross-border cooperation, JPAC had recommended to the 
Council in 2003 that the Call for Proposals for the upcoming year should focus 
primarily on projects related to water quality and specifically the management of 
freshwater systems such as the Great Lakes. 
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For this reason in particular, the elimination of the NAFEC shortly after the 
creation of the Cities Initiative in 2004 represents a lost opportunity for the Cities 
Initiative as it would have represented a significant source of resources, political 
legitimacy, and motivation for mobilization and deeper cross-border collaboration.  
Eliminating the NAFEC eliminated an important linkage that potentially could have 
sustained a more robust, EU-style, local-supranational nexus.   
NAFEC was eliminated despite the fact that an internal review conducted by 
the CEC in 2000 concluded that the NAFEC was a resounding success.  The review 
also stated that it fulfilled the mission of the NAFEC and, in particular, that it fulfilled 
Council Resolution 95-09 establishing the NAFEC, which directed the CEC to 
dispense funding in order to ―directly engage the energy and imagination of the 
people of North America in achieving the goals of the NAAEC‖ (CEC 2002b, 4).  
The prescient report also concluded that the discontinuation of the NAFEC would 
lead to the impoverishment of the CEC and the multilevel governance system, 
specifically, by (i) severing of contacts between the CEC and the public (ii) 
contributing to the loss of public participation (iii) leading to a loss of credibility of 
the CEC within the NGO community (iv) precipitating a loss of internal capacity for 
grassroots projects within the CEC (v) causing a loss of capacity within civil society 
(CEC 2000, 31).  This attack on civil society is significant considering that, as 
Swyngedouw (2005) argues, ―civil society is…the pivotal terrain from which social 
transformative and innovative action emerges and where social power relations are 
contested and struggled over‖ (1996). 
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The immediate cause of the NAFEC‘s demise is a lack of funding.  The 
NAFEC was instituted in 1996 with a budget of US $1.5 million, which was 
significant considering that the CEC‘s overall budget from which it drew its funding 
was only $9 million.  Since the CEC‘s budget remained static, even in the face of 
increasing responsibilities and expenses, the cuts came from the NAFEC.  Funding in 
1998 was reduced to $950,000, then to $500,000 in 2000.  The former chair of the 
JPAC argues that in essence the funding ―was cut because it was not a priority for the 
three federal governments‖ (ex-JPAC Chair, correspondence, August 1, 2009).  On 
October 23, 2003, the former Chair had written a letter on behalf of the JPAC to the 
Council members expressing his ‗deep concern‘ regarding the Secretariat‘s 
recommendations to conclude the NAFEC, warning the CEC of ―the likelihood of a 
very strong adverse reaction from the public‖ (ex-JPAC Chair, correspondence 
October 23, 2003) since the demise of the NAFEC will be interpreted as ―shots at 
public participation‖ and tantamount to ―closing a door‖ (ex-JPAC Chair, 
correspondence October 23, 2003).  This is in stark contrast to Europe, where more 
‗doors‘ are being opened. 
 
Top-Down or Bottom-Up Dynamics?  The Emergence and Development of 
Transnational Municipal Networks 
 
European local governments and transnational municipal networks benefit 
from greater formal institutionalization in Type I governance architecture and benefit 
from thicker and denser relations with a significantly more resourceful supranational 
infrastructure than their North America counterparts.  Some supranational institutions 
do exist in North America in the form of the IJC and the CEC, which have provided 
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some resources, political legitimacy, and institutional capacity for the expansion of 
multilevel governance and the mobilization of non-central state actors including local 
governments.  Although not insignificant, nonetheless, at this point, their potential 
value greatly outweighs their actual value for local governments.   
Hence, North American local governments simply do not have access to the 
same resources and political opportunities available to European transnational 
municipal networks. Consequently, whereas transnational municipal networks are a 
common fixture in European governance, there is only one such network operating 
within North America, and its organizational complexity and the scope of its 
activities are limited by the deficiencies in its external environment.  As a result, they 
are therefore relatively truncated compared to their European cousins.   
Thus, one can conclude, there is definitely a positive relationship between the 
transfer of authority and resources from the supranational, national and sub-national 
levels of government downward to the level of local governments and the degree of 
institutional development of transnational municipal networks.  At the same time, 
whereas a positive relationship does exist between the transfer of resources and 
constitutional authority downward and the development of transnational municipal 
networks, the gradual expansion of the internal functions and structures of the Great 
Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, which has taken place absent such transfers 
suggests that they are not absolutely necessary for the development of these networks.  
Therefore, the transfer of constitutional authority and resources downward to local 
governments acts as a kind of synthetic fertilizer accelerating the development of 
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these networks and expanding their policy capacity and repertoire, which could still 
otherwise take place organically albeit at a slower pace and to a lesser extent. 
The essentially ‗bottom-up‘ genesis of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Cities Initiative absent the downward transfer of authority and resources also 
indicates that whereas top-down dynamics may be important factors in conditioning 
the structure and behavior of transnational municipal networks once they come into 
being, which supports the thesis put forth by Duina (2006) about the positive 
relationship between the development of supranational structures and the 
development of transnational networks, the existence of the Cities Initiative indicates 
that these transfers are not essential for the emergence of transnational municipal 
networks, which contradicts Duina‘s argument.   
This suggests that ultimately what is required for these networks to emerge 
from the ground is the opening up of political space by higher tiers of government 
and the political willpower at the local level to occupy that space.  Again, it seems, 
we are witnessing the restatement of an old formula.  In his presidential address to the 
Canadian Political Science Association in 1977, Alain Cairns was explaining the 
recent assertion of sub-national authority occurring at the time in Canadian politics by 
suggesting that, ―passivity, indifference, and the absence of strong opposition from 
the [political] environment may be all that provincial governments need to thrive and 
grow‖ (quoted in Smiley 1984, 45).  Cairns‘ thirty-year old explanation applies, with 
minor adjustments, to the emergence of transnational municipal networks, in that the 
absence of strong opposition from higher tiers of government, and a collaborative 
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political climate, may be all that local governments need to thrive and grow and 
establish cooperation across borders. 
Coincidently, the findings in this dissertation support Jeffery‘s (2000) ―more 
comprehensive conception of multi-level governance‖ (9) which argues that sub-
national actors such as local governments are not merely ‗passive players‘ and that 
their mobilization is not merely an ‗an incidental by-product‘ of the rebalancing of 
relations at higher tiers of government nor of the passing down of decision-making 
powers or resources.  Rather, these findings also lend support to Jeffery‘s (2000) 
hypothesis that sub-federal actors actively seek to change ―the dynamics of intra-state 
relationships between central and sub-national authorities‖ (8).  However, whereas 
Jeffery (2000) ultimately concludes that sub-national actors and local governments 
succeed in changing those dynamics ―in ways which facilitate European policy 
mobilization‖ (8), the findings from the North American context allow us to 
generalize Jeffery‘s conclusions more broadly, by stating that local governments 
actively seek to change and succeed in changing intra-state dynamics in ways which 
facilitate the expansion of multilevel governance, be it in  Europe or North America 
or elsewhere. 
Kern and Bulkeley (2009) allude to a kind of self-reinforcing mechanism, or 
iterative relationship, between the expansion of multilevel governance and the 
expansion of local government policy capacity stating that the emergence and 
development of transnational municipal networks ―reflects and constitutes…the 
multilevel nature of European governance and the dynamics of Europeanization‖ 
(311).  A virtuous circle forms wherein a robust system of multilevel governance 
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creates conditions for robust transnational municipal networks which in turn reinforce 
and expand the system of multilevel governance further and so forth.  It is somewhat 
reminiscent of neofunctionalism‘s assumption of self-sustaining integration, except 
that students of multilevel governance and transnational municipal networks are 
aware that opposition from higher tiers of government can, at any moment, derail the 
development of both processes if one of the actors steps outside the bounds of 
accepted political latitude.  It is neofunctionalism tempered by the realities of having 
to operate in the ‗shadow of hierarchy‘ (Scharpf 1997). 
One of the elements at the heart of this self-reinforcing mechanism within the 
European Union is the interdependent relationship between the European 
Commission and sub-national actors which include local governments.  The 
Commission shapes local governments by downloading resources and ideas to local 
governments (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001; Olsen 2002), while local 
governments shape the Commission by uploading of resources and ideas.  This two-
way exchange has come to be known as Europeanization which, according to 
Ladrech (1994), entails ―an incremental process of reorienting the direction and shape 
of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organization logic of national politics and policy-making‖ and vice-versa (69).  For 
instance, Marshall (2005) analyzes the effects that interactions with EU institutions 
and programs has had on two cities in the United Kingdom, Birmingham and 
Glasgow, and found that ―whereas many British urban authorities seem to operate to 
the hymn sheet prepared by central government, those drawing down funding from 
the EU display a more strategic approach, reflecting their higher degree of 
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Europeanization‖ (680).  At the same time, the Commission adapts its own 
organizational structure, institutionalizing a systematic dialogue with local 
governments because it is dependent on local government for the ground-level 
expertise required for developing sound policies which in turn generate political 
legitimacy.  Europeanization, therefore, seen in this case as a mutual and self-
reinforcing embrace between supranational and local actors, is the ―means by which 
multilevel governance is accomplished‖ (Kern and Bulkeley, 2009) and, we should 
add, expanded. 
This kind of mutual reorientation of the organizational logic of supranational 
and local government institutions characterized by a significant degree of 
interdependence demonstrative of a mature iterative relationship between these two 
levels of government, is quite weak in North America because the supranational 
institutions such as the IJC and CEC are quite underdeveloped and under-resourced, 
while potential avenues for meaningful collaboration and exchange between 
supranational and local governments which could expand the system of multilevel 
governance, such as NAFEC, have remained limited or have been eliminated 
altogether.  The condition at the supranational level reflects a similar institutional 
anemia at the local level.  Furthermore, there is also no formal platform connecting 
the IJC to the CEC, even though many of their policy spheres overlap.  Consequently, 
the expansion of multilevel governance in North America lacks the robust internal, 
self-reinforcing functional inertia which Europeanization provides the multilevel 
governance system within the European Union.  As a result, the system of multilevel 
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governance is not as expansive or entrenched in North America and nor are the 
transnational municipal networks themselves. 
 
 From Embedded Networks to Emboldened Networks: A Change of Tactic at the Five 
Year Anniversary 
 
The overarching goal of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative in 
its first five years of existence, 2003-2008, was to establish its presence at various 
decision-making tables across the basin.  During the Annual Board Meeting held in 
Trois-Rivieres in 2009, Mayor Heartwell declared that the organization succeeded in 
―imbedding ourselves in the system‖ (GLSLCI, Board of Directors Meeting 2009).  
Such a declaration represents a remarkable achievement for institutionalized 
environmental cooperation between local governments in the basin, especially when 
one considers the political impotence of the International Mayors Association, the 
precursor to the Cities Initiative.   
Furthermore, the success of the Cities Initiative represents a steep learning 
curve that the organization has had to undergo in such a short period of time.  A 
prominent environmentalist and former chair of the Great Lakes Basin Commission 
states that when the City of Chicago first began seriously considering transforming 
institutionalized local government cooperation around the basin, they hired her in 
2000-2001 as a consultant to help them understand Great Lakes water governance.  
This was before David Ullrich, former EPA senior official, was hired as the 
Executive Director and brain of the Cities Initiative.  Illustrating just how weak local 
government engagement in Great Lakes issues had been until that time, and 
demonstrative of the kind of naivety on the part of local government, the former 
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Chair of the Commission states that they wanted her to present to them a one-page 
matrix listing all the significant Great Lakes agencies and organizations including 
their history and political status as well as all the main issues.  She states, ―they had 
no idea how complicated [Great Lakes governance] was‖ (ex-Chair Great Lakes 
Basin Commission, interview October 1, 2009).  Needless to say, the sophistication, 
and hence the political standing, of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative 
has undergone a transformation since that time, as reflected in the degree to which it 
has embedded itself in the governance structures. 
The most significant example of this institutional imbedding was the signing 
of the Canada Ontario Agreement Memorandum of Cooperation (COA MOC) on July 
17, 2008 between the Ontario Government and the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Cities Initiative.  The MOC commits the Cities Initiative to facilitate a new process of 
collaboration between the mayors of Ontario‘s local governments and the signatories 
from the three provincial government ministries including the Ministry of the 
Environment (MOE), the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR), and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs (MAFRA) thereby establishing a new forum for 
provincial-municipal cooperation regarding the environmental management of the 
Great Lakes.   
This agreement is significant for bringing local governments closer to the 
COA process.  The COA is the primary mechanism by which the governments of 
Canada and Ontario manage water quality and quantity in the basin.  The COA 
establishes both the shape of the programs and the size of the budget dedicated to 
those programs.  Furthermore, COA is the primary agreement through which Canada 
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meets its bi-national obligations under the Canada-United States Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreement.  The timing of the memorandum of cooperation is also very 
significant.  Since 1971, the COA has been renegotiated seven times, and the current 
version is scheduled to expire in 2010.  Therefore, the signing of the COA MOC 
indicates that local governments will have, for the first time, through this new forum, 
a strategic voice in shaping the discussions within the most important 
intergovernmental institution on the Canadian side of the Great Lakes.  After signing 
the agreement, John Garretsen, the Ontario Minister of the Environment, announced 
that ―today we formally recognize the importance of engaging municipalities as key 
partners in sustaining the health and vitality of the Great Lakes‖ (GLSLCI, City of 
Toronto News Release, July 17, 2008).  The Minister of Natural Resources, Donna 
Cansfield, stated that the memorandum ―marks the beginning of an exciting new era 
of collaboration among municipal, provincial and federal governments‖ (GLSLCI, 
City of Toronto News Release, July 17, 2008), while Leona Dombrowsky, the 
Minister of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, stated that ―this agreement 
reinforces the collaborative approach of the Government of Ontario‖ (GLSLCI, City 
of Toronto News Release, July 17, 2008).   
The work of the Cities Initiative was central to attaining greater inclusion of 
municipal governments in the COA process, and it played a key role in facilitating the 
finalization process which led up to the signing of the COA MOC.  As early as 
February 16, 2007, in a letter to Carolyn O‘Neill, the Manager of the Great Lakes 
Office, Land and Water Policy Branch at the Ontario Ministry of the Environment, 
the Executive Director of the Cities Initiative, David Ullrich, called on the provincial 
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government to give the Cities Initiative a greater role in future renegotiations of the 
COA than the heretofore normal mechanisms which had been reserved for NGOs, 
business, academic institutions and cities.  In the letter Ullrich implied that these were 
inadequate mechanisms.  Rather, Ullrich argued that it was essential that the future 
renewals of the COA ―involve municipal governments as full partners‖ (GLSLCI, 
Ullrich letter to Carolyn O‘Neill).  The Cities Initiative played a key role in 
convincing the provincial government to expand the COA process to include local 
government.   
Furthermore, during the six-month run-up to the signing of the memorandum, 
the Cities Initiative helped organize a Great Lakes Municipal Working Group which 
organized and prioritized municipal issues into common positions.  The Municipal 
Working Group was made up of nine mayors from the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Cities Initiative, sixteen senior officials from municipal governments including chief 
administrative officers, managers of various departments including the environment, 
transportation, public utilities, and water infrastructure, three directors from the 
secretariat of the Cities Initiative and the senior policy advisor from the Association 
of Municipalities of Ontario.  On this last point, it is quite important that the 
Association of Municipalities of Ontario, the chief provincial association of 
municipal governments, supported the fact that the Cities Initiative was the key player 
in breaking new ground not only on behalf of the members of the Cities Initiative, but 
on all municipal governments in Ontario, in its relationship with the Province and, 
indirectly, the federal government.   
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While working together to prioritize its set of common positions, the members 
of the Municipal Working Group were simultaneously working within a Joint-
Municipal-Provincial Committee which included twelve senior officials from the 
MOE, MNR, and the MAFRA, as well as participants from the Ministry of Tourism, 
Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, and the Ministry of Economic 
Development, to identify areas of common interest and to produce recommendations 
that the province could potentially act upon both within and outside the parameters of 
the COA.  From this new collaborative process emerged a report produced by the 
nine mayors from the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative who participated 
in the Municipal Working Group entitled At the Shoreline: A Mayors’ Collaborative 
Action Plan to Protect the Great Lakes in May 2009, which presented a five-point 
plan directly to the cabinet ministers representing the MOE, the MNR, and the 
MAFRA. 
During the Annual Board Meeting of the Cities Initiative in Trois-Rivieres, 
while congratulating the members for embedding the network deeper into the 
governance structures through the COA MOC and the Regional Collaboration, a 
senior official of External Affairs for the City of Chicago stated that the network can 
―declare victory on getting seats, but now we must exercise those seats‖ (GLSLCI, 
Board of Directors Meeting 2009), thus signaling a subtle shift from a focus on 
embedding and empowering the network to a focus on effectively employing their 
new influence.   
A document handed out at the Board Meeting contained a section on the 
―Future Direction‖ of the Cities Initiative which stated there are two overarching 
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goals for the network in the next five year period, 2009-2014.  The first is to continue 
to better integrate environmental, social, and economic concerns in the policies and 
agendas of local government, in what has been termed by the members the Triple 
Bottom Line.  The second goal is to expand and deepen collaboration with higher 
tiers of government.   
Towards this second goal, on May 5, 2009, a month before the Annual Board 
Meeting, several members of the cities initiative presented the Ontario Ministers of 
the Environment, Natural Resources, and Agricultural, Food and Rural Affairs their 
report At the Shoreline which included a five-point action plan.  Building on the 
success of the COA memorandum of cooperation, the first and most important point 
called for the establishment of ―a new collaborative relationship among federal, 
provincial and municipal governments to reinvigorate and reorient Great Lakes 
protection‖ (GLSLCI, At the Shoreline, 2009, 5).  In light of the fact that no such 
intergovernmental forum exists for cooperation and collaboration between all levels 
of government on Great Lakes issues, the mayors of the Cities Initiative called for the 
establishment of a federal-provincial-municipal Great Lakes Table (GLSLCI, At the 
Shoreline, 2009, 5).  Towards that goal, the first ever tripartite meeting was held in 
October, 2009, thus fulfilling Prime Minister Paul Martin‘s vision of breaking 
through the old silos of traditional intergovernmental relations. 
The establishment of the COA memorandum of cooperation between 
provincial and municipal governments, combined with the fact that plans have been 
put forth for the establishment of a federal-provincial-municipal forum in the form of 
the Great Lakes Table, demonstrates that the Cities Initiative has been an active 
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catalyst not only for the expansion of the multilevel governance system around the 
Great Lakes but, more accurately, they have been an active catalyst for the expansion 
of their own policy capacity and role within an expanding multilevel governance 
system around the Great Lakes, thereby lending support yet again to Jeffery‘s (2000) 
argument that local governments are more than passive recipients of authority and 
resources bequeathed from on high.  As in Europe, the expansion of local government 
policy capacity ‗reflects and constitutes‘ (Kern and Bulkeley 2009, 311) the growth 
of multilevel governance around the Great Lakes basin.  
Having established the increased participation of local governments within the 
governance structures around the basin, in the next chapter we analyze whether and to 
what degree the increased participation of local governments within environmental 
policymaking around the Great Lakes translates into effective influence. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
 
TRANSNATIONAL MUNICIPAL NETWORKS AND THE EFFECTIVE 
DEPLOYMENT OF INFORMAL POWERS: OPPOSITION TO THE EXPANSION 
OF BRITISH PETROLEUM‘S (BP) WHITING REFINERY 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In chapter four we established that federal, and in particular provincial and 
state, governments cast long shadows over local government through their 
constitutional ability to define functional responsibilities, prohibit activity, reduce 
funding, or terminate its existence altogether at any time.  Further underscoring the 
vulnerability of local governments, Peters and Pierre (2004) state that, ―all actors 
have the option to resort to the constitutional definition of their institutional capability 
if and when it is believed to be necessary to safeguard important institutional 
interests‖ (89).  Certainly the higher tiers of government can resort to their 
constitutional powers to reign in local government at any point.  However, local 
governments lack recourse to such constitutional protection and are thus fully 
exposed to federal and sub-national prerogatives as the forced amalgamations under 
the Mike Harris Conservative government amply demonstrated in Ontario.  As a 
result, despite finding greater opportunities for action during the present period of 
collaborative intergovernmental relations, local governments must tailor their 
strategies to this context of having to operate permanently ―in the shadow of 
hierarchy‖ (Scharpf 1997).   
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Under these conditions of uncertainty, Peters and Pierre (2004) raise a 
fundamental question about the informal basis of multilevel governance in general 
and the informal basis for the expansion of local government policy capacity, which 
is, ―to what extent informality entails inequality‖? (87).  In other words, ―the absence 
of any clear and comprehensive rules for institutional exchange in multi-level 
governance raise[s] questions about its ability to cater to the interests of the weak 
actors to ensure that multi-level governance means something more than multi-level 
participation‖ (87).  It is one thing for local government to be invited to the decision-
making table, but the question remains whether local government can affect policy.  
Peters and Pierre were addressing their remarks to governance in the context 
of the European Union, where, as discussed in the previous chapter, weak non-central 
actors such as local governments at the very least have recourse to powerful 
supranational allies such as the European Commission, the European Parliament and 
the European Court of Justice, which provide resources, political legitimacy and 
political cover for local governments in their relations with more powerful tiers of 
domestic government.  In the Great Lakes, local governments are fully exposed, with 
few allies and none with substantial formal powers that could provide support when 
local government interests clash with those of national and sub-national governments.  
Therefore, one would expect local governments around the Great Lakes to 
avoid conflict especially in a situation where the interests of both American and 
Canadian national governments align with the interests of provinces and states, big 
oil, and public opinion.  In the rare instances that such conflicts did arise, one would 
not expect local government to have much influence in altering the trajectory of a 
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given policy to better reflect its own interests.  And yet, in such a difficult case, if it 
could be demonstrated that local governments decided to challenge these entrenched 
interests and actually succeeded in altering the trajectory of policy, such a series of 
events would go a long way to answering the Peters and Pierre dilemma by stating 
that the informality within multilevel governance networks does not necessarily entail 
a degree of inequality that leads to the ineffectuality of sub-central actors. 
The present chapter begins by describing the evolution of oil sands 
development into a principal political and economic interest of the federal, provincial 
and state governments of Canada and the United States, and the forging of those 
strong interests to the profit motive of the powerful multinational, but primarily 
American and Canadian, oil industry.  Of particular interest is the period of historical 
oil prices between 2007-08 when a looming tidal wave of political inertia evolved in 
favor of accelerated oil extraction and refinery expansion as a result of three 
confluent factors (i) political pressure from the federal level to establish secure 
sources of energy (ii) from the state, provincial, and local levels to expand the tax 
base and increase revenue from oil profits, a desire that was particularly evident in the 
so-called ‗rust-belt‘ region around the Great Lakes suffering a period characterized by 
precipitous economic decline (iii) and from the oil industry and business community 
seeking to maximize profits during a period of record oil prices.   
Intense and ubiquitous political and economic pressure was placed on 
upgrading all the components of the petro-infrastructure of North America (Israelson 
2008) to expedite the delivery and processing of Canadian heavy crude oil from the 
oil sands, which manifested itself in one of the largest build-ups of refinery capacity 
243  
around the Great Lakes, resulting in increased discharges of pollution into the lakes 
and atmosphere.  In essence, a mammoth ‗pollution delivery system‘ was being 
constructed connecting Western Canada to the Great Lakes with the explicit support 
of federal, state and provincial governments which remained largely indifferent to the 
environmental costs (Israelson 2008). 
Yet, despite this overwhelming inertia, significant opposition was mobilized 
in one instance—the case of British Petroleum‘s refinery expansion in Whiting, 
Indiana. Specifically, the opposition formed against Indiana‘s Department of 
Environmental Management (IDEM) and Indiana‘s Governor Mitch Daniels who 
supported and facilitated the granting of a pollution permit to British Petroleum that 
would allow the expanded refinery to increase the amount of pollution discharged 
into Lake Michigan in order to facilitate the processing of Canadian oil sands oil.  
The opposition faced a difficult task since Indiana‘s Department of Environmental 
Management already had the reputation of being a proponent of industry at the 
expense of environmental concerns, while the state itself was considered an 
environmental laggard.  In a report titled ―America‘s Greenest States‖, Forbes 
magazine ranked Indiana the second-worst state in terms of its environmental record 
based on air and water quality (Wingfield and Marcus 2007).  Furthermore, the 
resistance came from an unlikely source:  local governments, heretofore considered 
‗bit players‘ and nothing more than an ‗attentive public‘, captives of ‗big business‘ 
and creatures of the provinces and the states, spearheaded a campaign alongside other 
societal groups against British Petroleum on environmental grounds that delayed the 
expansion of the refinery and thus simultaneously defied the large-scale plans of 
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government and industry backed by massive investments of financial and political 
capital.   
The resistance was also significant because it was waged at a time when the 
United States was experiencing record gasoline prices which sparked a national 
outcry for increased refinery capacity to increase supply and lower cost.  Local 
government was not only pitting itself against the powerful higher tiers of 
government and industry, but was moving against the current of national public 
opinion.  Gasoline prices were highest in the Midwest.  The City of Chicago, the 
founding member of the Cities Initiative, which spearheaded the protests against the 
British Petroleum expansion, had the highest gasoline prices in the country.  The 
political climate for any action that would delay the expansion could not be worse. 
Yet, local governments entered the fray, a significant phenomenon on its own, 
and their success in altering the policy process and the policy results went 
significantly beyond delaying the expansion.  The campaign forced British Petroleum 
to voluntarily commit to reducing the amount of pollution it emits, expanded the 
policy process to include a greater array of actors by establishing an epistemic 
community around the issue and, most importantly, the opposition provoked the State 
of Indiana to undertake a comprehensive two-year review of its regulatory process, in 
particular its anti-degradation rules, with the explicit purpose of making it more open, 
transparent, and accountable.  Thus, the Cities Initiative played an important role in 
determining the balance of the economic-environmental nexus. 
Using a ‗within case analysis‘, this chapter analyzes the dispute between the 
proponents and opponents surrounding the expansion of the British Petroleum 
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refinery in Whiting, Indiana, and specifically the developments before and after the 
State of Indiana‘s decision to grant British Petroleum its new pollution permit, a 
decision which set the stage for the expansion, the opposition, and the regulatory 
review.  Consequently, the case study is presented as a local ‗decision event‘ 
ensconced in a regional, national, and international context with ramifications across 
multiple levels of government and also across different policy issues.  Hence, the 
British Petroleum case represents an excellent example of multilevel governance in 
its broadest and truest application.    
Thus far, most studies of multilevel governance, and the role of cities within 
it, analyze the behavior of actors in one policy field—usually cohesion policy (John 
2000; Schultze 2003; Goldsmith 2003; Marhsall 2005), though also urban and 
environmental policy—in isolation from the rest, whereas this case study focusing on 
the environmental ramifications of the expansion of domestic petroleum capacity 
analyzes the behavior and efficacy of local governments that find themselves at the 
nexus, or crossroads, of foreign, energy, and environmental policy, thus drawing in 
and tying together more actors across borders and across continents, and more 
interests, which reinforces and magnifies the decisions taken.  In such a manner, the 
degree to which the global concerns of national governments and the regional 
concerns of state and provincial governments are interwoven with local concerns of 
local government is fully demonstrated, and the terms multilevel governance and 
‗glocalization‘ more fully appreciated. 
In this multilevel context, although the constitutional vulnerability of cities 
motivates them to become bridge builders, seeking cooperation and avoiding 
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confrontation and thus becoming catalysts for deeper integration of the entire 
environmental management network, local governments sometimes utilize the 
―weapons of the weak‖ (Cram 1, 2007) such as lobbying, dissemination of 
information, referencing values, and public shaming to achieve their environmental 
aims and to affect environmental policymaking around the Great Lakes.  Success is 
defined in terms of improving the democratic legitimacy of the policy process and in 
attaining a better balance between economic and environmental interests in the final 
policy result.  Although paying attention to the effects the opposition had on the 
policy result in this one instance, namely, the effluent reductions voluntarily 
undertaken by British Petroleum, the greatest interest and analysis is reserved for the 
changes the opposition precipitated in the decision-making process and in long-term 
environmental governance of the basin in general.  The focus will be on the 
democratic legitimacy of the decision-making process of the State of Indiana‘s permit 
process. 
The decision-making process will be evaluated using five criteria set out by 
Bukowski (2004) in her analysis of the democratic legitimacy of decision-making 
within multi-level networks.  Bukowski was responding to research by Peterson and 
O‘Toole (2001) who found that decision-making within network governance suffers 
from negative tendencies including ambiguity, a lack of transparency and 
accountability, as well as a lack of leadership and drift.  Bukowski analyzed the 
performance of sub-central governments and non-state actors within such a network 
and whether their mobilization could improve the democratic legitimacy of the 
process.  Bukowski conducted a process-tracing analysis of the construction of 
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Portugal‘s Vasco da Gama Bridge in Lisbon which, similarly to the British Petroleum 
case, pitted proponents of economic and environmental interests against each other in 
a decision-making process that relied on both formal and informal relationships and 
exchanges.  The five criteria used by Bukowski (2004) to evaluate the democratic 
legitimacy of the decision-making process are (278):  
Criteria 1: Transparency and Accountability in Policy Processes and Result 
 Criteria 2: Access 
 Criteria 3: Responsiveness 
 Criteria 4: Authoritativeness 
 Criteria 5: Representativeness and Consensus-Building Capacity 
Using a cross-case comparison method and applying these five criteria to the British 
Petroleum case,  it will be possible to determine and compare the democratic 
legitimacy of the decision-making process before and after the mobilization of 
opposition by local governments around the Great Lakes basin as well as the Great 
Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative.   
This comparative analysis produces two important findings.  First, as with the 
Vasco da Gama Bridge, part of the success of local government in the British 
Petroleum case stems from the fact that the opposition gained legitimacy and thus 
power by using the extant regulatory framework—in this case the anti-degradation 
provisions in the Clean Water Act—to frame their opposition, thus reinforcing the 
argument by Peters and Pierre (2004) that, ―multilevel governance embedded in a 
regulatory setting that enables weaker actors to define a legal basis for their action 
might be the best strategy to escape the Faustian bargain and to cheat darker powers‖ 
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(89) that are inherent in network governance.  Second, the European environmental 
groups provoked a more robust response and won farther reaching concessions from 
the Portuguese government and industry than the local governments and North 
American environmental groups achieved from the State of Indiana and the refinery 
in the British Petroleum case because the former had access to, and took advantage 
of, the political resources available at the supranational level in order to pressure their 
own domestic actors into striking a more equitable balance between economic and 
environmental concerns in the final policy result and in improving the democratic 
legitimacy of the process.  Nonetheless, despite important differences, both cases 
demonstrated that the mobilization of local governments and environmental groups 
was effective, improved the quality of environmental governance, and therefore 
proved that multilevel governance means something more than multilevel 
participation.   
These improvements in the accountability of the governance structures of our 
water systems are significant considering the continued deterioration of the regulatory 
system as described in the New York Times article, ―Toxic Waters‖ which we 
discussed in the Introduction to this dissertation, detailing the failure of the EPA to 
protect water quality from polluting industries.  The significance of local government 
mobilization effectively as oversight agents is a critical development especially in the 
light of Minnesota Congressman James Oberstar‘s observation that ―the EPA and 
states have completely dropped the ball.  Without oversight and enforcement, 
companies will use our lakes and rivers as dumping grounds—and that‘s exactly what 
is apparently going on‖ (Duhigg, 4).  The British Petroleum case further illustrates the 
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negative consequences of the decentralization of North American water policy, and 
the retrenchment of both federal and state governments from water management.  To 
repeat, as former EPA administer William Reilly states, ―unless the EPA is pushing 
state regulators, a culture of transgression and apathy sets in‖ (Duhigg, 8), while 
Matthew Crum, an employee of West Virginia‘s Department of Environmental 
Protection, observes, ―if you don‘t have vigorous oversight by the feds, then 
everything just goes limp‖ (Duhigg, 8).  In such a context, the mobilization of local 
government as oversight agents, as catalysts for the improvement of accountability 
structures within the water governance system, takes on a new imperative, even if that 
role is still rather limited at this point. 
 
The Need for New Oil 
According to the International Energy Agency‘s World Energy Outlook 2004, 
in less than a decade the world will enter a period of ‗peak oil‘ where a yawning gap 
will exist between the world‘s increasing demand for oil and the dwindling 
discoveries of fresh resources.  The world depends on oil for 40 per cent of its energy 
supply.  Some individual sectors such as transport depend on oil for 95 per cent of its 
energy needs (International Energy Agency 2004).  That gap is growing as global oil 
consumption increases by almost two per cent per annum, fueled in large part by the 
rapid industrialization of China and the pace of globalization that relies on the 
transportation of goods across vast distances.  In fact, it is estimated that the transport 
sector will account for over half of all oil consumption by 2030, compared to just a 
third in 1971 (International Energy Agency, 2004).  This trend is driven largely by 
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economic integration programs such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the European Union (EU), which have precipitated exponential growth 
in the trucking and shipping industry.   
At the same time, while the demand for oil consumption continues to increase, 
discoveries of new oil have dwindled.  New discoveries in the Middle East, a region 
which accounts for 58 per cent of world oil reserves (Energy Information 
Administration, 2006), are drying up, decreasing from a peak of 187 billion barrels 
uncovered between 1963-1972 to just 16 billion between 1982-2002 (International 
Energy Agency, 2004). 
North American concern over the dwindling oil reserves in the Middle East is 
exacerbated by deep concerns over the security and reliability of the delivery chain.  
This stems from continued regional political instability in the Middle East and Africa 
and the potential threat of blackmail from major suppliers such as Russia and 
Venezuela.   That concern is especially pronounced in the United States which is the 
world‘s largest net importer of oil at 21 million barrels a day.  Unlike neighbors 
Mexico and Canada which are self-sufficient and net exporters of petroleum, the 
United States depends on oil imports to satisfy 65 per cent of its total consumption 
which accounts for a quarter of the world‘s oil supply.  According to the National 
Energy Policy (2001), it is estimated that by 2020 United States oil consumption will 
increase by a third, which will require the country to import two out of every three 
barrels of oil consumed (National Energy Policy Development Group, 2001, x). 
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The Development of Canadian Oil as an American Political Imperative 
The National Energy Policy (NEP) submitted to President Bush on May 16, 
2001 recommended that the administration make energy security a national priority in 
its foreign and trade policy.  It added a sense of urgency to the debate by stating that 
―America in the year 2001 faces the most serious energy shortage since the oil 
embargos of the 1970s‖ (National Energy Policy Development Group 2001, viii) and 
underlined the political imperative ―to add supply‖ (xiii).  Responding to this clarion 
call, Congress passed the so-called Clean Energy Act on August 8, 2005, with the 
objective ―to create jobs for our future with secure, affordable, and reliable energy‖ 
(Energy Policy Act 2005, preamble).  For the most part, the Energy Act implemented 
the NEP‘s recommendations to stimulate domestic energy production by providing an 
$85 billion subsidy to various sectors of the energy industry, with the largest tax-
breaks reserved for fossil-fuels and nuclear power. 
However, the National Energy Policy also recognized the limited potential of 
increasing domestic oil supply, and therefore initiated the start of a process of 
significant policy reorientation that would place America‘s near abroad at the center 
of United States energy security, for example, by stressing to the administration its 
need to explore opportunities for closer cooperation with Canada and Mexico on 
energy policy.  As a first step, the national policy report recommended that the 
administration embrace the North American Energy Working Group (NAEWG) 
which was established by the energy ministers of the United States, Canada and 
Mexico just a month prior to the release of the NEP.  The NAEWG was established 
as a vehicle for trilateral consultations on energy policy.   
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Shortly thereafter the United States began to move much more aggressively, 
and in April, 2003, the American ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci, laid out his 
country‘s plans by declaring forthright that ―part of what the president‘s national 
policy is about is a complete integration of the North American energy market‖ 
(quoted in Dobbin 2003, 158).  In March 2005, as the Energy Policy Act was moving 
through Congress, President Bush signed the Security and Prosperity Partnership 
(SPP) of North America with Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin and Mexican 
President Vincente Fox.  The partnership institutionalized continental collaboration 
on economic and security matters and emphasized the need for the establishment of a 
self-sufficient energy policy, meaning, the need to coordinate and facilitate the 
development and production of oil primarily in Canada for delivery to the United 
States.  Congress followed the administration‘s lead by establishing a Commission on 
North American Energy Freedom to study continental energy policy and submit 
recommendations for making North America energy self-sufficient by 2025.   
The reorientation towards an integrated hemispheric energy policy culminated 
in President Bush‘s 2006 State of the Union Address, in which he framed America‘s 
addiction to oil and its reliance on unstable countries for its supply as a matter of 
national security.  He signaled a dramatic reorientation of American energy policy by 
promising to replace three-quarters of America‘s oil imports from the Middle-East by 
2025 and pledging to ―make our dependence on Middle Eastern oil a thing of the 
past‖ (Bush 2006).  This change of United States energy policy was premised to some 
degree on increased domestic production, conservation measures, and investments in 
sustainable energy technology.  For instance, in the address, President Bush 
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announced the start of the Advanced Energy Initiative which introduced a 22 per cent 
increase in clean-energy research at the Department of Energy.  Nonetheless, the 
unstated but essential component of America‘s reorientation strategy towards 
hemispheric self reliance was Canada and its oil.  Paul Michael Wihbey, a 
Washington-based lobbyist analyzing the geostrategic implications of oil policy, was 
quoted as saying, ―although he [Bush] did not mention Canada, that is in fact where 
the replacement supply will come from‖ (CBC, January 18, 2007; Israelson 2008). 
Specifically, the administration was interested in an area the size of Florida 
located in the northeast corner of the Canadian province of Alberta along the 
Athabasca River.  It is the location of the Athabasca Oil Sands and the site of North 
America‘s most important energy resource.  Estimated at 174 billion recoverable 
barrels of oil—and 2.5 trillion discoverable barrels—the sands are capable of 
satisfying the world‘s demand for oil for the next one-hundred years (National Energy 
Board 2004).  The harvest of this resource ranks Canada second only to Saudi Arabia 
in terms of the world‘s known oil reserves with approximately fourteen per cent of 
global supply.   
The United States itself has been interested in domestic oil sands since the 
1930s and had undertaken numerous pilot projects and studies of the major oil sand 
fields in Alaska, California, Kentucky, Utah, and Texas which contain 11 billion 
barrels of recoverable oil (Task Force on Strategic Unconventional Fuels 2006, 8).  
These studies have largely concluded that the rough terrain, small and scattered 
deposits, and the lack of natural resources necessary for their recovery has made the 
development of U.S. oil sands economically infeasible (Congressional Research 
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Service 2008, 6-7).  For this reason, and the widely acknowledged fact that the United 
States is behind Canada in developing the infrastructure and technological capacity to 
begin efficiently extracting its own oil sands, the short-to-medium term strategy 
remains the development of Canadian heavy crude oil from Alberta. 
Despite the technical obstacles of harvesting domestic oil sands, the 
reorientation of America‘s energy policy towards greater reliance on an integrated 
North American energy supply is based on a total reconsideration of the utility of oil 
sands in general—both foreign and domestic.  For instance, the National Energy 
Policy early on described oil sands as a potential ‗pillar‘ of North American energy 
(National Energy Policy Development Group 2001, 8.8).  In the Energy Policy Act, 
Congress identified oil sands and other nonconventional fuels as ―strategically 
important domestic resources that should be developed to reduce the growing 
dependence of the United States on politically and economically unstable sources of 
foreign oil imports‖ (Energy Policy Act 2005 sec. 369).   
However, the reorientation towards a hemispheric energy system depended 
primarily on an identification of Canada—with 90 per cent of the world‘s oil sands—
and not the United States as the major supplier.  For example, while extolling the 
virtues of oil sands in general, Congress established a Task Force to initiate a 
partnership with the Province of Alberta in the production and development of 
Canadian Oil Sands (Energy Policy Act 2005, sec. 369).  At the same time, one of the 
first acts undertaken by the newly created trilateral Security and Prosperity 
Partnership (SPP) was the formation of the Oil Sands Expert Group, composed of 
representatives of American and Canadian federal and sub-national governments as 
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well as oil industry leaders.  The Group met at a two-day summit in Houston, Texas, 
organized by Natural Resources Canada and the U.S. Department of Energy in 
January 2006 and filed a report underscoring not only that oil sands will be a 
―significant contributor to energy supply and security for the continent‖ (Oil Sands 
Experts Group, 2006, 1), but that the United States expects a ―five-fold expansion‖ of oil 
sands production and a concomitant increase in Canadian exports to the United States 
(CBC January 18, 2007). 
 
Canada Responds: a Willing and Eager Partner 
The United States federal government enjoys unqualified support from their 
Canadian counterpart in large part because the development of the oil sands is a critical 
driver of the Canadian economy.  A study by the Canadian Energy Research Institute 
(CERI) found that Canada‘s economy stands to gain $885 billion from oil sands 
development over a twenty-year period ending in 2020 (quoted in Canadian Association 
of Petroleum Producers, 2008b).  According to the Canadian Association of Petroleum 
Producers (CAPP), the total government revenue forecast from taxes and royalties 
amounts to $123 billion with the Canadian federal government receiving the largest share 
at 41 per cent (CAPP 2008b).  It is also worth considering that the development of the oil 
sands is motivated in part by fresh memories of the 1980s, when Canada was a net 
importer of crude oil, relying on imports to satisfy as much as 25 per cent of domestic 
consumption (Finlayson and Haglund 1984, 282).  The development of the oil sands is 
therefore also a guarantee against Canada‘s return to dependence on foreign oil. 
However, the Canadian government‘s enthusiastic support of investment in oil 
sands development stems less from calculations of its own fiscal benefits than from a 
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desire to placate two of the most powerful provinces in the federation which happen to 
have the greatest stakes in the oil sands.  The CERI report indicates that Alberta stands to 
gain the largest share of total oil sands investment with 44 per cent, while Ontario is 
second at an estimated 16 per cent (CAPP 2008b).  The lion‘s share of the anticipated 6.6 
million person years of employment generated from the oil sands and spinoff industries 
are expected to accrue in these two provinces—Ontario and Alberta. 
Although Ontario has historically been the economic and political center of 
Canada, and the electoral kingmaker accounting for the largest proportion of seats in 
parliament, it is the Alberta government which dictates Canada‘s energy policy and the 
development of the oil sands.  Regardless of the political party in power, the federal 
government has for decades taken at minimum a ‗hands off‘ approach to energy policy.  
The deference shown primarily to Alberta has its roots in the politically disastrous 
National Energy Program (NEP) established in 1980 and the severe provincial pushback 
that led to its gradual dismantling shortly thereafter until its complete elimination by 
1986.   
In the wake of the energy crisis during the 1970s, then Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau and his Liberal Party enacted the NEP as a means to make Canada energy self-
sufficient and protect the industrial heartland in eastern Canada from record oil prices by 
a near-nationalization of the oil industry in Alberta.  The federal government increased its 
stake in the oil industry three-fold, imposed higher taxes and royalties per wellhead, and 
ordered the National Energy Board (NEB) not only to redistribute revenue from the oil 
industry across Canada, but artificially set the price of Canadian oil well below world 
prices which prevented the Province of Alberta from capitalizing on those record oil 
prices.  As a result of this program, it is estimated that the Province of Alberta lost 
between $50 billion and $100 billion in revenue.   
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Popular anger towards the federal government for federal intrusion into 
provincial jurisdiction led to the ouster of the Liberal Party in 1984 and the election of 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney whose Progressive Conservative Party campaigned 
against the NEP.   That resentment still permeates relations between Alberta, the federal 
government and the rest of Canada in general. That tension also plays a significant role in 
electoral politics with whatever political party in power anxious to avoid being perceived 
as meddling in the province‘s oil driven economy in order to avoid stoking that 
resentment and sharing the same electoral fate as the Liberal Party in 1984.   
More than just deference, however, the federal government has been subsidizing 
the development of the oil sands since 1996 under the ―accelerated capital cost 
allowance‖ program which has provided generous tax breaks to the oil sands industry and 
indirectly curried favor with the province.  Pandering to Alberta‘s economic interests has 
been even more pronounced since 2006 with the election of a Conservative Party 
government which draws the bulk of its political support from Alberta.  In the 2006 
election, the Conservative Party won all 28 seats in the province.  In the last federal 
election in 2008, the party won all but one. 
Finally, Canada was also eager to facilitate American involvement and 
investment in the oil sands in part because it had learned a hard lesson about the impact 
of Canada‘s energy policies on Canada-United States relations from the fallout of the 
National Energy Program.  Under the NEP, the federal government undertook a program 
to ‗canadianize‘ (Finlayson and Haglund 1984, 271) the oil and gas industry.  By 1980, 
American firms controlled almost half of the oil and gas industry and growing (Finlayson 
and Haglund, 273) while the Canadian government wanted to ensure that at least 50 per 
cent of the energy sector would be owned by Canadian companies by the end of the 
decade.  The government set about accomplishing this goal by purchasing small 
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American firms already in operation and discriminating against foreign multinational 
companies by offering more generous tax breaks, subsidies, exploration and mining 
grants to Canadian companies.  The government also imposed a retroactive 25 per cent 
stake in all fossil fuels discovered on federally owned lands.   
The American response was swift and harsh.  In addition to filing grievances with 
multilateral forums such as the OECD and GATT, the U.S. Congress introduced and 
passed bills which placed limits on Canadian investments and the raising of capital in the 
United States, placing moratoriums on foreign purchases of American companies that 
held mineral rights on federal land, and categorizing Canada as a ‗non-reciprocal‘ 
country.  The NEP poisoned other areas of bilateral policy, including ongoing 
negotiations on acid rain and fisheries, where the Americans became non-cooperative.  
As Finlayson and Haglund argue, 
It is no exaggeration to state that this one issue soured relations 
between the two countries to a degree not experienced in a decade, 
when the Nixon administration's August 1971 imposition of across-
the-board surcharges on all imports into the United States signaled to 
many in Canada that the "special relationship" they believed their 
country enjoyed with the United States was no more (Finlayson and 
Haglund 1984, 271). 
 
In essence, Canada‘s present policy of facilitating American investment in the oil sands is 
motivated not only by Alberta‘s economic interests, but to a large degree by the desire on 
the part of the federal government to protect and strengthen the most important thread 
binding Canada-United States bilateral relations—oil production and trade. 
 
 
Oil Sands, Big Business, and the Economic Imperative 
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The oil sands (also called tar sands) are composed of three-quarters inorganic 
matter and fifteen per cent silt, clay and water.  What government and oil companies 
covet is the remaining ten per cent called bitumen.  Bitumen is a thick, black, viscous, 
tar-like substance, and is the dirtiest form of petroleum, often referred to as heavy 
crude oil.  Bitumen is classified as a nonconventional oil because of its heavy 
composition, containing higher concentrations of metals and impurities, and because 
of the intensive energy input required for its development which differentiates it from 
conventional oil.  First, unlike conventional oil mined from wells, bitumen is found 
underground in a solid or semi-solid state requiring an injection of vast amounts of 
heat and water before it can be drawn from the ground as a liquid.  Second, unlike 
conventional well-oil, the extracted bitumen-slurry must then undergo an extra step 
called ―upgrading‖ in special facilities that convert the heavy bitumen into a higher 
quality state resembling conventional light crude oil by removing carbon (through a 
process called coking) and adding hydrogen (a process called hydro-processing).  
Upgrading allows the bitumen to be transported via pipeline to refineries for its final 
conversion into petroleum products.   
The complicated process of extracting and converting oil sands into fuel is a 
capital and resource intensive process.  Compared to the cost of producing 
conventional oil—which fluctuates between $1 and $6 depending on the country of 
origin—the cost of bringing a barrel of oil derived from bitumen to market ranges 
between $36 and $40 (National Energy Board 2006, xi).  Since the pace of 
development of the oil sands is driven in large part by market forces and specifically 
the price of oil, the development of oil sands only became cost effective when the 
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price of oil began its dramatic ascent a few months after the September 11, 2001 
attacks on New York.  The development of the oil sands grew at its fastest pace 
between 2004 and 2008 when the price of a barrel of oil broke the $30 mark for 60 
consecutive months and reached a peak of $126.33 in June, 2008.  During this period, 
described as the greatest oil rush in modern history, enormous inertia was generated 
and sustained by the fusing of political and strategic imperatives of the North 
American federal governments to the profit motive of the oil industry and the wider 
business community.   
According to the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), the 
industry invested approximately $30 billion (CDN) in the oil sands in 2007 alone, 
which represents a ten-fold increase over the last ten years with no indication of 
abating (CAPP 2009, table 4.1b).  American companies such as Sunoco, Chevron, 
Exxon/Mobil, ConocoPhilips have already invested $100 billion in the sands.  These 
companies are planning to invest an additional $100 billion to increase production 
from the current 1.3 million barrels a day (b/d) to 3.5 million b/d by 2011 (Vidal 
2008).  Massive investment is not just limited to the oil industry or American and 
Canadian business interests.  Between 2004 and 2007, there were over 151 financial 
institutions from at least 18 countries financing the development of the oil sands 
including giants Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Societe Generale, Deutsche Bank, BNP 
Paribas, and Barclays (Marriott, Stockman and Kronick 2008, 15).  With such 
massive investment, it is little wonder Time Magazine described the activity along the 
Athabasca River as ―the site of some of the greatest engineering feats of mankind, 
comparable to the pyramids of Giza and the Great Wall of China‖ (Heinrich 2008). 
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The Oil Sands and the Great Lakes: an Intimate Relationship 
The massive political and financial investment in the oil sands could not 
proceed efficiently without concomitant investment in the expansion of refinery 
capacity to process the anticipated five-fold expansion of heavy Western Canadian 
crude oil.  All stages of oil sands production—extraction, pipeline, refinery—are 
interdependent and must expand in lock-step to ensure the efficient movement of oil 
from ground to market, thus the same pressure put on oil sands extraction by 
government and industry is applied to pipelines and refineries to expedite production.  
Presently, Canadian refineries are operating at 90 per cent capacity (National 
Energy Board 2006, 19), which would create a massive potential bottleneck if not for 
Canada‘s reliance on American refinery capacity and markets.  A Congressional 
Service Report (2008) states that three-quarters of all nonconventional oil produced in 
Canada and exported abroad is piped into American refineries situated in the 
Petroleum Administration for Defense District II (PADD II)
5
 which comprises states 
located in the Midwest including the Great Lakes states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Ohio, Wisconsin as well as North and South Dakota, Kansas, Iowa, 
Kentucky, Oklahoma and Tennessee.  It is the largest American market for western 
Canadian crude oil.  The region processed 1.1 million b/d of Canadian crude oil and 
is expected to increase that production by 120 per cent by 2015 (CAPP 2008, 9).  It 
has been estimated that 70 per cent of all refining capacity in PADD II will be 
dedicated to refining western Canadian heavy crude oil by this date.  Three-quarters 
of PADD II refining capacity takes place within states situated along the Great 
                                                 
5
  PADDs were created in the Second World War to coordinate fuel allocation in the U.S.  These 
districts are now used only as statistical tools to track national fuel allocation. 
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Lakes—otherwise known as sub-districts Northern and Eastern PADD II—with the 
largest refining capacity in the United States concentrated in two states: Illinois and 
Indiana.  In essence, the Alberta oil sands and the Midwest refineries around the 
Great Lakes basin are locked into a tight relationship, underscoring again the kinds of 
cross-continental interdependencies which confound jurisdictional boundaries. 
The National Energy Board states that the United States possesses ―the 
greatest potential for increased penetration of oil sands derived crude‖ (2006, 21), 
while the Oil Sands Expert Group states that in order for that potential to be realized 
―producers and refiners need to ensure that refinery capacity is available‖ (4) meaning 
―new build will be required‖ (4).  A significant proportion of that refining capacity 
will be located around the Great Lakes.  Refining of oil sands in Northern and Eastern 
PADD II is expected to increase from 637,000 b/d in 2007 to 1.725 million b/d in 
2015, representing nearly a three-fold increase.   
There are several reasons for concentrating and expanding refining capacity 
around the Great Lakes.  First, the Great Lakes are uniquely suited to meet the 
processing requirements of the oil sands.  Separating the bitumen from the sands 
(extraction) and to prepare the bitumen for refining (upgrading) requires enormous 
inputs of heat and especially vast amounts of water.  One barrel (159 liters) of oil 
sands requires four barrels of water to deliver the bitumen from ground to market.  
Four barrels of water are required just to upgrade five barrels of bitumen.  For 
example, to sustain current oil sands development in Alberta, the oil sands industry 
annually draws 150 million cubic meters of water from the Athabasca River although 
it is permitted to draw roughly twice that amount—enough to sustain a city of two 
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million people like Toronto or Chicago (Congressional Research Service 2008, 21).    
Approximately 90 per cent of that water is not returned to the river due to 
contamination but instead it is stored as wastewater in large tailing pools.  To 
understand the scale of water withdrawal, the tailing pond at one refining facility 
belonging to the Syncrude company, for example, now holds 540 million cubic 
meters of wastewater, which makes it one of the largest dams in the world, second 
only to China‘s Three Gorges Dam.  The Great Lakes, as the largest surface 
freshwater system in the world, containing 95 per cent of the U.S. surface freshwater 
and representing some 6,500 cubic miles of total fresh water capacity, provide a vast 
and cheap supply of water for the processing of tar sands oil and a convenient sink for 
the dilution and disposal of waste product that minimizes the need for expensive 
tailings ponds. 
Second, the upgrading and refining of oil sands requires a large input of 
energy, as the bitumen must be boiled in temperatures around 500 degrees Celsius.  
The Great Lakes states have the energy infrastructure in place.  For example, Illinois, 
where much of the refining capacity is located, is also the fifth largest coal power 
generator in the United States, and accepted more proposals for adding new plants 
than any other state in the country under the Blagojevich administration.  The Great 
Lakes states also possess the largest concentration of nuclear power plants in the 
United States.  Illinois, for example, has the most nuclear reactors in the United States 
with eleven.  The nuclear option is strategically important for refineries and offers 
flexibility.  Nuclear power does not generate greenhouse gas (GHG) while the use of 
coal for upgrading and refining bitumen produces 50 per cent more GHG than 
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processing conventional oil.  Consequently, the use of coal fired power plants to fuel 
oil refineries runs counter to the national policy to lower emissions.  In July 2008, the 
G8 countries, including the United States and Canada, announced that they would cut 
global CO2 emissions by 50 per cent. 
Although no new nuclear reactors have been built in the United States since 
1973, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has since 2007 received applications to 
build 34 new plants, one of which is being constructed in the middle of the Great 
Lakes region in Detroit, Michigan.  States like Ohio are considering the nuclear 
option, while legislatures in states that have moratoriums on new nuclear reactors 
such as Minnesota, Wisconsin and Illinois are reconsidering those bans.  The Energy 
Policy Act (2005)—which provided subsidies and tax breaks to the energy industry—
has fueled much of the expansion in both coal and nuclear capacity.   
Third, the strategy of concentrating refinery capacity around the Great Lakes 
creates economies of scale for the oil industry that lower operational costs.  
Describing this relationship, Leslie Cookenboo (1979) writes that, ―the 
refineries…would have to be closely consolidated geographically in order that the 
economies of scale of large trunk [pipe]lines might not be offset by many expensive 
small lines branching out to individual plants‖ (55).  The expansion in refinery 
capacity around the Great Lakes has created incentives for the construction of two 
large trunk lines connecting Alberta to the Midwest which are currently under 
construction.  TransCanada Pipelines, a Canadian company, is building its Keystone 
pipeline which will transport 590,000 b/d from Alberta to Wood River, Illinois.  
Another Canadian company, Enbridge Inc., has begun construction of its Alberta 
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Clipper pipeline that will transport tar sand oil from Alberta to Superior, Wisconsin at 
a rate of 800,000 barrels per day.   
The interdependence of the various components of the delivery chain is 
further underlined by the company‘s statement that, ―with supply from Western 
Canada oil sands developments expected to grow by as much as 1.8 million barrels 
per day by 2015, the industry has asked for more capacity out of the oil sands and into 
the U.S. Midwest markets.  The request is driven by oil sands producers and refiners 
that have long development timelines and need assurance that adequate pipeline 
infrastructure will be put in place in time to serve their projects‖ (Enbridge 2009).  
The U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS) states that close to $32 billion has 
already been invested in the expansion of oil sand pipelines.  According to the CAPP, 
there are 36 pipeline plans or actual expansions underway (CAPP 2008).  Most of 
these pipelines will deliver heavy crude oil from the Canadian oil sands to the 
Midwest. 
Fourth, by locating the refineries in the Great Lakes states, the United States 
takes advantage of Alberta‘s generous royalty system.  American companies pay 1 
per cent of the gross value of the bitumen they mine until all capital costs are 
recovered, after which they again pay either 1 per cent of the gross value of the 
bitumen or 25 per cent of net profit—whichever is larger.  Downstream processing of 
the excavated bitumen does not fall within the royalty system, which means that the 
value added to the bitumen in U.S. upgraders and refineries—which accounts for 
most of the bitumen‘s value—is not subject to Canadian royalties.  Furthermore, by 
locating upgrading and refining capacity outside Alberta, the American companies 
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evade provincial corporate taxes and instead pay corporate taxes to the state in which 
their refineries operate.  In this manner, both oil and wealth are transferred to the 
United States, a politically questionable practice which has gone on for decades.  As 
former Canadian energy ministry Marc Lalonde discussed in 1981, 
In spite of all the rhetoric about how much we needed the multinationals and 
about how they were doing such great things for Canada, all the money that 
they were spending in this country had been raised inside Canada, out of the 
Canadian taxpayers and the Canadian consumers, and ... since 1974 the 
industry had been a net exporter to the tune of about $3.7 billion (quoted in 
Finlayson and Haglund, 281). 
 
The one difference, of course, is that the amount of wealth transferred has increased 
substantially.   
What has remained the same, is that by locating heavy crude oil refineries 
around the Great Lakes, the United States not only secures most of the profits on the 
development of oil sands for itself, but it also shares the environmental costs with 
Canada.  In the 1980s it was evident that refineries and coal plants in American 
Midwest were responsible for a significant amount of acid rain and air pollution 
entering Ontario.  Today, it is well established that almost half of all airborne 
pollution in Ontario comes from the United States from coal fired power plants and 
refineries located downwind.  Furthermore, the Great Lakes are a shared resource and 
while the profits remain on the American side of the border, the effluent discharged 
into the waters is shared. 
A further critical consideration in the wake of the devastation wrought by 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, locating refinery capacity around the Great Lakes shields 
the American energy supply from disruptions caused by natural disasters such as 
hurricanes in the Gulf Coast.  For example, the inability to deliver crude oil from the 
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Gulf Coast in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina forced two of the largest refineries 
in Illinois to temporarily shut down and halt petroleum production. 
Finally, the Great Lakes region provides a convenient market of 40 million 
consumers for expanded refinery production, and a large industrial base with growing 
demands for petroleum.  The combined Canadian and American populations of the 
Great Lakes region constitute 36 per cent of the population of both countries (Austin 
et. al., 2008, 7).  The region also contains 44 per cent of the combined manufacturing 
jobs in both countries, and can be considered as the second largest economic unit on 
earth in terms of wealth generation (Austin et al., 2008, 7). 
 
Refinery Expansion around the Great Lakes: Costs and Benefits 
As Alberta was undergoing its oil rush from 2004-2008, the Great Lakes 
began undergoing a simultaneous expansion of refinery capacity as major oil 
companies competed in a kind of arms race for the privilege of processing Canadian 
heavy crude oil.  Seventeen refinery expansions around the Great Lakes are now 
either in the planning, approval, or construction stages.  The major expansions 
include three refineries in Illinois, one in Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, 
Wisconsin including one in Ontario (Israelson 2008, 6).  See Table 3. 
Just as the scale of this latest round of refinery expansions is unprecedented 
around the Great Lakes, so too are the environmental costs.  A report entitled ―How 
the Oil Sands Got to the Great Lakes Basin‖ published by the Program on Water 
Issues at the Munk Center for International Studies at the University of Toronto 
(2008) argues that ―we are already well into the development of a continent-wide 
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industrial supply chain—a pollution delivery system—that could cause irreversible 
damage to the Great Lakes‖ (Israelson, 2). 
Table 3: Major Refinery Expansions around the Great Lakes 
 
Refinery:  Detroit Heavy Oil Expansion 
Company:  Marathon Oil 
Location:  Detroit, Michigan 
Investment:  $1.9 billion (USD) 
Bitumen Capacity: 115,000 bpd 
 
Refinery:  Whiting Refinery Conversion 
Company:  British Petroleum 
Location:  Whiting, Indiana 
Investment:  $3.8 billion (USD) 
Bitumen Capacity: 205,000 bpd 
 
Refinery:  Wood River Refinery Conversion and Expansion 
Company:  WRB Refining (ConocoPhillips and Encana) 
Location:  Roxana, Illinois 
Investment:  $4 billion (USD) 
Bitumen Capacity: 495,000 bpd 
 
Refinery:  Toledo Refinery Conversion 
Company:  Bp/Husky 
Location:  Toledo, Ohio 
Investment:  $2.5 billion (USD) 
Bitumen Capacity: 131,000 bpd 
 
Refinery:  Lima Refinery Conversion 
Company:  Husky 
Location:  Lima, Ohio 
Investment:  $1.9 billion (USD) 
Bitumen Capacity:  146,000 bpd 
 
Refinery:  Superior Refinery Expansion 
Company:  Murphy Oil 
Location:  Superior, Wisconsin 
Investment:  $6 billion (USD) 
Bitumen Capacity: 235,000 bpd 
 
Source: Alberta Federation of Labour 2009 
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The threat of pollution affects both air and water.  Refineries in the Midwest 
which already account for a significant proportion of greenhouse gas emissions in the 
United States are expected to increase carbon emissions by 40 per cent by 2018, 
while toxic pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide which cause acid 
rain, will also increase substantially.  At the same time, refinery expansion will result 
in increased withdrawals of water from the Great Lakes and increased discharges of 
pollutants such as ammonia, mercury, and total suspended solids (TSS).   
Despite the fact that public opposition to the environmental costs of refinery 
expansion has meant that no new refineries have been built in the United States since 
1976, the current expansion projects around the Great Lakes basin are being carried 
out for the most part with little opposition.  The predominant pattern in the 
economically depressed Great Lakes states is that the economic benefits of these 
refinery expansions outweigh the environmental concerns and the projects move 
forward with few problems. 
In 2007, Murphy Oil unveiled its plans for a $6 billion expansion of its 
refinery in Superior, Wisconsin, on the shores of Lake Superior.  The construction of 
the largest refinery expansion in the region appeared imminent but is presently on 
hold due to economic considerations as a result of the dramatic decline in gasoline 
prices.  Nonetheless, once the plan goes forward it will increase oil sands processing 
capacity by 670 per cent, from 35,000 b/d to 235,000 b/d by 2015.  The refinery will 
be connected directly to the oil sands by the Alberta Clipper pipeline which will 
eventually transport 800,000 b/d of Canadian heavy crude from Hardisty, Alberta 
directly to the new refinery.  Wisconsin‘s Department of Natural Resources considers 
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the expansion to be the largest project in the state‘s history.  In the process, the 
refinery will also expand its ecological footprint.  Energy consumption is expected to 
increase twelve times.  The refinery expects to withdraw 18 million more liters of 
water per day.  Carbon emissions are expected to increase by 1 million tons per year, 
equivalent to adding 225,690 vehicles on the road (Israelson 2008, 39).  Nonetheless, 
environmental opposition has largely been muted on account of the economic benefits 
expected to accrue to the community and the state. The investment is four times 
larger than the entire value of the city of Superior.  The refinery expansion will add 
5,000 temporary construction jobs and 400 full-time positions.  State Senator Bob 
Jauch (D-Poplar) states, ―for the region, this would be the equivalent of getting the 
Olympics, and having them five years in a row‖ (Egan 2008). 
Marathon Petroleum Company received its final permits in June 2008 and has 
begun a $2.2 billion expansion of its refinery in Detroit, located on the Detroit River 
which feeds directly into Lake Erie, making it the only Michigan refinery able to 
handle Canadian heavy crude oil from the oil sands.  When construction is completed 
in 2012, the refinery will process 35,000 more barrels of Canadian heavy crude oil 
per day.  The expansion will also increase carbon emissions by 183,056 tons per year, 
equivalent to adding 39,452 vehicles on the roads, and will increase the emission of 
carbon monoxide and other particulates by 30 per cent.  The refinery will increase 
water consumption by 2,893,000 liters of water per day (Israelson 2008, 35).  
Illustrative of the primacy of economic over environmental concerns, an editorial in 
The Detroit News entitled, ―Refinery Expansion Benefits Region‘s Economy, Oil 
Supply‖, states that ―a steadier supply of refined oil, more jobs and an expanded tax 
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base are worthwhile tradeoffs for any worries about the impact of the refinery 
expansion‖ (The Detroit News 2008). 
In 2005, ConocoPhilips (USA) and TransCanada Corp. (Canada) signed an 
agreement to build 2,148 miles of pipeline that will transfer 590,000 b/d of bitumen 
from Harbisty, Alberta directly to the refinery in Wood River, Illinois, located at the 
confluence of the Mississippi and Missouri rivers, and sitting adjacent to the City of 
St. Louis located just across the state-line.  To meet the new demands for processing 
capacity, ConocoPhillips began its $3.6 billion refinery expansion at Wood River in 
2008, doubling its refining capacity of Canadian heavy crude oil to 240,000 barrels a 
day.  The Wood River refinery expansion is part of the company‘s $15 billion 
transcontinental expansion of its oil sands extraction and refining capacity from 
60,000 b/d to 555,000 b/d—an increase of 817 per cent (Israelson 2008, 36).  The 
increase in tar sands oil refining would add 836,400 tons of carbon emissions per 
year, equivalent to 180,259 additional cars on the road.  The refinery would increase 
its water consumption to 13,228,800 liters of water a day.   
Environmental groups were able to delay the start of construction on the 
refinery after a federal EPA appeal board upheld a challenge which argued that the 
refinery‘s flares were not being sufficiently controlled.  The company was ordered to 
negotiate the drafting of a new permit with the environmental groups, after which 
ConocoPhillips agreed to establish an inventory for greenhouse gases, offset 
emissions from its San Francisco refinery expansion project, and donate $3.4 million 
for various environmental projects in the local community (McGuire 2008).  On the 
whole, however, the predominant pattern prevailed as the economic benefits of the 
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expansion outweighed environmental concerns for the residents living in the greater 
St. Louis area.  The expansion at Wood River would bring an estimated 3,000 
temporary constructions jobs and 100 full-time jobs.    Congressmen Jerry Costello 
(D-Il) echoed the majority opinion by arguing that ―this is a significant investment in 
our region, producing good-paying jobs and supporting other businesses‖ (U.S. Fed 
News Service 2008).  Beyond the minor delay in the permit process, no significant 
change to the regulatory process resulted from the opposition by the non-
governmental groups. 
The pressure to increase refinery capacity in order to process Canadian heavy 
crude from the oil sands was intense and ubiquitous especially when oil prices peaked 
in 2007-08 and gas prices were rising.  The combined pressure from the federal level 
to establish secure sources of energy, from the state, provincial, and local levels to 
expand the tax base, and increase revenue in a period of economic decline, and from 
the oil industry and business community to maximize profits during a period of 
record oil prices, came together to form a political tsunami overwhelming 
environmental opposition and moving the expansion of the petro-infrastructure 
forward.  When the report published by the Munk Center for International Studies 
was released in December 2008, it stated that what we are witnessing is a ―massive 
upgrading of the petro-infrastructure of North America, transcending the imperatives 
of one particular company and either the support or resistance of any particular 
jurisdiction‖ (Israelson, 12).   
Yet, despite this overwhelming inertia, significant opposition was mobilized 
in one instance—the case of the refinery expansion in Whiting, Indiana, by British 
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Petroleum.  The resistance came from an unlikely source:  local governments, 
heretofore considered ‗bit players‘ and nothing more than an ‗attentive public‘, 
captives of ‗big business‘ and creatures of the provinces and the states, spearheaded a 
campaign against British Petroleum on environmental grounds that delayed the 
expansion of the refinery and thus defied the large-scale plans of government and 
industry backed by massive investments of financial and political capital.   
The resistance was also significant because it was waged at a time when the 
United States was experiencing record gasoline prices which sparked a national 
outcry for increased refinery capacity to increase supply and lower cost.  Gasoline 
prices were highest in the Midwest.  In supporting the expansion of the British 
Petroleum refinery in Whiting, Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels argued, ―the number 
one reason for $3 gasoline is the lack of refinery capacity in this country, and here‘s 
one of the biggest steps forward for the Midwest and really the whole nation‖ 
(Schaper 2007).  Hence, the political climate for any action that would delay the 
expansion could not be worse.  Yet, the success of local governments went beyond 
delaying the expansion.  The campaign forced BP to commit to further reductions in 
the amount of pollution it emits and, most importantly, the process instigated a 
significant regulatory review and reform in the state of Indiana with ramifications for 
environmental governance in the Great Lakes.  The following section analyzes the 
case surrounding the British Petroleum refinery in Whiting, Indiana. 
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The Case of British Petroleum and the Whiting, Indiana Refinery 
British Petroleum began as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which was 
founded in 1909 and over the course of one hundred years grew into one of the largest 
and most powerful companies in the world.  The company operated mostly in what is 
now present-day Iran, but was forced to expand its operations to other gulf states after 
the nationalization of Iran‘s oil industry in 1951.  The company renamed itself British 
Petroleum in 1954, and entered the American market towards the end of the 1960s 
after discoveries of oil were made in Alaska and the North Sea.  To distribute the 
petroleum across the country, the company began a partnership with Standard Oil of 
Ohio (Sohio) in 1970.  On August 11, 1999, BP and American Oil Company 
(Amoco) announced the largest industrial merger in the world.  Today, British 
Petroleum is the third largest energy company in the world, with 115,000 employees 
worldwide and $366 billion in revenue in 2008. 
Until the last two or three years, British Petroleum was reluctant to enter the 
oil sands business.  The company did not consider the oil sands to be profitable, nor 
politically viable, and decided that the environmental costs undermined its campaign 
to rebrand itself as a good citizen.  Under the chairmanship of John Browne (1995-
2007), British Petroleum successfully rebranded itself as an environmentally 
conscious company, adopting a new logo depicting a green and yellow sun and a 
motto ―better people, better products, beyond petroleum‖.  Browne‘s landmark 
speech at the Stanford Business School in 2007 was the first time a company had 
publically recognized the problem of greenhouse gas, and it announced the 
company‘s goal of reducing emissions.   Towards that goal, British Petroleum 
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supported the Kyoto Protocol and increased its investment in solar power technology.  
As early as the 1990s, the company was highly critical of oil sands development and 
sold all of its remaining interest in the oil sands by the end of the decade. 
By 2006, it became clear that considerations of the rising price of oil and the 
potential of losing out on substantial profits to rival oil companies, coupled with 
Washington‘s long-term political and financial commitment to develop Canadian oil 
sands, forced British Petroleum to overcome its hesitations and enter the oil sands as 
the last of the major oil companies to do so.  Spurred by the announcement in October 
2006 that rival oil company ConocoPhillips and EnCana, a company based in 
Calgary, Alberta, would enter into a $15 billion partnership to integrate and develop 
their upstream (mining and extracting) and downstream (upgrading and refining) oil 
business, British Petroleum and Husky Energy Inc., also based in Calgary, Alberta, 
responded by signing an $11.7 billion deal the following year.  The blueprint was 
identical.  The extraction of Husky‘s 3.2 billion barrels of oil sand reserves in Alberta 
would be accelerated, while BP‘s refinery in Toledo, Ohio, located on the shores of 
Lake Erie, would undergo a $2.5 billion expansion.  The refinery would double its 
output of western Canadian bitumen from 60,000 b/d to 120,000 b/d by 2015.  
British Petroleum‘s entry into the oil sands actually took place in November 
2006 when it announced its plan to invest $3.6 billion to expand and upgrade it‘s 
refinery in Whiting, Indiana.  To put the scale of that investment in perspective, a 
plan to build a new Honda automotive plant in Greenburg, Indiana, by 2008 that 
would produce 200,000 cars per year and employ 2000 workers is expected to cost 
$550 million.  The plan, referred to as Operation Canadian Crudes, would increase 
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the refinery‘s ability to process Canadian heavy crude oil.  As the second largest 
British Petroleum refinery in the United States, producing 405,000 b/d of petroleum 
products used for diesel, heating and jet fuels as well as asphalt, the Whiting refinery 
is of strategic importance to America‘s energy supply.  Presently 30 per cent of that 
refining capacity is dedicated to processing bitumen from the oil sands, but the 
upgrade will result in upwards of 90 per cent of capacity dedicated to refining 
Canadian heavy crude oil.  The refinery expansion will nearly triple the processing of 
Canadian heavy crude oil from 90,000 b/d to 260,000 b/d by its completion in 2011. 
The refinery is located on 1,700 acres of land on the shores of Lake Michigan 
in the Northwest corner of Indiana, which includes the small towns of Whiting and 
Hammond as well as East Chicago in Illinois.  The refinery has been vital to the local, 
regional and national economy for over one hundred years.    The refinery was built 
by the Standard Oil Company in 1890 and at that time it stood as the largest refinery 
in the world.  The refinery was purchased by British Petroleum in 1998 when it 
acquired Amoco, and it is now the fourth largest refinery in the United States.  The 
entire economy of Whiting, with a population of 5,137 people, and the surrounding 
communities are dependent upon the refinery which employs 1,700 workers.   It‘s 
average daily production of petroleum produces enough fuel to fill 430,000 cars, 
10,000 farm tractors, 22,000 semi-trucks, 2,000 commercial jet airliners, and 350,000 
propane cylinders (British Petroleum website, 2005 Environmental Statement: 
Whiting Business Unit). 
The expansion of the refinery has important economic benefits for the city of 
Whiting and the region.  In 2007, Indiana had the fourteenth highest unemployment 
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rate in the country.  The economic situation is especially dire in Northwest Indiana, 
where Whiting is situated, which has witnessed over two-thirds of its 89,000 
manufacturing jobs disappear since 1979.  An article in the Chicago Tribune summed 
up the unemployment problem in the area by stating that ―the labor market in 
Northwest Indiana is vanishing‖ (Chicago Tribune, May 30 2008).  In this context, 
the expansion of the refinery, which is expected to create 2,500 temporary 
construction jobs and 80 permanent jobs, is being hailed as the most important 
economic development opportunity in the community and the state with much more 
than just refinery capacity at stake.  Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels stated that ―in 
capital investment this is the largest we‘ve had…the eyes of the whole state are on 
Northwest Indiana today, as they should be.  This marks another huge step in 
Indiana‘s economic comeback‖ (British Petroleum 2006).  Marilyn Krusas, a member 
of Gary City Council, states, that the refining industry ―has built Whiting and 
provided health insurance and benefits …. We need jobs. We want to make sure the 
company stays and improves their operation, especially along the lakefront. It's kept 
the economy going in the region and the area‖ (Laasby 2007). In short, the economic 
merits of the project were well understood and, true to the pattern established in 
previous refinery expansions in the region, took precedence over environmental 
concerns in the political calculus. 
 
Traversing the Regulatory Road: The Water Permit 
In early 2007, British Petroleum submitted an application to the Indiana 
Department of Environmental Management (IDEM) to renew its National Pollution 
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Discharge Elimination System Permit (NPDES) as required every five years 
(Augustine 2008, 5).  The NPDES was established under the Clean Water Act in 1972 
and regulates the discharge of pollutants in the form of wastewater, storm water and 
cooling water from point sources directly into any surface waters in the United States.  
Point sources are readily discernible inputs of pollutants such as drains, pipes, and 
smokestacks and typically refer to publically owned treatment works (POTW) and 
industrial facilities.  The permit must also abide by the EPA‘s Effluent Limitation 
Guidelines (ELG) for industrial effluent discharged into surface waters, which were 
formulated specifically for the petroleum refining industry in 1974 and again in 1982.  
The EPA authorizes states like Indiana to administer the NPDES program, although 
the EPA is given an opportunity to review the permit for ninety days once it is issued 
and offer any objections or comments.  Once accepted by the EPA, the effluent limits 
established by the permit are enforced by the state, the EPA, or any individual citizen, 
and it is the responsibility of the permit holder to self-monitor and report the 
discharges. 
British Petroleum attained its first permit for the Whiting refinery in 1974, and 
new ones in 1980, 1985, and 1990.  The 1990 permit was renewed in 1995 and 
remained in effect until the IDEM issued the latest new permit in June 2007.  The 
latest application was submitted in anticipation of increased disposal of ammonia, 
total suspended solids (TSS) and other elements anticipated as a result of processing 
the Canadian heavy crude oil and the upgrades and expansion taking place between 
2008 and 2012.  The permit would allow the refinery to increase the discharge of total 
suspended solids (TSS) from a monthly daily average of 3,646 pounds-per-day (lbs/d) 
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to 4,925 lbs/d and from a daily maximum of 5,694 lbs/d to 7,501 lbs/d.  Both of those 
new targets exactly match the limits set by the federal Effluent Limitation Guidelines 
thus satisfying federal regulations.  The permit also allows Whiting refinery to 
increase discharges of ammonia from a monthly daily average of 1,034 lbs/d to 1,584 
lbs/d and from a daily maximum discharge of 2,060 lbs/d to 3,572 lbs/d.  These new 
limits are well below the federal ELG monthly daily average (3,528 lbs/d) and daily 
maximum (7,387 lbs/d).  In short, as subsequent independent analyses would 
determine, the EPA administrator Stephen Johnson concluded that ―Indiana issued a 
permit that is fully compliant with the Clean Water Act‖ (The Associated Press 2007) 
and federal regulations. 
The Whiting permit process moved forward in compliance with all of the 
guidelines.  According to the permit granting guidelines, the IDEM passed along a 
draft permit to the EPA for review, which, as would be expected, issued a notice of 
no objection on April 5, 2007.   The IDEM also notified local authorities about the 
draft permit, posted the document in government departments and libraries in Whiting 
and Hammond as well as online, and began a standard review process over the next 
three months.  This review process included a period for public review which took 
place from March 7 until May 11, where the agency accepted written commentary 
from the public.  The IDEM also organized a public meeting at Whiting City Hall on 
April 26, 2007.  Forty-six submissions from the public were received, the vast 
majority opposing the expansion on environmental grounds (Hawthorne 2007).  
Despite the small verbal protests, the IDEM approved the permit on June 21
 
and the 
EPA followed suit, arguing that all state and federal regulations were met and that the 
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limits established were consistent with the EPA‘s ―Final Water Quality Guidance for 
the Great Lakes System‖ which was adopted in 1995 and established water quality 
criteria for 29 pollutants (Augustine 2008, 6).  Peter Swenson, the EPA official 
responsible for wastewater permits in the Great Lakes deemed the Whiting effluent 
levels were safe (Augustine 2008, 6). 
 
Unsettled and Obscured Waters: The Lack of Transparency and Accountability at the 
Heart of the Permit Process Controversy 
 
The speed and relative ease with which the permit process was conducted 
belied a tension under the surface.  Prior to submitting their permit application, 
British Petroleum had been collaborating with five technical advisors composed of 
five retired EPA officials and one retired university professor, indirectly representing 
environmental groups, in order to bring to the fore environmental concerns regarding 
their expansion plans.  Such a forum for the exchange of information between British 
Petroleum and environmental groups was not unique, as the two sides worked 
together in the past on issues of common interest, for example, by forming a 
consortium to lobby for the passing of the Water Compact in the Indiana Legislature 
or pressing IDEM to process the backlog of air and water permits.  However, in this 
case, although the environmental concerns were entertained by British Petroleum, 
they were ultimately ignored.  A prominent American environmentalist, who was 
appointed by President Carter to head the Great Lakes Basin Commission in 1978, 
and who worked in the Department of the Interior, the EPA, and Chicago‘s 
Department of the Environment under Mayor Harold Washington, helped orchestrate 
the collaboration between British Petroleum and environmental groups.  She states 
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that in this case, British Petroleum ―did not take us seriously, they blew us off‖ (ex-
Chair Great Lakes Basin Commission, interview October 1, 2009).   
Very little attention was being paid to the British Petroleum permit process.  
The ex-Chair of the Basin Commission argues that at the public meetings organized 
by IDEM to discuss the permits, very few people attended.  The Gary Post-Tribune 
first reported on the permit process in a series of stories starting on May 9, 2007, but 
it provoked very little public attention.  Augustine (2008), a researcher at the William 
Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Business School, observes in her 
report ―BP and the Whiting Refinery: Beyond Petroleum‖ that the permit process was 
progressing ‗smoothly‘ until an article appeared in the Chicago Tribune on July, 15, 
2007, entitled ―BP Gets Break on Dumping in Lake‖.  A week earlier, the reporter 
from the Chicago Tribune had been approached by several key environmental group 
leaders and informed of what was transpiring in Indiana.   
The resulting article highlighted the fact that the permit allowed British 
Petroleum to increase its discharges of ammonia into Lake Michigan by 54 per cent 
and to increase its discharges of TSS by 34 per cent (2008, 6).  Although the numbers 
were accurate, the article‘s mischaracterization of the effluent as ‗sludge‘ seemed to 
spark further outrage.  Subsequent newspaper articles observed that the IDEM also 
allowed British Petroleum to use a controversial practice, called mixing zones, for 
discharging their pollution into Lake Michigan, the first such allowance since Indiana 
banned mixing zones in 1990.  As an aside, the ban on mixing zones was not 
absolute.  The Indiana legislature granted an exemption in 1994 to the same Whiting 
refinery which was then owned by Amoco which allowed Amoco to use mixing 
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zones in Lake Michigan in what is known as the ‗Amoco Amendment‘.  The present 
exemption allows British Petroleum to place a diffuser on the floor of Lake Michigan 
about 3,500 feet out from the shore in a designated mixing zone where the discharged 
ammonia and TSS would be diluted by the lake-water at a ratio of 37 to 1.  It is only 
after the effluent is diluted with the waters in Lake Michigan that water samples 
would be taken to measure if the water column meets water quality standards.  
According to environmental groups, the use of mixing zones is a cheap way of 
circumventing water quality standards since, without a diffuser, the effluent from the 
Whiting refinery would most likely be in violation of water quality standards at the 
point of discharge. 
Subsequent articles in the Chicago Tribune and USA Today newspapers 
reported that the permit granted British Petroleum a five-year grace period in which 
to meet federal mercury standards.  The permit would allow the refinery to continue 
to discharge up to two pounds of mercury per year into Lake Michigan, an exception 
that ran counter to the EPA‘s long-standing campaign beginning in the 1990s to 
virtually eliminate direct discharges of mercury into surface water.  Under EPA 
standards established in 1995, the annual discharge of mercury should be reduced to 
8/100
th
 of a pound.  Nonetheless, the permit would allow the British Petroleum 
refinery to be one of only two industrial pollution sources to dump mercury directly 
into Lake Michigan—the other being the power plant in nearby Chesterton, Indiana.  
Although most of the mercury deposited in the Great Lakes comes from air emissions 
from coal fired plants—880 pounds per year into Lake Michigan alone—the refinery 
discharges are still disconcerting since mercury does not degrade in the ecosystem but 
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instead accumulates in the waters and animals, and it is harmful even in small traces 
to human and animal brain and nervous system development (Hawthorne, 2007b). 
Although the permit ostensibly adhered to federal and state regulations, the 
opposition centered primarily on the argument that the increases in discharges 
violated an anti-backsliding provision in the Clean Water Act under section 402 (o) 
which prohibits the EPA from re-issuing an NPDES permit which is less stringent 
than the previous one.  This backsliding provision has been the object of contention 
since its insertion.  The anti-backsliding provision was inserted to fulfill the explicit 
policy aim of the Clean Water Act (1972) to attain zero discharges of pollutants into 
swimmable and fishable waters by 1983 and navigable waters by 1985.  Hence, the 
general spirit of the Clean Water Act dictates that subsequent permits be more, not 
less, strict in their adherence to environmental standards and goals. 
However, the backsliding provision does allow the adoption of less stringent 
effluent limits in very limited circumstances.  In situations where the permit satisfies 
state and federal water quality standards, as was the case with British Petroleum, the 
NPDES administrator, in this case, the IDEM Commissioner Thomas Easterly, can 
exercise discretion and lower effluent standards as long as the permit remains 
consistent with the state‘s anti-degradation policy.   
According to Indiana Code (13-11-2-50.5), degradation is defined as ―any 
new or increased discharge of a pollutant or pollutant parameter that results in a 
significant lowering of water quality for that pollutant or parameter … unless the 
activity causing the increased discharge results in an overall improvement in the 
outstanding state resource water‖.  In his post-mortem account of the conflagration 
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surrounding the British Petroleum permit, Dr. John Barnes, a professor of Public and 
Environmental Affairs at Indiana University who was tasked by Indiana Governor 
Daniels to provide an independent review of the permit process, stated that the anti-
degradation policy is ―at the heart of the controversy, from a legal and policy 
standpoint‖ (Barnes 2007, 11).   
The anti-degradation policy was explicitly encoded in the Clean Water Act in 
1987 through amendments to section 303(d)(4)(B) and in 1990 through amendments 
to section 118(c)(2).  The purpose of the policy is to ensure that the permit maintains 
the overall level of water quality in the watershed and protects existing uses of the 
water from that watershed.  The commissioner can calculate, on a case-by-case basis, 
an allowable increase in the monthly average effluent limitation as long as the overall 
water quality of Lake Michigan is not threatened.  Furthermore, according to federal 
regulation policy, the increase in effluent discharge can be justified on the basis that 
such an increase in pollutants is ―necessary to accommodate important economic or 
social development‖ [40 C.F.R Section 131.12(a)(2)].  Commissioner Easterly used 
these broad discretionary powers to defend IDEM‘s granting of the wastewater permit 
to British Petroleum, by stating, 
It is the position of the Indiana Department of Environmental 
Management that… The additional jobs, the long-term viability of the 
existing jobs/business and the value to our Nation‘s overall security 
resulting from utilizing a new source of petroleum from a neighboring 
friendly country have justified the proposed increase in the effluent 
limits for ammonia and total suspended solids (IDEM Post Public 
Notice Addendum June 2007, 5). 
 
The clear argument by the proponents of the pollution permit and the expansion of the 
Whiting refinery—namely British Petroleum, Indiana Governor Daniels, and IDEM 
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Commissioner Easterly—was that the permit process did not violate federal or state 
laws and the increase in pollution was justifiable on economic grounds. 
However, according to Barnes, the conflict surrounding the British Petroleum 
permit was not without merit and arose for two reasons.  First, IDEM‘s interpretation 
of how to apply anti-degradation policy is inherently subjective.  Barnes argues that 
―a critical question in anti-degradation policy is—how much, if any, deterioration in 
water quality (while still not going below the established minimum levels) will be 
allowed in order to obtain certain economic or social benefits?‖ (Barnes 2007, 12).  
The normative conceptions of how to balance competing environmental and 
economic and social interests is heavily subjective, and depends on whether the point 
of view belongs to the  public, the regulators or the regulated.  In the British 
Petroleum case, the vocal public opposed to the new permit applied the strictest 
interpretation of the anti-degradation policy to mean no increases in effluent 
discharges.  The regulated community, on the other hand, argued that some 
deterioration was necessary in order to achieve its business objectives and certain 
economic and social goals, while the regulators sought to strike a middle-ground 
(Barnes 12).  The problem is, of course, that there are few objective signposts within 
the State of Indiana‘s regulations that provide guidance on how such a balance 
between economic, social and environmental concerns should be struck.   
Hence, the second factor that precipitated an open conflict is that the anti-
degradation guidelines themselves are loose, incomplete and incoherent and fail to 
provide clear rules and standards that would provide a measure of objectivity and 
transparency to the permit process.  In a nutshell, the IDEM‘s anti-degradation 
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policies represented a microcosm of the problems identified by the International Joint 
Commission in its aforementioned 13
th
 Biennial Report on Great Lakes Water Quality 
(2006) focusing on the lack of accountability.  Part of that confusion stems from the 
fact that different bodies of water are afforded different levels of protection and it is 
not clear in this instance what the level of protection afforded Lake Michigan should 
be applied.  Under the Clean Water Act, the EPA requires that states implement an 
anti-degradation policy that has three tiers of protection.  See Figure 6. 
The first tier—Tier I—provides minimum water quality standards for all 
waters in the United States.  Tier II waters that exceed water quality standards are 
termed High Quality Waters (HQW) and these are given greater protection.  
Regulators must strive to maintain those levels unless the state deems that lowering 
the water quality is necessary for economic or social purposes as long as the first tier 
minimum standards are not breached.  Waters that are designated as Outstanding 
National Resource Waters (ONRW) are given the highest level of protection, and the 
degradation of these Tier III waters is strictly prohibited.  Indiana has designated 
Lake Michigan an Outstanding State Resource Water (OSRW), and is often referred 
to as a Tier II.5 water because it is entitled to protection that is greater than a High 
Quality Water but less than an Outstanding National Resource Water (Barnes 13).   
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Figure 8: Three Tiers of Water Protection 
Source: IDEM 2009 
 
What this level of protection actually means in practice is open to interpretation, and 
the question of whether the effluent limits set by the IDEM for ammonia and TSS 
discharges violate anti-degradation policy for Lake Michigan is open to debate.  
Hence, the process lacks concrete measures for accountability. 
One of the key components of both federal and state anti-degradation policy 
guidelines which could have provided some clear direction in the debate was the 
―anti-degradation demonstration‖.  Before approving any new or increased discharges 
of pollutants, the EPA requires that the permit applicant submit an ―anti-degradation 
demonstration‖ for any permits that will result in new or increased discharges of 
bioaccumulative chemicals of concern (BCC) which include metals such as mercury 
and lead and other compounds such as PCBs.  Among other things, the applicant must 
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demonstrate in a written report (i) why an increase in BCC discharges is necessary 
(ii) they must outline the economic and social benefits as well as the potential 
environmental and health costs (iii) and they must provide an evaluation of the 
availably, practicality and cost of implementing alternatives.   
However, in this case, since the British Petroleum permit foresaw only an 
increase in discharges of conventional pollutants such as TSS or ammonia, and not 
the more serious bioaccumulative chemicals of concern, the EPA concluded that such 
an ―antidegradation demonstration‖ was not required since it was not applicable 
(Barnes 13).  Consequently, there was a gap in the federal and state regulatory system 
which allowed British Petroleum to attain a new permit without having to justify the 
necessity for increasing their effluent discharges. 
Indiana‘s anti-degradation regulations do provide for an ―anti-degradation 
demonstration‖ that go farther than the EPA concern with BCC.  An applicant 
seeking a permit for new or increased non-BCC discharges into High Quality Level 
waters must submit an ―anti-degradation demonstration‖ to the IDEM commissioner 
when those discharges are expected to lead to ―a lowering of water quality that is 
greater than a de minimis lowering of water quality‖ (IAC 5-2-11.3-Bii).  These 
regulations also provide mathematical equations to quantify what a violation of the de 
minimis rule would entail with regards to pollution loading, and they state in clear 
terms the content of such a demonstration including, among others, a presentation of 
alternatives and the costs and benefits of their implementation. 
These same Indiana regulations however are much less clear when discussing 
the application of anti-degradation policy to Outstanding State Resource Waters 
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(OSRW) such as Lake Michigan.  The regulations do not stipulate the circumstances 
under which a demonstration would be triggered nor the required contents of such a 
demonstration in the same forthright and clear manner in which they are presented 
with regards to Tier II High Quality Waters (Barnes 14).  Since Lake Michigan is 
considered a Tier II.5 water, and thus should be afforded a higher level of protection, 
one can only assume that at minimum the same regulations governing ―anti-
degradation demonstrations‖ in High Quality Waters is applicable to Outstanding 
State Resource Waters, but assumptions and regulations are not the same thing.  
Therein lies the origin of the accountability gap. 
The IDEM recognized this gap in the regulations when it requested that 
British Petroleum voluntarily submit an ad-hoc anti-degradation analysis, even 
though such an analysis was not required by the letter of the law, in order to be able 
to make its determination according to the principles of anti-degradation policy.  The 
IDEM asked British Petroleum to identify measures or technology that could 
minimize the detriments to Lake Michigan water quality including considerations of 
non-discharge alternatives such as alternative locations, considerations of discharge 
minimization such as reductions in the scale of the project, and failing these two 
alternatives a consideration of end-of-pipe treatment scenarios (Barnes 23).  IDEM 
also stated that  
BP North America must demonstrate that all economically and 
technically feasible measures have been taken to avoid the action that 
will result in the new or increased discharge of the pollutant or 
pollutant parameter including a demonstration that it is not feasible to 
limit the new or increased discharge to a temporary or short term 
period. BP North America must demonstrate that any increase in 
pollutant loading is necessary‖ (British Petroleum 2007, 15).   
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British Petroleum appeared to cooperate with this request and submitted its ―Case-
By-Case Antidegradation Analysis‖ in November 2006.   
However, Barnes argues that the ―anti-degradation demonstration submitted 
by BP to IDEM fell short of what IDEM required and short of what ideally would be 
submitted‖ (24).  A coordinator of the Indiana Chapter of the environmental group, 
Sierra Club, argues that British Petroleum‘s demonstration ―made a mockery of the 
anti-degradation process‖ and that ―their anti-degradation was one page long, and it 
was ridiculous‖ (Sierra Club interview September 25, 2009).  British Petroleum stuck 
to a strict interpretation of the letter of the law and stated in the report that it was not 
legally required to provide an evaluation of non-discharge or discharge minimization 
alternatives as requested by IDEM and therefore did not provide one.  The report 
briefly and half-heartedly evaluated possible treatment alternatives but rejected them 
as infeasible while offering very limited information or justification that, according to 
Barnes, made it ―almost impossible, for a reviewer or the public to know whether the 
rejection of the alternative is reasonable‖ (Barnes, 24).   
Unimpressed, IDEM subsequently requested that British Petroleum submit an 
addendum which it did on November 30, 2006, entitled ―Evaluation of Ammonia-N 
Mass Discharge After Refinery Reconfiguration and use of CXHO‖, with CXHO 
meaning Canadian Extra Heavy Crude Oil.  The report stated that ammonia 
discharges could be reduced from the monthly average of 1,584 lbs/day anticipated in 
the new permit to its original daily average of 1,030 lbs per day with the addition of 
water tanks to the British Petroleum‘s Lakefront wastewater treatment plant.  
However, the report states that the lack of space needed to accommodate the 12,000 
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square foot expansion at the wastewater plant precluded such a project, and the 
company concluded that on this basis it was not appropriate to provide the capital or 
operational costs of this alternative even though IDEM specifically requested that 
such information be provided.   Barnes states in his report that, ―the shortcomings in 
the anti-degradation demonstration raised questions in the public‘s mind as to 
whether there had been sufficient inquiry/effort to avoid the increased discharge to 
Lake Michigan‖ (25), arguing that a ―better decision record‖ may well have satisfied 
the concerned public.  This state of affairs parallels a central concern in the IJC‘s 13th 
Biennial Report on the lack of accountability within the governance structures around 
the basin by concluding that ―the public has neither an accounting of specific 
progress…nor confidence that any reports tell the full story‖ (2006, 17). In this 
particular case, in short, British Petroleum failed to demonstrate convincingly that an 
increase in discharges of ammonia and TSS was necessary and unavoidable. 
In addition, neither the IDEM nor British Petroleum provided a rationale for 
the five year grace period the refinery was given to align its mercury discharges with 
federal standards.  The public‘s sensitivity over any mercury discharges had been 
heightened over the years by numerous fish consumption advisories due to mercury 
levels, and in this context, although the provision accorded with both federal and state 
regulations, and the actual level of mercury discharged would remain below the level 
of detection and below what would be permitted in drinking water, a better decision 
record and a more transparent line of communication between the public, the 
regulated and the regulators could have mitigated some of the conflict. 
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The final criticism directed at the quality of the decision-making process 
leading up to the granting of the permit dealt with the openness of the entire process 
to participation from actors outside the traditional federal-state duopoly, namely, local 
government.  What made the criticism more remarkable is that the City of Chicago, 
specifically, demanded that it be included in a decision-making process taking place 
outside the boundaries of its own state.    Sandhu Johnston, the commissioner for the 
City of Chicago‘s Department of the Environment, protested that the city should have 
been consulted even though the refinery expansion and the permit process were 
outside state boundaries, stating ―we were not approached by BP or IDEM.  We are a 
big neighbor to the north, and we would have hoped we‘d have been reached out to‖ 
(Buchtal 2007). 
 
The Opposition and Local Government Mobilization 
The City of Chicago was in essence the staging ground for the protests against 
the British Petroleum permit, and the main organizer of the opposition was in fact 
Chicago‘s local government.  However, the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities 
Initiative also played an important role by mobilizing its membership base behind 
Chicago and by acting as an information and coordination hub, crafting a strategy and 
a common message that was adopted by individual mayors.  Hence, rather than a 
series of isolated and ad-hoc protest activities, the opposition around the Great Lakes 
was synchronized and succeeded in delivering a clear and focused message that the 
failure of IDEM and British Petroleum rested in their inability, and perhaps their 
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disinterest, in finding a better balance between economic and environmental 
concerns. 
On July 18, just three days after the controversial article appeared in the 
Chicago Tribune, the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative circulated a press 
release condemning the State of Indiana‘s pollution permit for British Petroleum, 
quoting Chicago Mayor Richard Daley that ―we must find ways to demonstrate that 
economy and environment can co-exist‖ (GLSLCI, Press Release, 2007). The next 
day, Timothy Mitchell, the superintendent and CEO of the Chicago Park District—a 
separate agency of the City of Chicago and the largest park district in the United 
States with a $385 million budget—announced that, in partnership with the City of 
Chicago and various local environmental organizations such as the Alliance for the 
Great Lakes, the Park District would organize a petition drive on July 21-22 called 
―Save our Lake‖ protesting the refinery expansion.  The petitions were collected at 
fourteen locations throughout the city including beaches, Navy Pier and the Museum 
Campus, and would eventually deliver close to 100,000 signatures to Indiana 
Governor Daniels.   
On July 20, the two founding members of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Cities Initiative, Mayor Daley of Chicago and Mayor Miller of Toronto, as well as the 
Chairman of the Cities Initiative, Mayor Gary Becker of Racine, Wisconsin, 
published a letter to the editor in the Chicago Tribune in the section titled ―Voice of 
the People‖ under the heading ―We must all protect, not contaminate, lake‖.  The 
letter stated that ―BP‘s plan and the precedent it sets jeopardize all of the efforts of the 
last 30 years to protect the Great Lakes‖ and emphasizes again the need to balance 
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both economic and environmental interests (GLSLCI, Chicago Tribune letter to the 
editor, 2007).   
On August 2, the executive director of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Cities Initiative, David Ullrich, testified in front of the City Council of Chicago and 
the Joint Committee on Energy and Parks, explaining their stance and stating that ―the 
resounding answer from United States and Canadian mayors across the Great Lakes 
and St. Lawrence is that increased pollution will not be allowed‖ (GLSLCI, Ullrich 
testimony in front of Chicago City Council, 2007).  Economic sanctions were 
considered.  One of the most powerful aldermen—Edward M. Burke—insisted on 
introducing a city-wide boycott of British Petroleum by putting forward a motion in 
front of Chicago‘s City Council that would stop the city‘s use of a 100 BP gas station 
cards, which are mostly used by police officers.  Alderman Burke also proposed that 
the Council block three large banks with connections to British Petroleum, including 
Goldman Sachs, from receiving city bond deals worth millions of dollars.  Legal 
action was also discussed by officials from the City of Chicago. 
With the assistance of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, the 
opposition also spread out to cities beyond Chicago.  Two days before the letter to the 
editor was published in the Chicago Tribune, five Wisconsin mayors—Mayors Juan 
Perez of Sheboygan, Jim Schmitt of Green Bay, including three members of the 
Cities Initiative, Tom Barrett of Milwaukee, Mayor Dave Ross of Superior, and Gary 
Becker of Racine—wrote a letter directly to IDEM Commissioner Thomas Easterly 
criticizing the permit as ―a careless disregard for the numerous communities across 
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the region…and undermines years of work by local governments‖ (Barrett et al., 
letter to IDEM Commissioner Thomas Easterly, July 24, 2007).   
Individual local governments began passing resolutions condemning the 
British Petroleum permit that were based on a template resolution crafted and 
distributed by the Cities Initiative.  For example, Highland Park, a member of the 
Cities Initiative, passed a resolution on July 26
th
, opposing the permit granted by the 
IDEM.  Subsequent resolutions were passed by other city councils such as Marquette 
and Ferndale in Michigan, and Evanston, Illinois, on August 13.  Canadian cities such 
as Niagara-on-the-Lake, Archipelago, and Salaberry-de-Valleyfield in Quebec passed 
their own resolutions in August.  Mayors across the basin voiced their concerns in 
local newspapers, radio and television news which amplified the discontent even 
further.  The discontent reached a crescendo in certain media markets.  For example, 
after Windsor Mayor Eddie Francis commented on the British Petroleum dispute, the 
radio station AM 800 CKLW aired a commentary on July 24 by Paul McDonald 
stating that the British Petroleum permit ―amounts to environmental homicide‖ 
(CKLW, commentary, 2007).   
The early public relations campaign waged by Chicago and the Cities 
Initiative sparked and sustained a second wave of public protests.  At the beginning of 
August, the annual rock-and-roll festival Lollapalooza brought hundreds of thousands 
of spectators to Grant Park in Chicago.  On the closing night, August 5, the popular 
alternative rock band Pearl Jam led the crowd in a protest song called ―Don‘t Go BP 
Amoco‖.  The Chicago Sun-Times ran a series of editorials criticizing the expansion 
and on August 17 it proposed a total boycott of British Petroleum in an article titled 
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―Boycott BP (Big Polluter): Don‘t Buy BP Gas Until They Agree to Not Dump In 
Lake‖ which states, ―if BP insists on dumping more pollutants into our lakes, it‘s time 
for us to stop pumping its gas into our tanks.  We‘re calling for an all-out boycott of 
BP gas.‖ (Chicago Sun-Times 2007). 
Pressure was also coming from Washington.  Congressmen Richard Durbin 
(D-Il) and Rahm Emmanuel (D-Il) sent letters on July 16, 2007 to the EPA administer 
Stephen Johnson and the assistant administer in the EPA‘s Office of Water, Benjamin 
Grumbles, strongly opposing the EPA‘s decision to grant the permit to British 
Petroleum and seeking clarification on how the EPA measured environmental and 
economic concerns, how it reconciled their decision with the anti-backsliding 
provisions in the Clean Water Act, and to what extent it examined the cumulative 
impact on Lake Michigan and the Great Lakes that would result from an increase in 
pollution discharges.  On July 26 the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly 
passed a resolution by 387 to 26 votes introduced by Illinois Representative Rahm 
Emmanuel and Michigan Representative Vernon Ehlers on July 18, condemning the 
British Petroleum permit and urging the IDEM to reconsider its decision (H.Con.Res. 
187). 
 
The Effects of the Opposition on the Policy Result and the Policy Process 
Despite the public pressure, the IDEM Commissioner Tom Easterly refused to 
back down and approved the permit by stating, ―This permit went through the most 
public process that any other permit has gone through ...[and]… the increase in 
ammonia is still limited to one half of the federal requirement‖ (quoted in Augustine 
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2008, 7).  Governor Daniels refused to ask the IDEM to re-open the permit process.  
The British Petroleum chairman, Bob Malone, announced that the plan would move 
forward arguing that all federal and state regulations had been met.  On August 23, 
British Petroleum chairman Malone stated that although the company maintained the 
legality of its permit, ―ongoing regional opposition to any increase in discharge 
permit limits for Lake Michigan creates an unacceptable level of business risk for this 
$3.8 billion investment‖ (Augustine, 2008b, 1). 
Nonetheless, the opposition achieved four significant concessions from the 
State of Indiana and British Petroleum that will be discussed in turn: (i) it opened up 
the decision-making process by establishing an epistemic community surrounding the 
permit process and refinery expansion, and by holding a Lake Michigan Summit 
involving stakeholders from state and non-state actors from around the Great Lakes 
(ii) British Petroleum agreed to meet effluent limits set by the previous permit (iii) the 
State of Indiana undertook a comprehensive two-year review of their anti-degradation 
policy process with exhaustive multi-level stakeholder participation with substantial 
public input (iv) implementing a comprehensive anti-degradation rule will expedite 
the updating of lapsed pollution permits that will force heavy industry to finally 
adhere to stricter environmental standards because the long-time lack of an anti-
degradation policy was the central impediment blocking the IDEM from processing 
its backlog of pollution permits. 
Although the permit was granted, British Petroleum chairman Malone agreed 
to a proposal tabled by U.S. Representative Biggert, who advised British Petroleum to 
partner with Argonne National Laboratory and Purdue University Calumet to 
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organize a task force made up of scientists and water experts to review emerging 
technologies available to provide alternate solutions for the refinery‘s wastewater 
(Augustine 2008, 7).  The two institutions had already cooperated on water quality 
issues through the Purdue University Calumet Water Institute which is located close 
to Whiting refinery.  However, it was unique to see collaboration between industry, 
academia and government organized in such a way.  Furthermore, British Petroleum 
also invested $5 million in Purdue University to further research into the applicability 
of clean water technology to Whiting.     
Shortly thereafter the EPA administrator for the Great Lakes states, Mary 
Gade, convinced chairman Malone to take part in a Lake Michigan Summit held on 
August 15, 2007 in Chicago focusing on issues surrounding the Whiting refinery 
expansion.  Participants included representatives from British Petroleum, officials 
from state governments in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin as well as from 
the City of Chicago and Cook County, members of Congress and representatives of 
environmental organizations (Augustine 2008, 8).  Gade captured the mentality of 
this emerging epistemic community being organized by stating that the industry and 
government need to find ―strategies for going beyond compliance‖ (quoted in 
Augustine 2008, 8). 
British Petroleum also voluntarily agreed to defer from increasing pollution 
discharges into Lake Michigan by agreeing to abide by the effluent limits set by the 
previous seventeen-year-old permit at least until 2011.  The significance of such a 
concession on the part of industry is tempered, however, by the fact that construction 
on the refinery expansion is only expected to be completed in 2012, and hence the 
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anticipated increases in effluent discharges would only come into effect thereafter.  
The concessions also provoked chairman Malone to draw a line in the sand, warning 
that these accommodations raise the risk of the investment being pulled altogether, 
stating that ―if necessary changes to the project result in a material impact to project 
viability, we could be forced to cancel it‖ (Augustine, 2008b, 2).  Nonetheless, a 
senior member of the Alliance for the Great Lakes, a major regional environmental 
non-governmental organization, states that the simple fact that a private corporation 
voluntarily committed itself to adjusting its permit limits indicates that there was 
room for improving the permit itself in the first place in terms of the balance between 
economic and environmental aims (Alliance for the Great Lakes, interview 
September 29, 2009). 
The most significant concession the opposition secured was Governor Daniels 
commitment to a two-year regulatory review of the State of Indiana‘s anti-
degradation policy, a review that had been derailed two years earlier.  Between 1997 
and 2005, the IDEM attempted to develop a comprehensive anti-degradation rule but 
failed in large part as a result of pressure from industry.  The process was shelved 
shortly after a letter by the law firm Barnes & Thornburg LLP was sent to the Office 
of Water Quality at the Indiana Department of Environmental Management on May 
30, 2005, communicating its opposition to the anti-degradation review on behalf of 
the Indiana Water Quality Coalition (IWQC) composed of the Indiana Coal Council, 
Indiana Builders Association, Indiana Manufacturers Association, Hoosier Energy, 
Eli Lilly and Company, G.E. Plastics, American Electric Power, and British 
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Petroleum.  The Indiana Manufacturers Association is a non-profit trade association 
that represents 2,000 companies and 600,000 manufacturing jobs (Evans 2009).   
The opposition to the British Petroleum refinery in 2007 forced the state to 
revive and complete a regulatory review that had been delayed for twelve years.  The 
‗first notice‘ informing the public that the IDEM intends to develop an anti-
degradation rule was filed on October 15, 2008 and a ―Draft Rule‖ was filed on 
‗second notice‘ in the Indiana Register for a 45 day public comment period on July 
17, 2009.  The Draft Rule fills the gaps in the current anti-degradation rules by 
outlining (i) the process applicants must follow (ii) under what circumstances the 
applicant must undertake an evaluation of alternative measures (iii) when an applicant 
must demonstrate social and economic benefits (iv) and when periods of public 
comment are necessary.  In preparing the Draft Rule for the final promulgation 
process before being signed into law by the governor, the IDEM also opened up the 
process to unprecedented public scrutiny by organizing extensive consultations with 
stakeholders and the public.  On March 7, 2008, Governor Daniels initiated the first 
of thirteen stakeholder meetings which included representatives of industry (British 
Petroleum, U.S. Steel, Indiana Manufacturers Association, Indiana Chamber of 
Commerce, Eli Lilly, and the Indiana Coal Council), environmental groups (Alliance 
for the Great Lakes, Environmental Law and Policy Center) as well as municipal 
governments.  The Draft Rule was open to public commentary in four meetings 
organized from August 19, 2009 to September 21, 2009 in the towns of Portage, 
Garrett, Seymour and Vincennes. 
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Finally, the anti-degradation review process that is being undertaken will help 
eliminate the last major remnants of the major backlog of pollution permits that has 
plagued the IDEM.  In 2005, the IDEM had close to 300 air permits and 276 water 
permits that were outstanding, meaning, they were not issued, renewed, or updated.  
Even though the Clean Water Act requires that water permits be updated every five 
years in order to meet stricter standards, the backlog has meant that major polluters 
such as coal and steel factories have been discharging pollution into the Great Lakes 
based on environmental standards that are out-of-date by as much as fifteen years, as 
is the case with U.S. Steel‘s Gary Works which is operating on a permit issued in 
1994 and expired in 1999.  The controversial British Petroleum refinery in Whiting 
was operating on a permit that expired in 1995.   
By 2009, after a concerted effort on the part of IDEM, the amount of air and 
water permits outstanding has been reduced to five and six respectively.  However, 
the six water permits pertain to the largest polluters in Indiana including five steel 
mills such as the U.S. Steel Gary Works and ArcelorMittal Burns Harbor.  A high 
ranking member of a regional environmental group, Save the Dunes, argues that the 
absence of a comprehensive anti-degradation rule was a major reason why permits 
were not being issued thus creating a backlog (Laasby 2009).  It is also the reason 
why the largest polluters still remain without updated permits.  Governor Daniels has 
argued that there is no sense issuing the steel plants new permits at this point until the 
anti-degradation draft review is complete. 
In addition to these concrete concessions on the part of IDEM and British 
Petroleum, the prominent environmentalist and  former Chair of the Great Lakes 
302  
Basin Commission argues that the success of the opposition can also be measured by 
the fact that the public debate ―stimulated attention not just to the local refinery, but 
the whole issue of developing heavy tar sands‖ (ex-Chair Great Lakes Basin 
Commission, interview October 1, 2009), and the dispute over the water permit 
brought increased attention to British Petroleum‘s subsequent air permit required for 
the expansion of the Whiting refinery.  On October 19, 2009, the EPA ordered the 
Indiana Department of Environmental Management to reconsider and revise within 
90 days the air permit it issued to British Petroleum in 2008, which they argued was 
incomplete, demonstrating perhaps the dawn of a stricter regulatory regime. 
 
Assessing the Case in Comparative Perspective: the British Petroleum expansion in 
Whiting, Indiana and the Vasco da Gama Bridge in Lisbon, Portugal 
 
The dynamics taking place surrounding the permit process for the expansion 
of the British Petroleum refinery are very similar to the dynamics surrounding the 
planning and implantation of the construction of the Vasco da Gama Bridge in 
Portugal analyzed by Bukowski (2004).  A brief comparative analysis will not only 
illustrate those similarities, but it will also highlight the differences between European 
and North American multilevel governance, specifically, the crucial role that the 
supranational level of government plays in empowering non central-state actors. 
 
The Vasco da Gama Bridge 
As in the British Petroleum case, there was considerable political support at 
the highest levels for the construction of a bridge spanning the Tagus Estuary in 
Lisbon which had been contemplated since the 1980s.  The project was given a high 
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priority by the Social Democratic Party government which established in 1991 a 
special agency called the Office of the Tagus River Crossing in Lisbon (GATTEL) to 
―develop, coordinate, and control the activity of the promotion of the construction of 
a new road crossing over the Tagus‖ (quoted in Bukowski 2004, 283).  The new 
office was composed of officials from the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and 
Communications (MOPTC), the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources 
(MARN), and the Finance Ministry (MF).  Private interests, in particular the business 
community, were heavily invested in the project and influential in the decision-
making process (Bukowski 2004). 
The ensuing conflict centered on the location of the bridge crossing between 
proponents of the so-called Central corridor and those who favored the Eastern 
corridor.  At the heart of the debate were two issues.  The first issue dealt with policy 
results and specifically concerned the perceived imbalance between economic and 
environmental impacts and interests reflected in the final location of the bridge 
crossing.  The second issue dealt with the quality of the decision-making process, 
specifically, with the transparency, accountability and openness of the process.  The 
Portuguese government unilaterally settled on the Eastern corridor which not only 
disregarded environmental concerns raised by Portuguese environmental groups, but 
also went against the recommendations of its own agency, the GATTEL, and 
provided little technical or objective justification for that particular choice.  As the 
process moved forward and environmental groups remobilized, developed new 
strategies and were able to muster a greater array of allies and resources, the 
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opposition to both the policy result and the policy process became more vocal and the 
pressure on government more intense. 
Once the decision for the Eastern corridor was announced, the company which 
won the bid, Lusoponte, subsequently submitted an environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) which was opened for a two-month period of public consultations carried out 
through town-hall style meetings, postings on the internet, and through bulletins 
posted in public offices.  The Portuguese environmental groups immediately 
criticized the EIA in very strong terms for lacking scientific rigor and criticized the 
selection of the Eastern corridor in general.  As in the British Petroleum case, the 
Portuguese environmental groups argued that the final decision was based on 
subjective criteria and limited considerations of both the environmental impact and 
the possible alternatives reflecting in general a lackluster effort on the part of the 
government to solicit public input. 
This initial round of pressure on the part of environmental groups succeeded 
in provoking the first serious response from the Portuguese government.  In February 
1995, a few months before the construction of the bridge was set to commence, the 
government attempted to placate the NGOs and quell the initial criticism by 
establishing the Commission for Oversight and Construction (CAO) composed of 
representatives of the various government agencies involved in the project, several 
municipal governments that were directly affected by the project, a representative 
from GATTEL and representatives from environmental NGOs (Bukowski 2004, 
290).  Nonetheless, the CAO was viewed as ineffectual and Bukowski (2004) argues 
that ―there existed a consistent lack of public participation, and an attitude on the part 
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of government authorities that while they must ‗suffer‘ the process of public debate, it 
largely did not figure into their decisions‖ (287).  Thus concluded what can be 
considered the first stage of the confrontation, wherein the environmental groups, 
highly motivated but largely on their own, elicited a mild or moderate response from 
the government. 
During the second stage of the confrontation, as the construction unfolded, the 
Portuguese environmental groups developed, and began to employ, new strategies 
and new resources, characterized by a turn toward supranational institutions in order 
to increase the pressure on their own government by referring specifically to 
European Union laws and norms.  The environmental groups undertook an intense 
and public lobbying and information campaign directed at the European Commission, 
specifically the Directorate General for the Environment and the Directorate General 
for Regional and Cohesion Funds, as well as the European Parliament and the 
European Court of Auditors.   
The environmental groups demonstrated that the bridge project violated the 
European Union‘s Birds Directive (79/409/EEC) and the Habitats Directive 
(92/430/EEC) as well as the rules and practices of the European Union‘s Cohesion 
Funds.  The Portuguese government had previously applied for and attained Cohesion 
Funding for the project, and so the criticisms leveled at the bridge‘s financial 
foundations proved to be especially effective.  At the apex of the dispute, an official 
delegate of the European Commission acknowledged, according to Bukowski, that 
―the position of the environmental groups was very strong, and that if they wanted to 
force the issue, the Commission would have to halt all funding to the bridge‖ (292).  
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This second stage of mobilization by the environmental groups relying on 
supranational institutions provoked three new responses on the part of the Portuguese 
government which dramatically altered both the policy result and the policy process.  
First, the process became more open and the network involved in the decision-making 
process was expanded as supranational actors such as the European Commission 
become more intimately involved in the project.  For example, the effective lobbying 
provoked the European Commission to send a delegation to investigate the 
construction project.  Furthermore, the Commission, the European Parliament, and 
the European Court of Auditors, all released individual reports critical of the bridge 
project, identifying severe flaws and violations related both to the location of the 
bridge and the decision-making process.   
Second, accountability was augmented as oversight of the process was 
enhanced.  For example, the activities of private interests and industry in the project, 
in this case the Lusoponte consortium, were placed under more careful scrutiny by 
both national and supranational authorities.  For example, in addition to increased 
oversight from the European Commission, the Portuguese Environmental Minister, 
Elisa Ferreira, threatened to impose fines after conducting an investigation of 
Lusoponte.  The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (MARN), which 
until this point had been overshadowed by the Ministry of Public Works, Transport 
and Communication (MOPTC), only became assertive in its opposition to the Eastern 
corridor after the European Commission and the Directorate General for the 
Environment became actively involved in the process and itself highly critical of the 
project.  The elevation of environmental concerns within the decision-making process 
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even led to Cohesion Fund money being suspended on three occasions for violations 
of various environmental directives.  Furthermore, the Commission for Oversight and 
Construction (CAO) was reconstituted with new members and the CAO was given 
more effective oversight of the project which satisfied environmental groups.   
Third, in addition to improving the policy process by introducing greater 
accountability and greater multi-level input from both state and non-state actors into 
the decision-making process, the Portuguese government and Lusoponte agreed to 
implement compensatory measures that would offset the negative environmental 
impact of the bridge by expanding environmentally sensitive Special Protection Areas 
(SPA) in other areas and by transposing long delayed European Union environmental 
directives into Portuguese domestic law.  Hence, a better balance between 
environmental and economic interests was struck in the final decision due to the 
cooperation of local and supranational actors. 
 
 Comparing the Bridge and the Refinery Cases Before and After the Opposition 
In both the Vasco da Gama Bridge and the British Petroleum refinery cases, 
we find support for the observation by Peters and Pierre (2004) that ―multilevel 
governance embedded in a regulatory setting that enables weaker actors to define a 
legal basis for their action‖ (89) allows them to transcend the negative tendencies of 
network governance and is in fact ―the best strategy to escape the Faustian bargain 
and to cheat darker powers‖ (89) inherent in a multilevel governance setting that 
weakens transparency and accountability.  In the bridge case, local governments 
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based their opposition on the Birds and Habitat directives.  In the British Petroleum 
case, the opposition used Indiana‘s anti-degradation policy and the Clean Water Act. 
Furthermore, using Bukowski‘s (2004) aforementioned five-criteria for 
assessing the quality of decision-making, we find in both cases that the mobilization 
of non central-state actors improved the democratic legitimacy of the policy process 
and the policy result.   
In the first criteria, transparency and accountability in the policy process and 
policy results, Bukowski asks whether the stakeholders and the public understand 
how and why decisions are made.  In the case of the refinery and the bridge, we find 
that there was originally very little transparency and accountability in the decision-
making process.  Bukowski‘s observations about the early stages of the bridge 
deliberations, that ―the final decision was made by government entities which were 
not able to justify their choice…based on objective criteria‖ (293), is entirely 
applicable to the decision undertaken by the Indiana Department of Environmental 
Management (IDEM) to grant British Petroleum its pollution permit.  The IDEM‘s 
decision to move forward with the permit process was based on the State of Indiana‘s 
anti-degradation guidelines which were ambiguous to begin with and provided few 
concrete criteria that could provide the basis for an objective justification of the final 
decision by Commissioner Easterly. Ultimately, the final decision about the permit 
reflected Commissioner Easterly‘s and Governor Daniels‘ broad discretionary powers 
and their subjective calculations of the proper balance between economic and 
environmental interests, which opened them up to criticisms of bias in favor of 
industry that was partly justified.  The Barnes inquiry concluded that the ad-hoc anti-
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degradation analysis provided by British Petroleum failed to demonstrate or justify an 
increase in pollutant loadings into Lake Michigan by offering limited information that 
made it ―impossible, for a reviewer or the public to know whether the rejection of the 
alternative is reasonable‖ (Barnes, 24).  In other words, Professor Barnes pointed out 
that the decision-record was not transparent, and little technical data was provided 
upon which external observers could rely on to assess the final decision, and yet 
despite these flaws the permit was still granted.   
As mentioned, one of the positive developments to emerge from the dispute 
over British Petroleum was the anti-degradation review undertaken by IDEM which 
seeks to clarify the process applicants must follow, the rules regulators must apply 
when granting the permits and the conditions under which an anti-degradation 
process is triggered including when public input is required. 
In the second criteria, access, Bukowski asks whether all actors are given the 
opportunity to provide input into the process and whether that input is actively sought 
(278).  The State of Indiana‘s permit process provides the public and non-
governmental organizations with access to the decision-making process by requiring a 
public consultation period, although one that is much shorter than the period required 
by European and Portuguese law, lasting only five days.  As was the case with the 
Lusoponte consortium, the IDEM did notify local authorities about the permit, posted 
the documents online and in various departments and libraries in Whiting and 
Hammond, and organized one town hall meeting.  However, input from local 
governments and organizations outside the immediate area surrounding the refinery, 
including major cities such as Chicago that would be directly impacted by the 
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increase in pollution discharges into Lake Michigan, were not actively sought by the 
Indiana authorities.   
Bukowski argues that in the Vasco da Gama Bridge case, the expansion of 
access to the decision-making process only began after ―very active environmental 
groups using a variety of tactics and acting through formal and informal channels 
forced their way onto the decision-making stage‖ (294) and in the same way access to 
the permit process in the British Petroleum case was only opened up only after local 
government and the Cities Initiative organized a fierce public relations campaign 
through the media and other informal channels.  Shortly thereafter, the President of 
British Petroleum, Bob Malone, met with a delegation from Illinois led by 
Representative Judy Biggert who succeed in establishing an epistemic community 
around the issue by partnering British Petroleum with the Argonne National 
Laboratory and Purdue University Calumet to study alternate solutions to increased 
pollution discharges into Lake Michigan.  Subsequently, the EPA administrator for 
the Great Lakes, and British Petroleum President Bob Malone, helped organize a 
Lake Michigan Summit focusing on the Whiting Refinery expansion which included 
public officials from the state governments of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and 
Wisconsin, including officials from the City of Chicago and Cook County, members 
of Congress and other environmental organizations that were excluded from the 
original deliberations.  Furthermore, Indiana‘s anti-degradation policy review 
included an exhaustive series of stakeholder meetings and public consultations.  
Hence, the opposition did considerably expand access to the decision-making process. 
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In the third criteria, responsiveness, Bukowski asks, what were the responses 
of decision-makers to input from other parties and whether outcomes reflected that 
input (278).  It was clear in both cases that public officials were not responsive to 
initial public concerns and public input which itself was limited, thus following a 
similar pattern in other refinery expansions occurring around the basin.  For instance, 
a senior member of the Alliance for the Great Lakes, a major non-governmental 
organization, stated that his organization was collaborating closely with British 
Petroleum in the run-up to its formal application process as a technical advisor 
thereby introducing environmental considerations into the project. Nonetheless, 
despite these preparations, the formal permit did not reflect the state of the 
negotiations that had taken place.  In other words, the input was entertained, but 
essentially ignored (Alliance for the Great Lakes, interview, September 29, 2009). 
In a related criteria, representativeness and consensus-building capacity, 
Bukowski (2004) asks whether a variety of viewpoints are reflected in the policy 
process and whether some interests are given more weight than others (278).  Not 
only was input limited, and responsiveness stunted, but in both cases, it was apparent 
that ―private actors in the form of large corporations appeared to wield 
unaccountable, yet crucial, influence in the decision-making processes and results‖ 
(Bukowski 2004, 296) and that the government authorities responsible for the final 
decisions ―were biased in favor of corporate and local business interests at the 
expense of other viewpoints, notably environmental concerns‖ (Bukowski 2004, 296).  
Nonetheless, in both cases, the opposition was able to delay the policy process long 
enough for dissenting voices to get traction and force the government to weigh 
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alternate (i.e. environmental) considerations.  As Mayor Anderson observes, the 
British Petroleum process ―was designed to be put right through.  We were 
instrumental in making it put on hold‖ (GLSLCI, interview with Anderson, June 18, 
2009).  Eventually, the opposition succeeded in transforming what was a localized 
dispute involving few actors into a regional, and even national, process which 
involved officials from all the Great Lakes states, the United State Congress, and 
environmental groups and local governments from across the basin. 
In the final criteria, authoritativeness, Bukowski asks whether public 
authorities provided clear leadership and whether innovative solutions, ‗especially‘ in 
terms of public goods problems (i.e. bridge, water quality), were encouraged (278).  
In the Portuguese case, the government did in fact experiment with innovative 
solutions, by establishing the GATTEL at the very start of the bridge project thus 
formalizing an environmental policy network inclusive of a wide array of actors and 
viewpoints around the process which, not surprisingly, came up with innovative 
solutions reflecting a better balance of environmental and economic concerns.  Its 
recommendations were eventually ignored by the government which, like the IDEM 
in the British Petroleum refinery case, responded primarily to pressure from industry 
and emphasized economic considerations.  Such networks of public input quickly 
proved to be little more than window dressing.  Only after opposition was mobilized 
around the Great Lakes, did Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels, and IDEM 
Commissioner Thomas Easterly, agree to take part in the Lake Michigan Summit and 
undertake a long-delayed anti-degradation policy review. 
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In both cases, the Portuguese environmental groups and the groups 
spearheaded by the City of Chicago and the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities 
Initiative, improved all five criteria measuring the democratic legitimacy of the 
decision-making process, including transparency and accountability, access, 
responsiveness, authoritativeness, and representativeness. They also both succeeded 
in attaining what can be termed ‗first-stage‘ responses from their respective 
governments that are fairly moderate.  In Portugal, the response came in the form of 
the establishment of the Commission for Oversight and Construction (CAO), whose 
main purpose it has to be said was to deflect criticism rather than to genuinely 
augment accountability.  With regards to British Petroleum‘s permit process, the 
opposition succeeded in convincing the State of Indiana to organize a summit to 
invite previously excluded officials from other Great Lakes states to comment on the 
permit process, as well as to establish partnerships between British Petroleum and 
local research centers in order to search for alternative solutions.  Furthermore, the 
opposition precipitated a review of the State of Indiana‘s anti-degradation policies, a 
review which Governor Daniels himself admitted he was reluctant to initiate in the 
past due to the fact it would be costly both in terms of time and money. 
 
Difference in Opportunity leads to Differences in Strategy and Outcome 
The major difference between the effects non-central state actors had on the 
policy process and policy results of the Vasco da Gama Bridge and the British 
Petroleum refinery, is that the opposition in the former succeeded in provoking a 
‗second stage‘ response from the government that went significantly farther in terms 
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of environmental concessions and improvements to the policy process.  This 
difference resulted from the fact that the Portuguese environmental groups were able 
to resort to a ‗supranational option‘, recruiting allies in the form of the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Auditors to place 
even greater pressure on the Portuguese government by cultivating a credible threat 
that not only could the financing of the bridge be withheld, but that its very 
construction could be halted by the European Commission on the legal grounds that it 
violated the Birds and Habitat directives as well as the general rules of Cohesion 
Policy that was funding the project.   
Bukowski (2004) concludes that access to powerful supranational institutions 
gave the environmental groups the resources and legitimacy to provoke a second-
stage response from the Portuguese government, stating that ―access in Brussels 
ultimately gave them crucial means of forcing the government in Lisbon to respond to 
their viewpoints‖ (297), and not just entertain those viewpoints, and that ―the 
environmental NGOs were able to use both formal and informal points of access at 
the supranational level to pressure the Portuguese government to agree to and 
implement compensatory measures to alleviate damage to the environment caused by 
the bridge construction‖ (297), and also that ―particularly because of the 
characteristics and functioning of supranational institutions, sub-national societal 
groups may well have more points of access through which to influence decision 
making‖ (297).  In short, Bukowski (2004) concludes, ―the supranational level of the 
network becomes crucial‖ (294) to non-central state actors.   
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The virtual absence of supranational actors in the British Petroleum case and 
its effect verifies this argument.  In the British Petroleum case, the Great Lakes and 
St. Lawrence Cities Initiative did not have the option to resort to powerful 
supranational actors, nor could they refer to a supranational layer of legislation, in 
order to initiate and sustain increased pressure on the State of Indiana by threatening 
either legal or financial repercussions.  Neither the IJC nor the CEC were involved in 
the conflict, and thus could not provide any additional access points for local 
governments to influence decision-making.  Consequently, the opposition led by local 
government and the Cities Initiative was not able to cultivate a credible threat, hence 
they were not able to escalate the dispute and elicit more than a first-stage response 
from the government. 
Thus, we must temper our conclusions about the efficacy of local government 
mobilization in this case.  Even in the case of the anti-degradation review, though the 
IDEM was forced to undertake a comprehensive review of their anti-degradation 
policy, environmental groups for the most part argue that the gaps in the anti-
degradation policy identified in the Barnes Report are not being remedied.  For 
instance, the new anti-degradation draft rule put forth by IDEM proposes to set an 
‗insignificance‘ threshold that will allow facilities to increase their pollution 
incrementally without triggering the anti-degradation demonstration.  A senior 
counsel at the Environmental Law and Policy Center (ELPC), also argues, for 
example, that the IDEM wants to target only traditional pollutants of concern, which 
would allow many other pollutants—such as the ammonia and TSS involved in the 
British Petroleum case—to avoid stricter regulation.  Such loopholes according to the 
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senior counsel at ELPC ―guts the whole process‖ (Environmental Law and Policy 
Center, interview September 22, 2009).  In short, whereas in the Portuguese case the 
sustained pressure applied from the European Union meant that the initial success of 
the opposition carried through to significant and long-standing legal and political 
improvements, in the British Petroleum case, once the dust settled, the lack of 
sustained scrutiny and pressure has meant that the IDEM has carried through a 
regulatory review that maintains many of the fundamental flaws of its anti-
degradation policy. 
Another key point raised by Bukowski is that the Portuguese opposition 
groups ‗were able to use both formal and informal points of access‘, which indicates 
that they were imbedded in, and thus able to operate from, both Type I and Type II 
multilevel governance structures in pursuing their goals.  The previous chapter 
demonstrated that European non-central-state actors such as local governments are 
embedded in formal governance structures to a greater degree than North American 
local governments.  This is a key distinction with regards to the opposition groups in 
the refinery case whose influence depended almost completely on whether the IDEM 
was willing to grant them access to the decision-making process through informal 
channels, because IDEM controlled the permit process.  Although the permit 
contravened the spirit of the Clean Water Act, it was compliant with both federal and 
state laws, however flawed those laws may have been.  Hence, recourse to formal 
challenges, for example by mounting a successful legal challenge to the permit, was 
at best a strategy with uncertain results for the opposition.  As a result, IDEM and 
British Petroleum could have chosen to restrict the permit process entirely to the 
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formal sphere, to Type I governance structures.  They did not have to move beyond 
the formal procedures in order to establish epistemic communities, engage in a Lake 
Michigan Summit, or even undertake comprehensive stakeholder meetings during 
their anti-degradation review, in which case local governments and opposition groups 
could have easily been excluded from influencing the permit process entirely.  In 
other words, they could have stuck to a strict, formal definition of the pollution laws 
and rejected all negotiations and all collaboration leaving local government ‗on the 
outside looking in‘.  The IDEM held all the marbles.  To maintain some influence on 
the decision-making process, local governments had to keep the IDEM from closing 
the informal sphere.  In the Portuguese case, the opposition groups did not have to 
overly concern themselves with the government closing the formal avenues once they 
ascertained that recourse to formal supranational structures above the level of the 
nation-state would remain an open and viable alternative. 
Such an awareness of the political context on the part of the opposition to the 
British Petroleum permit meant that, instead of adopting a strident, combative 
position, as the Portuguese environmental groups did by attacking the very legal and 
financial foundations of the project, the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities 
Initiative, shorn of a credible threat, adopted a moderate response that emphasized a 
positive-sum result with the hope that this approach would persuade IDEM and 
British Petroleum to keep open the informal governance sphere and bring the 
discussion of the permit into Type II governance structures where non-central state 
actors could present their input.   
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IDEM and British Petroleum could easily have closed these informal spaces, 
and probably would have had that space presented a grave threat to the refinery 
project, but the balanced approach taken by the opposition, the strategy of ‗firm but 
fair‘, created an atmosphere where positive-sum results were attainable.  
Acknowledging and balancing both economic and environmental concerns gave the 
Cities Initiative instant credibility in the region and, through that credibility, political 
entrée.  To repeat an earlier statement by Mayor Dave Ross of Superior, Wisconsin,  
There are organizations that get up and just scream, and they tell tales 
of disaster and impending calamity without coming to the table with 
science, reasoning, for their opposition.  The credibility of the Great 
Lakes mayors happens because we came to the table with real science.  
We came to the table with another unique perspective.  We didn‘t just 
flat out oppose the Whiting expansion. We simply asked that the 
expansion include the best available technology (GLSLCI, interview 
with Ross, June 18, 2009). 
 
In turn, according to a senior member of the Alliance for the Great Lakes, by 
voluntarily agreeing to operate below the pollution limits of its new permit, British 
Petroleum was acknowledging that ―there is room for collaboration and not just 
working through a combative process‖ (Alliance for the Great Lakes, interview, 
September 29, 2009).   
This measured, collaborative approach was also adopted by other public 
officials in the region.  In mid-July, the Chairman and President of British Petroleum, 
Bob Malone, met with Illinois Representative Judy Biggert and a delegation from 
Illinois to discuss the permit.  In a statement that reflects the balanced position taken 
by the Cities Initiative, Biggert argued that a trade-off between economic and 
environmental security should be narrowed as much as possible, stating, 
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There‘s no question that America needs to expand domestic energy 
production, but we must find long-term solutions that protect the 
environment in the process…early indications suggest that the permit 
and the refinery are compliant with the law…But with emerging 
technology, it shouldn‘t be necessary to permit more ammonia and 
mercury to be dumped into the lake.  That means going beyond just 
determining what‘s legal and what isn‘t, and finding ways to do even 
better (quoted in Augustine 2008, 7). 
 
In a sense, it is going beyond the formal mechanisms of government. 
Local governments, and the Cities Initiative, utilized the ‗weapons of the 
weak‘ (Cram 1, 2007) such as dissemination of information, referencing values, and 
public shaming in order to persuade, rather than force, the IDEM and Governor 
Daniels to voluntarily introduce improvements to the policy result and the policy 
process.  For example, Mayor Daley himself took every opportunity to acknowledge 
that he was not opposed to the expansion of the refinery itself, but to the fact that 
IDEM and British Petroleum did not practice due diligence in seeking out alternatives 
to the increased pollution, did not justify why such pollution was necessary, nor did 
they attempt to incorporate other environmental measures or projects that could offset 
the initiative environmental costs of the expansion.  A verbal salvo that typified this 
approach came from the executive director of the Cities Initiative, David Ullrich, who 
stated that, ―I find it very difficult to believe that a company such as British 
Petroleum, which has earned more than $62 billion in profits over the past three 
years, is the third most profitable company on the planet, and bills itself as a ‗green‘ 
petroleum company, does not have the technical and financial resources to solve this 
problem‖ (GLSLCI, Ullrich testimony in front of Chicago City Council, 2007).  
Recourse to reasoned argument, to persuasion rather than intimidation and force, on 
the part of the opposition meant that British Petroleum and IDEM not only 
320  
recognized the inadequacy of conducting policy through purely formal venues but, as 
Congresswoman Biggert‘s aforementioned statement suggests, they were willing to 
move beyond what was legal, and that meant opening up, and operating from within, 
more informal, Type II governance structures that were accommodating of a greater 
array of actors and viewpoints. 
The opposition to the British Petroleum permit was not only an important 
watershed moment in terms of the external relations of the Great Lakes and St. 
Lawrence Cities Initiative and the role local government assumes in water quality 
governance in the Great Lakes basin, but it also represented an important test for the 
internal governance of a young transnational municipal network.  As discussed 
earlier, maintaining cohesion and consistency within transnational municipal 
networks is a primary concern and the British Petroleum case forced the Cities 
Initiative to wade into a dispute with economic consequences for many of their key 
members that could have exposed new fault lines.  Blatter (2001) observes that cross-
border coalitions in North America ―have not been able…to overcome territorial 
identities and loyalties in policy disputes which are characterized by high material 
interdependencies‖ (201) and that cross-border institutions ―are not strong enough to 
play a significant role in policy conflicts with distributive consequences across the 
national border‖ (202).   
The dispute over British Petroleum does not quite fit into the category of a 
dispute across national borders, since it was not framed in terms of Canadian versus 
American interests.  For such an analysis, it would be better to analyze the response 
of the Cities Initiative and its membership to the ‗Buy American‘ provisions in the 
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American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009), the so-called ‗Stimulus Bill‘, 
which has strained relations to the degree that, on June 6, 2009, the Federation of 
Canadian Municipalities passed a resolution which threatened to shut American 
companies out of the bidding process from Canadian municipal contracts.  However, 
the British Petroleum case definitely contained distributive consequences and 
demonstrates high material interdependencies that had the potential to fragment the 
organization across state lines, across national identities, and between those cities 
whose economies are tied to the refining industry and those who are not.   
In this last context, the fact that Mayor Ross, whose own city will soon break 
ground on a multi-billion dollar refinery expansion linked to the Canadian oil sands, 
stated that he was ―not only opposing, but vehemently spoke out against the permit in 
Indiana‖ (GLSLCI, interview with Ross, June 18, 2009), illustrates how membership 
in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative may well allow local 
governments to overcome their localized territorial identities and loyalties in favor of 
a basin-wide consciousness.  Mayor Ross is the mayor of Superior, Wisconsin, where 
Murphy Oil has unveiled plans to undertake a massive $6 billion expansion of its 
refinery.  Mayor Ross could have easily ‗sat out‘ this dispute for fear that his 
involvement could destabilize or jeopardize such a major investment in his city.  Ross 
states, 
We had strong discussions in my own administration. Should I get 
involved in BP and would it come back and bite me when it came to 
advocating the Murphy Oil expansion.  We had a long conversation 
about that. I knew down the road I was going to be standing in front of 
the microphones and be asked about the BP question (GLSLCI, 
interview with Ross, June 18, 2009). 
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Despite these concerns, Mayor Ross was one of the signatories of the letter to 
Commissioner Easterly vigorously protesting the British Petroleum permit.   
Mayor Ross argues, what helped him decide to actively oppose the permit was 
the fact that the plans for the Murphy Oil expansion in his city set a higher 
environmental standard which exposed the inadequate measures undertaken by 
British Petroleum in its own expansion.  Ross states, 
We didn‘t just blindly sign onto the Cities Initiative‘s effort to exact 
changes in the Indiana permit.  We thought, let‘s scorecard this thing 
and see how does Murphy Oil in Superior measure up to BP Whiting, 
Indiana, and there was such a stark contrast in what Indiana was 
allowing that if the BP expansion was going to be happening in 
Superior under that permit I would have vehemently opposed it, 
because in all of our conversations with Murphy Oil about this 
proposed expansion we exacted promises from the company that they 
would use best available technology. They have put in place over $80 
million in pollution enhancements.  What really put us over the top, I 
think they [British Petroleum] only had to invest $150 million to bring 
water quality standards to permissible levels so that their discharges 
into the lake would be as good as Murphy‘s are into our lake.  When 
you compare those dollars to the overall cost of the expansion it was 
miniscule.  So, based on that, I found it easy to get involved in the BP 
case (GLSLCI, interview with Ross, June 18, 2009). 
 
This statement reflects a search for positive-sum results and a concern for balancing 
economic and environmental concerns which demonstrates an understanding of the 
role local government can play around the basin.  To repeat Mayor Anderson‘s 
statement, ―the vision is to eventually be known as a positive and constructive 
resource for provincial, federal, and state governing bodies as well as industry, so that 
they are looking at us as a balance‖ (GLSLCI, interview with Anderson, June 
18,2009).   
Mayor Ross is able to strike a middle ground by pushing for higher 
environmental standards to be included in refinery expansion projects while 
323  
simultaneously stating that he is a proponent of the oil sands industry and refinery 
expansion.  One can make the argument, of course, that the British Petroleum refinery 
was not expanding in his own backyard but hundreds of miles to the south and thus 
had no immediate economic impact on his community.  Yet, what is significant, 
however, is that this statement illustrates the mayor‘s deep engagement in an issue 
despite that distance, one that crossed state lines, demonstrating that his concerns 
radiated beyond the local to the regional, to a constituency defined not by his city 
limits but by the perimeter of the Great Lakes basin. 
Finally, the British Petroleum case served as a kind of ‗coming out‘ party for 
the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative, which served to further embed the 
network within the governance structures around the basin.  Mayor Ross argues, ―it 
put us at the table when it comes to visibility.  You couldn‘t pick up a newspaper 
anywhere in the United States referencing the BP permit and not see one of our 
members being quoted‖ (GLSLCI, interview with Ross, June 18, 2009).   
As the Great Lakes states inevitably move forward with the next wave of 
refinery expansions, the Cities Initiative appears to have committed itself to playing 
an oversight role with regards to the pollution permit process which precedes such 
expansions.  Ross argues,  
if the Murphy Oil plant expands, it is incumbent upon this 
organization, the Great Lakes mayors, to scrutinize this expansion with 
all its energy, because I think its healthy that our organization has 
begun to question a number of water issues, air quality issues, 
concerning industry within the Great Lakes basin.  We have 
encouraged Murphy Oil that in the future…they would fully engage 
not only with the founders of our organization but with the mayors 
(GLSLCI, interview with Ross, June 18, 2009). 
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Organized local governments have injected themselves into the center of a 
regional, national, and continental debate that is slowly beginning to gather 
public attention by offering industry a valuable service.  As Mayor Anderson 
stated, ―we can help them [industry] make choices where they‘re not going to 
end up on the front page‖ like British Petroleum (GLSLCI, interview with 
Anderson, June 18, 2009), but that is possible only if they cities are included 
in the decision-making process and their concerns given serious consideration.  
More importantly, it is no longer the case that a negotiation over refinery 
expansions is a localized matter between one oil company and one city.  The 
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative has demonstrated its potential 
to mobilize thirteen million pairs of eyes to scrutinize whether a proper 
balance between economic and environmental concerns has been met in the 
basin. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In his address to the Canadian Parliament on May 17, 1961, United States 
President John F. Kennedy famously said, ―Geography has made us neighbors. 
History has made us friends.  Economics has made us partners.  And necessity has 
made us allies‖.  Yet, it is the environment, and the necessity of governing the 
common geography of shared watersheds and other ecosystems, which may finally 
bring the two countries together as equals.  This leveling of the historically 
asymmetrical bilateral relations between Canada and the United States is already 
evident at the level of local government, particularly in the relationship between 
American and Canadian local governments interacting on equal terms within the 
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative towards a common goal of balancing 
the economic-environmental nexus. 
Cross-border environmental cooperation between local governments is 
increasingly becoming a vital instrument for managing the waters of the Great Lakes 
basin and a vital component in managing the bilateral environmental relations 
between Canada and the United States which were once the exclusive domain of 
federal governments.  Their growing involvement in the Regional Collaboration, the 
Canada-Ontario Agreement (COA), the International Joint Commission (IJC) and 
through a recently established and heretofore non-existent trilateral intergovernmental 
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forum are but a few examples that testify to the democratization of bilateral 
environmental relations around the Great Lakes basin. 
The opening up of the decision-making process to local government has been 
the result of both ‗top-down‘ and ‗bottom-up‘ processes that have led to the 
emergence and expansion of a multilevel governance approach in the management of 
shared ecosystems.  The re-balancing of federal-sub-national relations and the 
adoption of a collaborative approach to intergovernmental relations has opened up 
political space for informal Type-II governance structures to emerge within the basin 
alongside traditional, long-standing, formal, Type-I governance mechanisms.  These 
complementary, informal Type-II governance structures have given local 
governments more access points through which to influence the decision-making 
process.  At the same time, local governments have not been mere passive 
beneficiaries of the re-balancing of intergovernmental relations, but have actively 
sought to extend their policy capacity through savvy political entrepreneurialism and 
pluck.  Nowhere is this more evident than in the establishment of the Great Lakes and 
St. Lawrence Cities Initiative which has become the main vehicle for the increased 
participation of local government in decision-making forums in the basin. 
The emergence of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative is 
remarkable for the simple fact that the institutionalization of cross-border cooperation 
between American and Canadian local governments was deemed improbable under 
the ‗competitive-city paradigm‘ proposed by Brunet-Jailly (2004).  It was argued that 
non-central state actors in North America were incapable of transcending severe 
market forces (Blatter 2001; Brunet-Jailly 2004) or institutional barriers to cross-
327  
border cooperation (Norman 2009) particularly in the absence of mediating 
supranational structures.  The fundamental shortcoming of these and other previous 
studies into cross-border relations is an overestimation of the effect of supranational 
institutions and market forces combined with an underestimation of the capacity of 
non-central state actors such as local governments to mobilize in the face of severe 
market pressures and in the absence of supranational support. 
The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative is the first and only 
transnational municipal network operating across the shared border between Canada 
and the United States.  Hence, this dissertation represents the ‗first-cut‘ in our 
examination of North American transnational municipal networks.  It also provides 
the first comparative analysis between European and North American transnational 
municipal networks.  The comparative analysis of the Vasco da Gama Bridge in 
Portugal and the British Petroleum refinery in Indiana has been particularly 
illuminating, yielding three preliminary findings. 
First, the institutionalization of multilevel governance and local government in 
formal, Type-I governance structures goes deeper in Europe than in North America, 
while the development of supranational level institutions also goes farther in Europe, 
thereby creating a more favorable political climate for European non-central state 
actors such as local governments by providing them with greater political 
opportunities and resources to institutionalize their cooperation and influence 
decision-making.  In particular, the strength of the supranational-local nexus is 
positively correlated with the policy capacity of non-central state actors such as local 
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governments to expand their administrative capacity and influence the policymaking 
process. 
Second, although the support of supranational actors is important for the 
formative stages of transnational municipal networks, such support is not necessary 
for their initial emergence.  This finding challenges the hypothesis proposed by Duina 
(2006) and Brunet-Jailly (2004), which states that robust supranational structures are 
necessary preconditions for the institutionalization of cross-border cooperation by 
non-central state actors.  The Cities Initiative demonstrates that the only condition 
necessary for the emergence of transnational municipal networks is the lack of 
opposition from higher tiers of government and a desire on the part of local 
government to organize. 
Third, the persistent existential uncertainty stemming from a combined lack of 
formal constitutional authority in external environmental relations, their exclusion 
from formal Type-I governance structures, and the lack of supranational allies and 
resources, predisposes North American transnational municipal networks to behave as 
bridge-builders, eschewing conflict, and seeking positive-sum gains in its relations 
with other actors.  Even when disputes with higher tiers of government materialize, as 
in the British Petroleum case, local governments are careful to balance the interests of 
competing actors rather than challenge them outright, they utilize persuasion over 
power and other weapons of the weak, and avoid a strident posture that could provoke 
the higher tiers of government from eliminating access points by closing Type-II 
channels. 
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However, despite these limitations, the British Petroleum case also 
demonstrates that local governments can overcome the ‗dark side‘ of network 
governance (Peterson and O‘Toole, 2001) and improve the democratic quality of both 
the policy result and the policymaking process, thereby answering the challenge by 
Peters and Pierre (2004) to demonstrate whether multilevel governance means 
something more than multilevel participation.  The cross-case analysis of the refinery 
and the bridge did, however, demonstrate that non-central state actors are more 
effective under conditions where the supranational infrastructure is well developed 
and where the supranational-local nexus is well established. 
This dissertation confirms the observations by Peterson and O‘Toole (2001) 
and Peters and Pierre (2004) about the ‗dark side‘ of the shift towards network 
governance.  The retrenchment on the part of the United States federal government 
from environmental management, the devolution of authority for environmental 
policymaking to the provinces and the states, and the move towards multilevel 
governance around the Great Lakes basin has opened up an accountability gap that 
has undermined water management and water quality in the basin.  This development 
makes the mobilization of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative as a 
potential oversight agent, as demonstrated in the British Petroleum refinery case, that 
much more significant.  The word potential is stressed, however, pointing to the fact 
that the Cities Initiative successfully mobilized opposition to one refinery expansion 
while ignoring others.  By recognizing this selective strategic behavior on the part of 
the Cities Initiative we reject the notion that the characteristics of a given scale can be 
assumed a priori and thus we avoid the local trap (Brown and Purcell 2005).  At the 
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same time, we invite future studies to examine this strategic behavior on the part of 
the Cities Initiative further. 
Apart from its practical application to public policy, the study of transnational 
municipal networks as sui generis contributes to our theoretical understanding of 
transnational actors by challenging our conceptual division between state and non-
state actors.  The unique fundamental duality of transnational municipal networks, 
which are constituted as non-state actors and govern their internal and external 
relations as non-state actors, yet as a constellation of individual local governments are 
moored to the hierarchical federal structure and thus governed by the inherent 
hierarchical intergovernmental power relations of the federal state, undermines our 
traditional understanding of a civil society organized versus the state.  Furthermore, 
the claim that within network governance ―the boundary between organizations and 
public and private sectors has become permeable‖ (Stoker 1998, 38) is no longer what 
is novel about network governance.  What is novel about network governance, at least 
in the form of transnational municipal networks, is that this boundary between the 
public and the private is effaced. 
The emerging literature on North American transnational municipal networks 
will undoubtedly benefit from more sustained comparative analyses with their 
European counterpart.  Specifically, studies into the ability of transnational municipal 
networks to successfully influence the policymaking decision of higher tiers of 
government are non-existent within the European context.  This gap is the basis for a 
major limitation of the cross-case comparison utilized in this dissertation, in that 
whereas the case of the environmental opposition to the bridge in Portugal focused on 
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local environmental groups as the unit of analysis, the case of the environmental 
opposition to the refinery in Indiana focused specifically on a transnational municipal 
network.  Future studies should be able to identify, and compare, the behavior and 
fortunes of European and North American transnational municipal networks in 
similar circumstances. 
At the same time, it would be worthwhile to examine the other cross-border 
regions in North America in order to determine why transnational municipal networks 
have emerged in some places and not in others.  There is also a need for a more 
systematic quantitative analysis of how participation in the network has changed the 
perceptions, interests and strategies of member cities in order to determine whether 
and how they are able to break the bounds of the competitive-city paradigm and 
overcome their constitutional constraints. 
Ironically, perhaps, constitutional changes or even greater formal 
institutionalization of local policy capacity is not called for, since, it is argued, it is 
exactly their sense of vulnerability stemming from their weak formal powers which 
drives local governments to seek positive-sum solutions within the basin and to 
constantly act as bridges between other actors over which water policy agreements 
and strategies are forged.  However, it is argued that local governments must be made 
full partners alongside federal, state and provincial counterparts in all forums related 
to environmental management in the basin, and that resources in the form of political 
legitimacy and financial support for local cross-border cooperation be extended and 
enhanced.  This can be achieved immediately and most notably by strengthening 
cooperation between transnational municipal networks and supranational actors—in 
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other words, between the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Cities Initiative and 
NAFTA‘s Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC)—thereby 
strengthening the supranational-local nexus.  In this way the political legitimacy and 
policy capacity of both the supranational and local level will be increased, the 
accountability within the environmental governance system around the Great Lakes 
stands a better chance of improving, and the economic-environmental nexus at the 
heart of bilateral relations between Canada and the United States may find a better 
balance.   
Finally, that local governments possess a new voice, new platforms and new 
instruments is itself a significant development, and although it can be said that local 
governments around the Great Lakes speak softly and carry a small stick, in the final 
calculation, within a multilevel governance setting where authority is shared, that 
may very well be their greatest strength and the clearest justification for an even 
greater inclusion of local government within the governing structure. 
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